A phenomenological analysis of the psychological manifestations of ontic conscience as derived from Heidegger's ontological conception of that phenomenon by Parker, Michael Alan
Grahamstown 
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MANIFESTATIONS OF ONTIC CONSCIENCE AS DERIVED 
FROM HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF THAT 
PHENOMENON 
MICHAEL ALAN PARKER 
A thesis submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts 
in Psychology, Rhodes University 
February 1985 
... In order to arrive there, 
Tb arrive where you are, to get from where you are not, 
You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy. 
In order to arrive at what you do not know 
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance. 
In order to possess what you do not possess 
You must go by the way of dispossession. 
In order to arrive at what you are not 
You must go through the way in which you are not. 
And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
And what you own is what you do not own 
And where you are is where you are not. 
T. S. Eliot 
* IIEast COker II (lines 
135-146) of Four Quartets 
* 
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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study was to investigate antic conscience, as derived 
from Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience, as it i s li ved 
in concrete experience. Having established, through a close examination 
of Heidegger's writings on conscience, a question which would elicit 
actual experience of this phenomenon, the researcher collected sixty-
four written accounts of these experiences. Of these he chose the 
four psychologically richest accounts and, having interviewed each 
of these four subjects on his situated experience, analysed in detail 
(using the phenomenological method) the resulting protocols comprising 
the written accounts and interviews. He then explicated the structure 
of conscience within its context of authenticity and inauthenticity. 
The context of conscience was discovered to be such that the person, 
having surrendered himself to others ' experience and expectations of 
him, lives a pretence in the service of (inauthentically) being-for-
others. He loses his sense of (bodily) self in the process, and it 
is at this point of his living at the extremes of inauthenticity, that 
he is forced to realise his own (authentic) reality which he has hither-
to been concealing both from himself and from others. His primary 
attunement is reflected in feelings of betrayal, guilt, shame, dread 
and ambivalence. Through openly and resolutely living his authentic 
experience, he heals the rupture in his existence between what is 
revealed (his being-for-others) and what is concealed (his authentic 
experience), and feels liberated in so doing. This structure of 
conscience was dialogued with the writings of existential and psycho-
analytic philosophers and psychologists in the context of discussing 
particular areas of psychological significance such as self} others , 
meaning, awareness and psychotherapy . 
(iii) 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. I NTRODUCTION 
1 .1 Aims 
In the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the most consistent goal of 
which was to establish a fundamental ontology, the ontological is in-
extricably bound to the ontic; every ontological · notion is rooted in 
corresponding ontic experience. As Mehta (1976 ) says: 
UIn Being and Time, Heidegger proceeds from the phenomenal 
and the 'existenziell' to the phenomenological and the 
'existenzial', from the facts of experience to the disclosure 
of the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, 
from the 'antic I to the 'ontological' II (p. 40). 
Accordingly, Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience must have 
as its basis certain corresponding antic experiences. It is the 
primary aim of this study to arrive at these concrete experiences that 
might reveal ontically the implicit presence of conscience as ontological, 
and to analyse these experiences phenomenologically from a psychological 
perspective so as to bring to light their basic structure. It is hoped 
that through this exercise, the psychological meaning of this particular 
phenomenon of conscience will become manifest. 
It should be stressed that this is not a study of conscience in general, 
but explicitly of Heidegger's particular view of conscience. This is 
an important point since Heidegger's definitions of conscience , as he 
himself admits II ••• cannot be brought into harmony at once with the 
ordinary interpretation. Indeed, they seem to be in. direct conflict 
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with it" (Heidegger, 1980, p.289)1. Furthermore, the present study 
should in no way be regarded as an empirical IItesting" of the validity 
of Heidegger's claims concerning conscience at the antic level: his 
philosophy has brought this phenomenon to light in a most original way, 
and will be taken as the point of departure for a psychological in-
vestigation of the phenomenon. What emerges from the present empirical 
analysis of conscience2 will be dialogued with Heidegger's ontological 
claims concerning conscience, but there is no intention to prove or 
disprove his claims. 
It is believed that a study of conscience as the phenomenon that appears 
at the interface between being-inauthentic and being-authentic (as will 
be clarified later), would be a valuable undertaking, especially in 
view of the fact that this area has received very little, if any, 
attention in psychological research. In the current edition of the 
Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms (1977) of Psychological Abstracts, 
the terms lIauthentic"/llinauthentic" do not even appear, and under the 
heading "Conscience" o ne finds "Psycho analytic Personality Factors" and 
"Superego", which suggests that this extremely complex phenomenon has 
been reduced to the limited interpretation provided by a particular 
paradigm (viz. that of psychoanalysis). It is hoped that this study 
might elucidate (more primordial and fundamental) dimensions of conscience 
1page references to Be~ng and Tlme lndlcate the pagination of the later ' 
German editions, as shown in the outer margins of the text cited. 
2Henceforth "conscience" should be understood to mean Heidegger's view 
of conscience specifically, unless otherwise stated or implied by the 
context in which it appears. 
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which have thus far largely been neglected by contemporary psychology. 
1 .2 Rationale 
What follows might appear to be too condensed and not immediately clear, 
but will become more comprehensible when seen in the light of the 
section on Heidegger appearing in the literature review. Much detail 
has been omitted here so as to avoid undue overlap between this section 
and the next. 
As has already been noted, Heidegger's (ontological) interpretation of 
conscience does not coincide with the ordinary everyday interpretation 
of it. He considers the ordinary interpretation to be lI ontologically 
suspect" in principle, since, insofar as everyday Dasein is inauthentic, 
its understanding of conscience is bound also to be inauthentic; its 
characterisation of conscience will adhere to what "they" know as the 
conscience. As Heidegger (1980) puts it: 
"If indeed Dasein understands itself proximally and for 
the most part in terms of that with which it concerns 
itself, and if it interprets all its ways of behaving as 
concern, then will not there be falling and concealment 
in its interpretation of that very way of its Being which, 
as a call, seeks to bring it back from its lostness in the 
concerns of the 'they' ? II (p. 289) . 
Although on page 281 of the same work, he concedes that "whatever the 
ways in which conscience is experienced or interpreted, all cur experiences 
'agree' on this 'Guilty! III (i.e. all experiences of conscience point to 
one's being- guilty), the existential (as distinct from existentiell) 
conception of this Being-guilty differs from the everyday conception . 
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Whereas in the everyday conception, which is regarded as being derived 
from the existential sense of rlBe ing-guil ty", guilt is regarded as "an 
indebtedness which has 'arisen' through some deed done or left undone" 
(ibid., p.287), existentially (ontologically) speaking, Dasein is guilty 
regardless of its acts and/or omissions; "Dasein as such is guilty U 
(ibid., p. 285). Dasein is guilty in the very basis of its being in 
that it is the basis of a lack or nullity (and hence is indebted) both 
in its thrownness and in its projection1 This might be understood in 
existentiell (antic) terms as f o llows: in my thrownness, as a male born in 
South Africa, I ' am the basis of a lack insofar as I cannot simultaneously 
be a female born in France; in my projection, in choosing to become a 
psychologist I am the basis of a lack in that I thereby exclude the 
possibility of being something which is incompatible with being a 
psychologist. 
This primordial Being-guilty "remains proximally and for the most part 
undisclosed!!, it is "kept closed off by Dasein's falling Being ll , and 
"Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it" (ibid., 
p.286, original emphasis). Indeed, conscience, insofar as it is that 
which calls Dasein back from its lostness in the "they" to its funda-
mental Being-guilty, is possible only because Dasein closes itself off 
from itself as Being-guilty in the first place . 
It is not only the case that Dasein, in its everydayness ) is shut Qff 
1 '1 f' GU1 t as re err1ng to a lack or owing is bette r reflected in the 
German} where Schuld means "indebtedness" among other things (see foot-
note 1 in Heidegger, 1980, p.280). 
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from the ontological level of Being, but also that "to Dasein the pri-
mordially appropriate ontological way of formulating questions remains 
alien" (ibid., p . 281). If our goal is t o understand guilt (and hence 
conscience) at the ontological level, then 
" ... the idea of 'Guilty!' must be sufficiently formalised 
so that those ordinary phenomena of 'guilt' which are re-
lated to our concernful Being with Others, will drop out. 
The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the domain 
of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must 
also be detached from relationship to any law or ought such 
that by failing to comply to it one loads himself with guilt" 
(ibid., p. 283). 
Since it is the explicit aim of this study to disclose conscience as it 
is ontologically understood, it is necessary to formulate a research 
question which bypasses the everyday "fallen" interpretation of con-
science, and which yields descriptions of conscience (and guilt) which 
are ontologically more revealing. It is here that the present study 
differs significantly from that of Brooke (1983) on being-guilty. His 
research question asked subjects to describe ordinarYJ everyday experiences 
of guilt (Brooke, 1983 , p. 80). Hence at the level of the naive description 
(raw data) in his research, he had access only to the fallen, non-ontological 
interpretation of guilt. Consequently, any claims he makes about onto-
logical guilt (and he does make such claims), are unlikely to have 
emerged t oo readily from the protocols themselves. Ontological themes 
of guilt, if in evidence at all, are likely to be only deeply implicit 
in such descriptions, and claims concerning such themes are likely to be 
informed more by existential/phenomenological literature than by the 
protocols themselves. The intent of the above is not to criticise 
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Brooke's findings per se, but merely to point out that, owing to his 
point of departure (his research question), he has not fully addressed 
the ontological interpretation of guilt and conscience. 
What follows is the rationale in support of the particular research 
question to be implemented in this study. 
For Heidegger, conscience is the call back to its own self of the 
authentic self to the inauthentic self J or the "they" self J that is 
caught up in the world. It follows, therefore, that no call of con-
science can be experienced unless one is being inauthentic, for without 
one's be~ng inauthentic there would be no "lostness in the 'they'" 
(Heidegger, 1980, p.307) from which one might call oneself back to being 
oneself authentically. Heidegger acknowledges this when he says: "The 
'good' conscience is neither a self-subsistent form of conscience, nor a 
founded form of consciencei in short, it is not a conscience-phenomenon 
at all" (ibid., p. 292). Although we might talk about "good" conscience1 , 
it is never experienced as suchi IIgood" conscience is not a phenomenon. 
So long as one is being authentic (and thus J presumably, living in "good II 
conscience), one does not experience conscience at alIi the experience 
of conscience is reserved for those moments when one is steeped most 
deeply in being inauthentic. It should be noted that the terms 
rrauthentic" and "inauthentic II are not used in a loose sense by Heidegger: 
1 It should be noted that in everyday terms we might speak of "good 
conscience" but not in Heideggerls (ontological) terms. Man (Dasein) 
is guilty as such , even when he is being authenticj he simply owns 
his guilt in authenticity. 
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" . . . these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict 
sense" (ibid. J p. 43). The term "authentic" is a translation of the 
German eigentlich which contains the root eigen meaning !lawn II J as in 
"my ownl! (Gelven, 1970, p. 161). So when we speak of "authentic" 
selfhood or lIauthentic 11 existence I we mean that self or existence which 
is uniquely my own. So if one wants a description of a person's in-
authentic-being (in which conscience is most likely to be experienced), 
one needs to ask him to describe a situation in which he failed to 
appropriate or live out that experience or self which was uniquely his 
own. Experience, self and world (situation) are inseparable: experience 
is always grounded in a particular situation (i.e. in-the-world), and the 
self which experiences is always in-the-world. As Heidegger (1980) says, 
"in saying I I I Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world" (p. 321). 
Furthermore, the self does not understand itself in terms of an isolated 
subjectivity which needs to be introspected for there to be self -under-
standing, but rather IIhas a tendency to understand itself in terms of the 
' world ' with which it is concerned" (ibid., p. 321). As Van den Berg 
(presumably following Heidegger's thought) has observed, the psychologist 
" .. . gains knowledge of the subject by inquiring about his objects, about 
the solid , real things of the world" (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 39). So 
if we wish to understand a person (the person's self) either in his 
being-authentic or being-inauthentic, we need to look to his world, how 
the world appears to him. "Our world is our home, a realisation of 
subjectivity:: (ibid., p . 40) . We do not ask him to describe himself. 
Taking the above into account, then J the following was formulated as 
the question which might best elicit experiences of conscience: 
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"Describe as concretely and accurately as possible, 
a situation in which you felt you were not being true 
to yourself." 
The subject is asked to describe a situation (not himself) since pre-
reflectively one lives situations, and is never directly present to 
oneself but only silently present to oneself in one's presence to the 
world. The request for concreteness in the description emphasises 
this point. This way of phrasing the question might then yield a 
description which is suitably naive for phenomenological analysis . 
The specific meaning intended by Heidegger in his use of the term 
"inauthentic" is translated into everyday language in terms of IInot 
being true to oneselflO. 
The present study, then, in view of the meaning and context of the 
conscience in the philosphy of Heidegger, will have more to say about 
inauthentic existence and its modification into authentic existence, 
than about guilt as it is experienced and interpreted in everyday life . 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In that this thesis is a study of conscience explicitly in relation to 
Heidegger's ontological conception of conscience, the review which 
follows will be of literature which has bearing on this particular 
conception. Some of the authors represented here (e.g. Laing) may not 
refer to "conscience" as such in their writings, as "conscience" as 
commonly conceived in contemporary psychology approximates more closely 
the Freudian conception of "superego" than it does Heidegger I s view. 
However, once the meaning of Heidegger's conception of this phenomenon 
has been grasped, it should become clear how the writings of these 
other authors have a bearing on conscience at the level of structure. 
2.1 Historical origins 
"Conscience II J as "a fundamental anthropological fact transcending all 
empirical psychology" (Zwi Werblowsky, 1970, p. 83), appears in our 
linguistic usage as a translation of the classical terms syneidesis} 
conscientiae The original meaning of IIconsciencell is primarily a 
"knowing-wi th" : the Greek syneidesis Ii terally means "the self knowing 
wi th or observing itself" (Bromley, 1979, p. 762); the Latin conscientia 
is derived from con meaning "with" J and "scire" J meaning "to know". 
Hence "conscience" and "consciousness" (llcon -scious -ness") both derive 
So .. ~- ... w .. o.l... basic and fundamei"ltal to con~c;ience 
is not morality but self-awareness. Gonsciousness has been defined in 
terms of an awareness of being aware: animals are aware, but only man, 
being conscious (knowing-with), is aware that he is aware. Whatever 
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man knows or experiences, it is always tlwith": his IInaturalness" 
and lIimmediacy" are destroyed through his being conscious. Man is 
aware of tha t awareness which he iS J and he is never more aware of this 
awareness than in conscience . As Smith (1934) has it, nif conscious-
ness normally represents a cleavage of nature, then conscience represents 
a further crack in what is cleft" (p. 20). 
Since Heidegger's task was to establish a fundamental ontology, it should 
not be surprising to find that his interpretation of conscience should 
hail back to conscience as it originally came into being. And, indeed, 
his interpretation reflects conscience as o~iginally understood in at 
least two important respects: 
1. conscience is not concerned primarily with the moral 
evaluation of particular actions; it is more con-
cerned with life/existence as it is lived as a whole; 
2. conscience is concerned with the relationship of the 
self to itself: in the original conception conscience 
(syneidesis) is the self knowing with or observing 
itself; for Heidegger conscience is the call of the 
authentic self to the inauthentic ("they") self. 
So although Heidegger's conception of conscience might seem idiosyncratic 
in view of c o ntemporary understanding (of conscience as superego), 
it is not cut off from the roots of conscience as such. 
- 11 -
The following quotation from Jaspers reflects points 1 and 2 above 
and hints at Heidegger's view of conscience: 
"Conscience gives me detachment from myself. I 
am not subjected to myself as to a being-in-the-
world that is given and merely enacted. I act 
upon myself and out of my being-in-the-world produce 
what I am, so far as lies within my power. Between 
my being-in-the-world and my being authentically 
myself, not yet revealed to me, is interposed the 
reality of conscience, through which I must acknow-
ledge or reject what for me should become being" 
(cited in Zwi Werblowsky, 1970, p.86). 
2.2 He idegger 
Heidegger's view of the nature of conscience cannot be considered apart 
from his descriptions of inauthentic and authentic modes of being and 
the distinction he draws between the two. What also needs to be 
considered is resoluteness, as used by Heidegger to describe that 
authentic existence which is attested to by the will to have a conscience. 
What follows, then, will be an explication of: 
a) the inauthentic and authentic modes of being, each 
in terms of its corresponding existentiell (ontic ) 
variations of the fundamental existential (ontological) con-
stitution of the "there ll of Dase in ("Being-there"). The 
inauthentic mode will be described in some detail: 
firstlY,becaus e it is out of this mode of being 
that conscience arises, and secondly, since Heidegger's 
observations in this area at the antic leve l, are a source of 
rich psychological insight; 
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b) the conscience as a call from the authentic self 
to the inauthentic self irrunersed in the IIthey" i 
c) resoluteness as a description of authentic existence. 
It seems appropriate, however, to begin with a brief note on the 
existential constitution of the "there", as the background against 
which inauthentic and authentic being will be seen. 
The explication which follows stems primarily from Heidegger's Being 
and Time (1980), in dialogue with an extensive consultation of the 
following secondary sources: Gelven (1970), Langan (1959), Ie Fevre 
(1962), Macquarrie (1968) and Mehta (1976). 
2.2 .. 1 The existential constitution of the "there" 
Human existence, or Dasein, is essentially an openness to the world, 
the II there " of Being. Man is not an encapsulated subjectivity but 
a being-in-the-world. It is through Dasein that the world is disclosed, 
and "Dasein is its disclosedness" (Heidegger, 1980, p.133). If Dasein 
is its openness, its lIthere", then it is important to clarify the way 
in which this "there" is constituted existentially. 
Dasein is its "there" (also referred to as "being-in", "standing-in" 
and "openness 1t ) in three constituent ways, each of these ways being 
equally primary. These are state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), under-
standing (Verstehen) and discourse (Rede). 
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The ontological term Befindlichkeit (which, when translated more 
literally and accurately, means "the state in which one may be found ll ), 
refers to something which is ontically a matter of common experience: 
our current moods, feelings and the various ways in which we are 
attuned to our environment. State-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) refers to 
the fact that Oasein is always already-in-a-world (Macquarrie, 1968, 
p. 27). We are always in a particular mood, in one mood or anotheri 
the world always appears to us in one way or another . Although my 
mood might change from being joyful to being fearful, that I am in a 
mood cannot be denied. The world always appears to me in a certain 
way, and no matter how my life might unfold, it can do so only on the 
basis of how I find myself at present. Associated with state-of-mind 
are thrownness and facticity, which will not be dealt with separately 
here. 
Equally original with state- of-mind (Befindlichkeit) in Oasein's dis-
closedness is understanding (Verstehen). In this existential sense, 
understanding does not refer to the mind's cognitive activities. 
Understanding cannot be restricted to a specific function of the mind, 
a function among other functionSi it reveals the manner in which 
Dasein exists (ex-sistere - uto stand Dutil). If a man understands 
in Heidegger's sense, this means that he comprehends his being in terms 
of possibilities; he realises that he is what he can be, and how he 
actualises his possibili t ies. Man is not closed in on himself and so 
defined once and for all. We are what we are not (viz. our possibilities 
- as Heidegger (1980, p. 145) says " (Oasein) is existentiall y that 
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which, in its potentiality-for-being, it is not yet "), and we are not 
what we are (i.e . insofar as we are always open to the future, our being 
cannot be restricted to and defined in t erms of how we are in the present 
exclusively, as this disregards how we will be). As Heidegger (1980) 
has it, " ... Dasein is constantly 'more' than it factually is, supposing 
that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand 
and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were able to 
do so" (p. 145). This is so because understanding, as a fundame ntal 
mode of Being of Dasein, has the structure of what Heidegger calls a 
"pro ject" (En twurf) . Understanding always presses forward into 
possibilities because of its structure as projection. However J the 
projective character of understanding is not such that the possibilit-
ies, in view of which Dasein does the projecting, are grasped themati-
cally as so many already thought out plans of action towards which 
Dasein c omports itself. This would deny these possibilities as poss-
ibilities, turning them into something given. On the contrary, as 
projecting " ... unders tanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which 
it is its possibilities as possibilities" (Heidegger, 1980, p. 145), 
Moreover, having possibilities or potentiality-for-being is an essential 
characteristic of Dasein , inescapable as part of its facticity. So 
although Dasein i s more than what it factually is (as its ontical 
presen t-at-hand existence), it is never more than what it factically 
is (as its ontological existence) . Expressed more simply, this means 
that I a .. iTI mOl-a in terms, of rHy p68sibili tie::; than I am in terms of my 
actuality. 
In Verstehen Dasein i s revealed as constantly becoming and never being 
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fixed (CL Marcel's (1951) concept, in his book by the same name, of 
homo viator) Broan on the way"). In this sense, Dasein is always ahead -
of-itself in that it has always already projected itself into some 
possibility of its Being (CL Sartre's view of man as being condemned 
to be free and to choose, and as being nothing else but that which he 
makes of himself. See Kaufmann, 1956, p. 291). 
Equiprimordial, once again , with state-of - mind and understanding, is 
discourse (Rede) as the third existenti ale that is fundamental to the 
openness of Dasein's being-in-the-world. State-of-mind and understand-
ing are brought together in discourse in that the attuned comprehension 
of being-in-the- world expresses itself as discourse or speech. In 
Heidegger's (1980) words: "The intelligibility of Being-in-the-worl d 
- an intelligibility that goes with a state-of-mind - expresses itself 
as discourse" (p. 161). In being-in we are engaged in a spelling-
out. Discoursing or talking must be understood in terms of our 
being-with-one-another. Furthermore, as Heidegger (1980) puts it, 
IIcommunication is never anything like a conveying of 
experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior 
of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with 
is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and 
a co-understanding. In discourse Being- with becomes 
'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already but 
it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold 
of and appropriated" (p. 162). 
Although discourse has expression in language, hearing and keeping 
silent are also possibilities belonging to discursive speech. Human 
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communication is the give-and-take of actual talking (discourse), 
and this give-and-take entails both listening and keeping silent. 
We never first hear pure sounds or words as such; if someone speaks 
to us we hear his message, and not his words as such. The message is 
phenomenally more primary than the words. What we hear is II ••• the 
column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire 
crackling" (ibid., p.' 64); to hear the pure noise produced here would 
require an extremely artificial frame of mind. There is always an 
understanding to our hearing, and Heidegger refers to this hearing with 
understanding as IIhearkening". "Being-with develops in listening to 
one another ... " (ibid., p.' 63); if I listen to you I begin to share 
your world. Silence as a possibility of speech also has its basis in 
understanding: "In talking with one another, the person who keeps 
silent can 'make one understand' ... more authentically than the person 
who is never short of words" (ibid., p.' 64). More will be said about 
keeping silent later in the section on conscience. 
The above does not pretend to be an exhaustive exposition of the modes 
of Dasein's being-in, but merely highlights those aspects of these 
modes which will feature most prominently in the explication of in-
authentic and authentic being associated with conscience. 
2.2.2 Inauthentic being 
Heidegger is concerned with ascertaining the self of everyday Dasein. 
After stating that the "assertion that it is I who in each case Dasein 
is, is ontically obvious" (ibid., p. " 5), he goes on to question this: 
"i t could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself'" 
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( ibid., p. 11 5) . It may transpire that in the very constitution of man, 
as being-in-the-world, there is some basis for the fact that he is 
first and foremost not his own self. There is no such thing as a 
pure subject without a world, and !I ••• an isolated 'I' without others 
is just as far from being proximally given" (ibid., p.116). The til" 
is always worlded, and it is always in-the-world along with others. 
To understand the self, then, we need to look to the self as worlded-
wi th-others. 
Being an essential characteristic of Dasein, the 11111 or self must be 
interpreted existentially: the self cannot be seen as some-thing given 
or present-at-hand J as the traditional view would have it; " ... man's 
'substance' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is 
rather existence" (ibid., p.117). 
If the self is defined as a way Qf existing, then what is the "way of 
existing" of everyday Dasein? This way of existing is to be caught 
up in the world with (and as interpreted by) others, and hence the self 
or IIwho" of everyday Dasein is not "I myselfll J but the anonymous "they-
self ll , or to use Mehta's term, "oneself" (Mehta, 1976, p.221). In 
losing itself in the "they" (das Man), Dasein relieves itself of the 
burden of authentically choosing the possibilities and potentialities 
of its own being, and gives itself over to the already understood and 
interpreted world of the "they". So, for example, if at the beginning 
of this century a woman with an aptitude for medicine wished to become 
a doctor, she might not do so, since in terms of the "they" J as a 
woman "one" does not aspire to "male professions". As a result of its 
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lostness J then, " ... Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by 
the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity" (Heidegger, 
1980, p. 268). One should bear in mind once again that, throughout, 
"authenticity" and Uinauthenticity" are used in a terminologically 
strict sense: "authentic" refers to that which I have appropriated as 
my own; lIinauthentic ll refers to that which I have failed to appropriate, 
or that which I have surrendered. It is clear, then, that the self of 
everyday Dasein J in giving itself over to the "theyl1, is the inauthentic 
self, the they-self. Dasein, for for most part, exists inauthentically. 
We now turn to the three constituent modes of Dasein's openness in 
being inauthentic. These are described as idle talk, or chatter 
(Gerede), corresponding to the existentiale of discourse; curiosity 
(Neugier), corresponding to the existentiale of understanding; and 
ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), corresponding to the existentiale of state-
of-mind. It should be noted that Heidegger's interpretation of every-
day (inauthentic) being " . .. is purely ontological in its aims, and is 
far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and fro m 
the aspirations of a 'philosophy of culture'" (ibid., p . 167). 
The terms lIidle talk" or IIchatter" are used by Heidegger in a neutral, 
nonderogatory sense, and denote the mode of interpreting and understand-
ing characterising Dasein in everyday life. Man's average (everyday) 
talk (dl::;(;o uL"st;!) 1.::; eXfJressed by being spoken out, and hence is 
language. Language, furthermore , as an already established (though 
constantly developing) system of meanings, always implies a certain 
understanding and interpretation of existence: the Chinese language 
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embodies an ontology and interpretation of existence which differs from 
that embodied by the English language. So there is implicit in 
language a way in which the understanding of Dasein has already been 
interpreted) and for the mas t part, II ..... Dasein is constantly delivered 
over to this interpretedness which controls and distributes the 
possibilities of average understanding and of state-of-mind belonging 
to it" (ibid., p.167). Mehta (1976) reflects Heidegger's understanding 
of language well when he writes: 
"Language as a repository of understandings (that is , 
meanings) contains within it the deposit of the already 
attained disclosure of essents and comprehension of Being 
which we inherit and thus also the possibilities available 
and the horizons open for further interpretation and con-
ceptual articulation" (p.169). 
However, it is precisely because there resides in language this 
"average intelligibili ty II J that the hearer can have some (second-hand 
and closed - off) understanding of what is talked about without attaining 
the primordial understanding which attends participating in a basic 
relationship to the being of the things talked abcut. In chatter J as 
Heidegger (1980) puts it, we " ... do not so much understand the entities 
which are talked about; we already are listening to what is said-in-
the-talk as such" (p.168). So, with the shift of emphasis from what 
is spoken abcut to the language as such, speech becomes an end in its-
self, and diction, pronunciation and speaking style become the criteria 
relevant to determining its genuineness. What is said-in-the-talk 
gains a broad exposure through gossiping and "passing the word along" J 
and assumes an authoritative character. Ul timately, "things are so 
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because one says so" (ibid., p.168), and idle talk ends up lacking 
entirely any ground or basis. Idle talk is " . .. the possibility of 
understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own", 
and " ... serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in 
an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up 
the entities wi thin-the-world" (ibid., p. 169) . Thus idle talk serves 
to conceal possibilities rather than to reveal them. In his everyday 
living man cannot help but be influenced by the world-as-already-
interpreted that is reflected in idle talk. The possibilities of 
his attuned disposition, the way he "sees" things, are prescribed by the 
"they" in idle talk. The average ways in which things have been 
interpreted by the "they" are characterised by obviousness and self-
assurance. So although one might expect " ... the particular Dasein, 
(which) drifts along towards an ever-increasing groundlessness, as it 
floats ... " (ibid., p. 170) in its uprooted understanding imparted by 
idle talk to experience a certain uncanniness, the uncanniness of this 
floating remains hidden from it, so long as it remains under the 
"protecting shelter" of the "they". 
The second characteristic of Dasein's everyday (inauthentic) mode of 
being is curiosity (Neugier), which corresponds to the existentiale 
of understanding . Heidegger describes curiosity in terms of the 
phenomenon of "sight" which is intimately linked with Dasein's openness. 
"seeing" or "slght" are used here not in the narrow sense of referring 
exclusively to visual perception, but in the broader sense to denote 
knowing or understanding. This usage has its roots in Greek philosophy 
(as evidenced in the epistemology of Parmenides and in Aristotle's 
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Metaphysics) and is still evident in our everyday discourse when we 
might say "I see" to mean "I understand". As being-in-the-world. man 
is absorbed in the world of concern, and this concern is guided by 
circumspection which discovers the ready-to-hand as man is involved 
in his work or whatever else he might be attending to. When he takes 
a break from his work, his preoccupation with the ready-to-hand may come 
to rest such that his circumspection is set free. His circumspect look 
is free to wander from that which is closest to him (his work) to the 
distant and unknown world, and so to explore the possibilities of seeing 
just what the world looks like. However, in curiosity or inquisitive-
ness, when circumspection has been set free in this manner, there is no 
concern for truly understanding what is seenj in this mode man concerns 
himself only with seeing as such. In curiosity there is very little 
commitment to or involvement in what is encounteredi one is concerned 
only with the superficial "look" of things. CUriosity flits from one 
novelty to the next, and, in Heidegger's words, 
" . . . curiosity is characterised by a specific way of 
not tarrying alongside what is closest. Consequently 
it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, 
but rather seeks restlessness, and the excitement of 
continual novelty and changing encounters. In not 
tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant 
possibility of distraction" (ibid., p. 172). 
Finally, founded on the not tarrying in the environment of one's concern 
and being constflnt]y di8tr~r:t-ed. by ne l."! possibilities, ... · .. hich are prOPerties 
constitutive of curiosity, is the third essential characteristic of 
curiosity j viz. the character of "never dwell i ng anywhere". CUriosity 
is abodeless. As Heidegger puts it, curiosity " ... is everywhere and 
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nowhere 11 and J as a mode of being-in-the-world J " ••• reveals a new kind 
of Being of everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly up-
rooting itself" (ibid., p. 173). Idle talk and curiosity, the two 
everyday modes of discourse and sight respectively, function together. 
Idle talk encourages curiosity, and curiosity promotes idle talk, so 
each drags the other along with itself. Neither idle talk nor curiosity 
is limited in its scope, and together they give to Dasein the impression 
of a "full life ll • In Heidegger's words: 
"CUriosity, for which nothing is closed off and idle 
talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, 
provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this 
manner) with the guarantee of a 'life' which, supposedly, 
is genuinely 'lively'" (ibid., p. 173). 
This brings us to the final characteristic of Dasein's openness in 
inauthenticity, namely ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), which corresponds 
to the existentiale of state-of-mind. In our everyday being-with-
one-another where everyone has access to all things (through curiosity) 
and can say what he likes about them (in idle talk), it becomes impossible 
to distinguish between what is disclosed in genuine comprehension and 
what is not . Consequently, the way in which one finds oneself 
(Befindlichkeit) is in a state of ambiguity. This ambiguity does not 
merely apply to the world, but extends also to our being-together-with 
others and envelops the way e ach of us understands himself. Dasein is 
always ambiguously "there" in the openness of public togetherness, 
" ... where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosi ty keep 
'things moving' J where , in an everyday manner, everything (and at 
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bottom nothing) is happening" (ibid., p. 174). Heidegger provides a 
masterful description of this ambiguity as it pervades man's relation-
ships with others when he writes: 
IIEveryone keeps his eye on the other first and next, 
watching how he will comport himself and what he will 
say in reply. Being-with-one-another in the 'they' 
is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which 
everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous 
watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-
in. Under the mask of Ifor-one-another', an 'against-
one-another I is in play" (ibid. J p. 175). 
This description seems to typify, if in an exaggerated way, the sort of 
ambiguous spying on each other and furtive mutual overhearing which 
characterises everyday relating in which each person is concerned with 
not stepping out of line with the others. 
When taken together, the three characteristics of the openness of everyday 
Dasein described above constitute what Heidegger calls the IIfallingtt or 
"fallenness II of Dasein. As he puts it, II 'fallenness' into the 'world' 
means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is 
guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity" (ibid., p. 175). This 
mode of being (i.e. inauthenticity), should not be seen in negative terms 
as a being-no-longer-in-the-world J but amounts rather to "~ .. a quite 
distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world - the kind which is completely 
fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of others in the 'they'" 
(ibid., p. 176). Not-being-its-self functions as a positive possibility 
of Dasein which, in its essential concern) is absorbed in a world. 
Dasein has fallen for the world which belongs to Das0.in's being as being-
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in-the-world. Fallenness is characterised by the phenomena of tempta-
tion, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling. Through idle 
talk and the way things have been publicly interpreted, man offers to 
himself the possibility of losing himself in the "they", and thus 
constantly brings upon himself the temptation of falling. Fallenness 
is a kind of tranquillizing for it takes away from Dasein responsibility 
and the anxiety that goes with it. The reality sustained by the self-
assuredness of the "they" gives Dasein the impression conducive to 
tranquillity that there is no need for authentic understanding and the 
state-of-mind (anxiety) that goes with it, since it is supposed that 
one is leading a full and genuine "life" in which " .. . everything is 
'in the best of order' and all doors are open" (ibid., p. 177). However, 
far from bringing stillness, this tranquillity aggravates one's fallenness 
through driving one into restless activity in which one becomes increasing-
ly estranged from oneself. As Kruger (1981) poin ts out, "the polar 
opposite of a serene letting-be-ness ... is neither anguish nor suffering, 
but rather an attempt to avoid the genuine possibilities of Dasein" (p . 70). 
In this state man's own innermost potentiality of being becomes concealed 
from him, and he fails to understand that " ... understanding itself is 
a potentiality-for-Being which must be made free in one's ownmost 
Dasein alone" (ibid., p. 178). Fallenness, then, in diverting Dasein 
from its authentic selfhood and authentic community, is alienating. 
However, this alienation does not mean that man is torn away from himself; 
on the contrary, this alienation 1I ••• drives it (Dasein) into a kind of 
Being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting 
itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very 'character-
ologies' and 'typologies' which it has brought about are themselves 
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already becoming something that cannot be surveyed at a glance" (ibid., 
p. 178). Man, being thus caught up with himself, can no longer see 
beyond himself. This mode of being represents the fourth characteris-
tic of fallenness, a characteristic with which most psychologists are 
familiar, namely man's entanglement with himself. 
Having exhibited in its full complexity the total structure of Dasein 
in its average everydayness, Heidegger seeks a way of grasping this 
structure in its unity and wholeness. The comprehensive concept which 
he uses to achieve this unified understanding is that of "care" (Sorge): 
" ... it is as care that Dasein' s totality of Being has been defined" 
(ibid., p. 323). Care consists in a threefold structure of existentiality, 
facticity and fallenness, these being the fundamental ontological 
characteristics of Dasein (see Heidegger, 1980, p. 191). Existentiality, 
or Dasein's being ahead-af-itself, is associated with possibility, 
projecting,understandingi facticitYJ or Dasein's being already-in-a-
world is associated with thrownness J state-of-mindi fallenness J or 
Dasein's being close-to-its-world to the point of being absorbed in it, 
is associated wi th the "they" and "scattering" J whereby the Dasein 's 
possibilities are dictated by factors outside of itself, the cohesion 
and unity that belong to authentic selfhood being lacking (see Macquarrie , 
168, p. 27). "Care B must be understood in a purely ontological and 
existential sense, excluding ontic suggestions such as "the cares and 
-- .. ~- ... .:--
................... "'" .... ~eQ of , .: ~- " ..L..L.1.C and uth8l"S . The aforegoing may be concisely 
summed up in Heidegger's (1980) words: 
"The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological 
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structural whole must ... be grasped in the following 
structure: the Being of Dasein mean s ahead-of-itself-
Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities 
encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the 
significance of the term "carel! (Sorge) J which is used in 
a purely ontologico-existential manner II (p. 192). 
2.2.3 Conscience and guilt 
Now, if man is for the most part living inauthentically, when does he 
become aware of this ? Heidegger provides the answer to this question: 
"When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the 'they' is 
revealed" (ibid. , p. 307). To understand the call of conscience is t o 
become aware that one is not being true to one's (ownmost) self, and 
that one has forfeited1 one's being through surrendering to the "they" 
one's choice of a potentiality of one's being. 
In order for Dasein to be itself authentically it is necessary that it 
should bring itself back to itself from its los tness in the "they". 
This pulling itself out of i ts f orfeiture to the "they" and back to its 
own self must concern the very point of which the omission caused Dasein 
to l ose itself in inauthenticity. This means that Dasein must once 
again choose for itself, the neglect of which choosing has led to in-
authentici ty. But in order to choose it is necessary for Dasein to 
choose to make this choice (of choosing) J and "in choosing to make this 
choice, Dasein makes possible J first and foremost, its authentic 
potentiality-for-Being" (ibid., p. 268). However J in order for Dasein 
1 . In thlS connection it is interesting to note that Mehta refers to 
"fallenness" as "forfeiture" (Mehta, 1976, p. 172). 
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authentically to be itself (i.e. to be its authentic potentiality-for-
Being), it must first find itself, since it is for the most part lost 
in the IIthey". In order to find itself, it must be made transparent 
to itself in its possible authenticity . Furthermore, as Mehta (1976) 
says, "the possibility that man can find his way back to himself is to 
be found within his own self as an ability to be something that, in a 
sense, he already is" (p. 222). Hence authentic selfhood is not some-
thing which is revealed or attained only in some special kind of 
experience such as in mysticism; it is available to everyday Dasein, 
and so lies within the range of what is already (if vaguely) understood. 
As Heidegger (1980) puts it, " ... authentic existence is not something 
which floats above falling everydayness; existentially it is only a 
modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon" (p. 179), and 
"authentic Being-anels-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition 
of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it 
is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they ' as 
an essential existentiale" (p. 130). 
Dasein needs that potentiality-for-being-its-self (which it is) attested 
to, and it is in the phenomenon popularly called the "voice of conscience" 
that Heidegger finds testimony of this potentiality. 
Conscience and guilt are the human existentials that expose authentic 
sclfhovd. __ ~ J-\.._ CUIU. Lout basis of fL6~dGm. have acted in a way which 
has made me feel guilty and I confront my guilt, then I am (and become 
aware of) my authentic self; ! am guilty insofar as I become aware of 
myself as being responsible for the action, and so see my-self as being 
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the source of the action. At the same time, had I not been free to 
act otherwise, ! would not have been authentically guilty. Guilt thus 
attests both to authentic selfhood and freedom. On the other hand, if 
I avoid the significance of my guilt (having freely committed an act for 
which I am guilty), I also avoid an awareness of my-self. As Gelven 
(1970) has observed, "by avoiding guil t you become a non-self (in-
authentic) self; whereas if you confront the guilt you are a self 
(authentic) self" (p. 163). However, what is distinctive of authentic 
being is not the experience of guilt for a particular act as such, but 
rather wanting to have a conscience, that is, wanting to own one's 
guilt if there are grounds for one's being-guilty. One's being-guilty 
is not a contingent matter, since man as such is guilty in his very 
being, regardless of his particular actions; Dasein as such is guilty 
beth in its thrownness and in its projection (see Section 1.2). 
Consequently, grounds for one's being-guilty are not even necessary 
since one is guilty in one's very ground (merely by being one is guilty) 
and so by wanting to have a conscience and hence wanting to own one's 
guilt, one acknowledges how one fundamentally is. In Heidegger's 
(1980) words, "Dasein need not first load a 'guilt' upon itself through 
its failures and omissions; it must only be ' guilty' authentically -
'guilty' in the way in which it is" (p . 287). It is because conscience 
is thus intimately linked to the way one actually is (and self and 
world are inseparable), that Steiner refers to Hcidegger's concept 
of conscience as: the I1reality pri:1ciple ll {Stei:lcr, 1978, p. 73). As 
Langan (1959) has noted, "conscience suggests a note of awareness, the 
kind of awareness that is bern of a steady gaze directed at things as 
they are" (p. 35). The will to have conscience, further, is what 
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Mehta (1976) calls " ... the most fundamental existenziell presupposition 
for the possibility of factual guilt . . . Il, since H ••• only thus does 
Dasein let its innermost self act in itself, out of its chosen poten-
tiality of being, and be responsible" (p. 230). So the ontological 
interpretation of conscience (and guilt) is prior to and is presupposed 
by morality in general, as well as any psychological or theological 
description and classification of conscience <and guilt). 
Being lost in the publicness and the idle talk of the "they", Dasein 
fails to hear its own self in listening away to the they-self. It is 
by way of conscience as a call that this listening-away is interrupted. 
Calling is seen as a mode of discourse which gives one something to 
understand .. The voice of conscience is precisely this giving-to-
understand and not a literal voice, since vocal utterance is not 
essential for discourse, the latter being presupposed by any expressing 
or proclaiming . The disclosure belonging to the call causes an abrupt 
arousal. The call is from afar (i.e. from the authentic self that is 
far removed from the they-self) to afar (i.e. to the they-self), and it 
reaches him who wants to be retrieved (from the .. they") .. The unsettling, 
jolting nature of the call of conscience is poetically described by 
Langan (1959) when he writes: 
lOA soul that retains deep down a modicum of sensitivity, 
driven so far in (the) pursuit of happiness that the 
unreal ness of the chase after an always just-escaping 
security begins to manifest itself, can suddenly, when 
least expected, be forced to throw the whole quest of 
the aver age man into serious doubt. It is then, as all 
dissolves into the nothingness that waits at its base to 
engulf the flimsy structures of a fabricated life, that 
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Dasein is forced to question radically where he is from, 
and where he is going" (p. 30). 
2.2.4 The nature of conscience as a call 
As Gelven (1970) has pointed out, treating conscience as a kind of 
calling exposes four dimensions to the nature of conscience, these 
dimensions being true of any form of calling. When there is a calling, 
there must be (1) someone who calls, the IIcaller"; (2) someone who is 
called; (3) something that is called about; and (4) that to which 
someone is called~ The last point distinguishes calling from other 
forms of discourse, in that when one calls someone rather than merely 
speaks to him, an action or direction of attention is expected. 
In terms of Heidegger's understanding of conscience, all of these 
dimensions refer to the self, each dimension referring to a different 
mode of the self (i.e. each to a different way of existing). (1 ) It 
is the self which does the calling, this self being the authentic self 
which has lost the comfortable feeling of being with the crowd. 
This self is in a state of anxiety or dread (Angst) and is "uncanny" 
(unheimlich: "not at horne II) . It is, as Heidegger (1980) puts it, 
" ... this Dasein, which finds itself in the very depths of its uncanni-
ness (that is) the caller of the call of conscience" (p. 276). (2) The 
one that is called is the self of the they-self, the calling being an 
attempt to bring this self, that is lost in the company of others, back 
to its own self, "and because only the self of the they-self gets 
appealed to and brought to hear, the 'they' collapses" (ibid., p. 273) . 
Precisely in IIpassing over" the "they II which is keen on appearances and 
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public repute, the call pushes it into insignificance. (3) It is 
the self that the calling is about in that conscience awakens the self 
to the mode of existing in which it finds itselfi the call is " ... an 
occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself" (ibid., p. 272). 
(4) The calling is to the self in that it directs the sel f (that is 
immersed in the "theyll) back to its (ownmost) self. 
appeal to the self to be authentic. 
The call is an 
The (authentic) self to which the they-self is called is not the sel f 
which can become an "object II for itself and which might examine and 
judge its "inner life" with fussy curiosity; "the appeal to the self 
in the they-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can 
close itself off from the 'external world'" (ibid., p. 273). The call 
is rather such that it appeals "sol ely to that self which ... is in no 
other way than Being - in-the- world" (ibid., p. 273). 
Although in the call of conscience it is Dasein who calls its own self, 
the call has a peculiar, impersonal character in that it is quite 
independent of our own agency and wishes. "It" calls unexpectedly 
and even against our will, though it certainly does not come from 
anybody else; 
p. 275). 
"the call comes from me and yet from beyond me I. (ibid., 
Beinq an existentiale of Dasein! conscience possesses a mode of being 
which is appropriate to Dasein's existentia l constitution, namely that 
of care. Having its source in Dasein's thrownness or its being already-
in-a - world (facticity), conscience recal l s Dasein from its falling into 
- 32 -
the "they" or its being close-to-its-world (fallenness), and appeals 
to Dasein in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, or its being ahead-
of-itself (existentiality). It is Dasein's being as care that is the 
basis for the possibility of conscience. 
With its source in the uncanniness or homelessness of man's thrown 
solitude and recalling him to his own self} conscience as a call summons 
him to his ability to be. The call of conscience " ... calls us back in 
calling us forth" (ibid., p. 280); in the words of Mehta (1976) 
conscience is a "calling forward recall" (p. 226). The latter notion 
may be better understood if we look at Van den Berg's understanding of 
lived time (see Van den Berg, 1972 , pp. 74-101). This understanding 
is typified in his statement that "the present is an invitation from 
out of the future to gain mastery over bygone times" (ibid ., p . 91). 
My future (my potentiality for being) is inextricably bound to my past, 
or the course my life has followed thus far (my facticity). My authentic 
future, seen in terms of my possibilities} opens up in terms of my 
particular past, and in each particular future a particular past is 
implicated. Thi s point is covered by Heidegger (1980) when he says: 
"When the call gives us a potentiali ty-for-Being to 
understand, it does not give us one which is ideal and 
universal; it discloses it as that which has been 
currently individualised and which belongs to that 
particular Dasein" (p. 280). 
So in calling man forth (to his ownmost possibilities), conscience calls 
him back (to his thrownness as the basis of these possibilities). In 
that he is the basis of a l ack or nullity both in his thrownness and 
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his projection (see Section 1.2 ), man is guilty (in the ontological 
sense) . Hence the call of conscience, in summoning man to the nUllity 
of his thrownness and projection, appeals to him to be guilty, i.e. 
to be what he is. 
2.2.5 Authentic being 
The .authentic understanding of the call of conscience has been character-
ised as "wanting to have a conscience ". This will to have conscience, 
as an understanding of oneself in one's authentic potentiality, is a way 
in which Dasein is disclosed, a mode of Dasein's openness. As such it 
is characterised by understanding, state-of-mind (mood), and discourse. 
What follows is a description of the mode of openness (the mode of the 
IIthere" of Dasein-libeing-there ll ) characteristic of Dasein's authentic 
being. 
The understanding characteristic of authentic being involves projecting 
oneself upon one's ownmost possibilities, one's ownmost being-guilty. 
This projecting of one's ownmost possibilities might be contrasted with 
the inauthentic mode of understanding (viz. curiosity) which is abodeless 
and constantly uprooted, being unlimited in its range of possibilities. 
When the call of conscience is understood existentielly} such understanding 
" is more authentic the more non-relationally Dasein hears and under-
stands its own 8eing-appealed-to, and the less the meaning of the call 
gets perverted by what one says or by ",hat is fitting and accepted" 
(ibid., p. 280) . 
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The state-of-mind or mood associated with this understanding is anxiety 
(dread). In inauthentic being in which Dasein is absorbed in the 
"they II, Dasein IS openness is characterised by a tranquillised J self-
assured attitude of feeling familiar with and at home in the world. 
However, as Dasein becomes increasingly inauthentic (i.e. as Dasein 
falls) , 
II ••• anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 
'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein 
has been individualised, but individualised as Being-
in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential 
'mode' of the 'not-at-home'" (ibid., p. 189). 
The IInot-at-home-ness" referred to above is the uncanniness 1 which one feels 
in anxiety. That in the face of which one experiences anxiety is 
being-in-the-world as such, insofar as the latter, once authentically 
understood, calls us forth to choose our ownrnost possibilities. In 
our everyday (inauthentic) being, we flee " ... in the face of the 
uncanniness which is basically determinative for individualised 8eing-
in-the-world" (ibid., p. 276). We seek for and try to lose ourselves 
in distractions to fill up that no-thing-ness which we are and in the 
face of which we feel anxious (uncanny). However, uncanniness II ••• is 
the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way 
it has been covered up . Out of the depths of this kind of Being, 
Dasein itself, as conscience J calls II (ibid. J p. 277). Uncanniness 
pursues Dasein and threatens the lostness in which it has forgotten 
1 
The German term for "uncanny"J viz. lIunheimlich"J when translated more 
Ii terally means l1 unhomelike I •• 
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itself . Hence wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which is definitive of 
authentic being, becomes a readiness for anxiety. 
The mode of discourse of authentic being (wanting to have a conscience) 
:i,.s one of reticence (keeping silent): "conscience discourses solely 
and constantly in the mode of keeping silent" (ibid., p. 273). Although 
we expect to be told " ... something currently useful about assured 
possibilities of 'taking action' which are available and calculable u 
(ibid., p. 294), we miss such positive content in that which is called. 
Our expectation is based on that way of interpreting our existence which 
belongs to cornmon-sense concern - a way of interpreting " ... which forces 
Dasein's existence to be subsumed under the idea of a business procedure 
that can be regulated" (ibid., p. 294). However, the call of conscience 
fails to give practical injunctions as to how the IIbusiness" of life is 
to be !lrun " precisely because it swnmons Dasein to existence, to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self. If the call were to have 
any positive content (e.g. in the form of an injunction or a prohibition), 
it would both limit the very openness of existence and forestall Dasein's 
possibility of authentically choosing itself (as something that is still 
to become) from the wealth of its own possibilities. In its lostness 
in the IIthey" Dasein is fascinated with It ••• the 'hubbub I of the mani-
fold ambiguity which idle talk possesses in its everyday Inewness I II 
(ibid., p. 271). Hence the call must do its calling " ... without any 
hubbub and unamhi g1101J.'3ly leaving no foothold for curiosi ty" (ibid. J 
p.271). In being uncannily reticent J the call " ..... does not call him 
into the public idle talk of the 'they', but calls him back from this 
into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being" (ibid., 
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p. 277). In the light of Dasein's authentic mode of discourse being 
silence, Gelven (1970) points out that " ... one of the chief modes of 
inauthentic discourse is loudness, for when one is 'loud' one cannot 
listen" (p. 169). If we are to hear the call back to our authentic 
selves, it is necessary that we be quiet enough to listen to it. It 
should be noted that being one's self authentically does not imply an 
egocentric preoccupation with oneself. The (authentic) self does not 
become an object of concern for itself, but rather is: "as something 
that keeps silent, authentic Being-one's-Self is just the sort of thing 
that does not keep on saying 'I'; but in its reticence it is that 
thrown entity as which it can authentically be" (ibid., p. 323). 
Dasein's disclosure (openness) in conscience, then, may be summed up in 
the following description: it is a " ... reticent self-projection upon 
one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety" (ibid., 
p. 297). Heidegger refers to this disclosure as IIresoluteness" 
(IiEntschlossenhei t ,,1 ) • 
2.2.6 Resoluteness 
Resoluteness is seen in existentiell terms by Heidegger as " ... the 
choosing to choose a kind of Being-one 's-Self ... " (ibid., p. 270). 
The connection between resoluteness and choice and freedom ought not to 
be overlooked: "resoluteness II is a translation of "Entschlossenhei til, 
which also means I'decision" J t'resolve", "having made up one's mind", 
etc. This connection seems to make sense intuitively, in that it does 
1 
The etymological connection between "Entschlossc:mhl?'i t " ("resoluteness") 
and "Erschlossenhei t" ("disclosedness") should be noted. ·~ 
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appear to be the case that, in order to live one's own life and to be 
one 1 s "own person ", one needs to be free to choose one I S mode of existing. 
Resoluteness focuses upon the particular Dasein's unique assertion of 
its own existence, freely grounded in responsibility and guilt. In 
the call of conscience, and through resoluteness, Dasein is recalled to 
an authentic openness, such that its awareness of the world and of 
others is transformed. Although the world that is ready-to-hand does 
not change in content, and although Dasein's "circle of others" is 
not changed for a different one, now Dasein's " ... comprehending and 
preoccupied being-toward handy essents and its solicitous being-with 
the others is determined from (the depths of) its innermost potentiality 
of being itself" (Mehta, 1976, p. 234). So, for example, the person 
will attend symphony concerts not so as to be seen to be doing the 
"done II thing J but because he has a deeply felt love of classicq.l nmsic i 
he will relate to others not because they are the "right" people to be 
seen to be associating with, but because he has a certain feeling for them 
or resolutely chosen commitment to them. 
Nor does resoluteness, as being-one's self, mean that Dasein becomes 
detached from its world, such that it becomes an isolated and free-
floating "1". On the contrary, authentic openness consists in being-
in-the-world authentically with-others; after all, by its very nature, 
the self !Dacci:;.) is in a 'W'orld with others. In appropriating its 
own existence in resoluteness, Dasein becomes free for its world and can 
allow others to be themselves authentically. Dasein's resoluteness 
makes it possible to co-disclose the authentic possibilities of others 
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(their "ownmost potentiality for being!!) in " ... the solicitude that 
leaps forth and liberates" (Heidegger, 1980, p . 298); when Dasein is 
resolute, it can become the conscience of others. Furthermore, it is 
"only by authentically 8eing-their-Selves in 
resoluteness (that) people can authentically be 
with one another - not by ambiguous jealous stipulations 
and talkative fraterni zing in the 'they' and in what 
'they' want to undertake" (ibid., p. 298). 
In resoluteness, Dasein does not withdraw from "actuality"; it first 
discovers what is factically possible and then projects itself upon 
definite factical possibilities. Resolute Dasein does not float in 
the realm of limitless possibilities, but is always situated. However, 
the situation of resolute Dasein does not occur independently of that 
Dasein; it only comes into being as that situation which it is through 
the existence of Dasein in it: "the situation is the 'there I as which 
the existent entity is there" (ibid., p. 299, emphasis added). '!he 
situation is not an objectively existing setting in which Dasein happens 
to exist or into which it puts itself; it is ..... far removed from any 
present-at- hand mixture of circumstances and accidents which we encounter" 
(ibid., p. 300). As Gelven (1970) points out, in Heidegger's use of 
the notion of a situation, situations exist only in terms of Dasein's 
projection of possibilities. We say that a particular situation is 
"fraught with tension II or "comfortable II J and this is because of our 
understanding of the situation through the projection 1 of "tense" or 
1 . .. . 
"PrO]Cct10 n" 1S used here 1n the Heideggcrian sensa J in keeping with 
the notio ns of "project" and lIexistentialitY"J and is not to be confused 
with the Freudian notion of projection. 
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"comfortable II possibilities. Gelven (1970) points out that the meaning 
of the situation cannot be represented by a simple listing of the facts 
or circumstances that actually occur, but rather " ... it is the amount 
and intensity of human caring and concern that establish what we call 
a 'situation'" (p. 171). 
The inauthentic they-self, on the other hand, is blind to the situation 
as described abcve. For the they-self, the situation is something 
which has been "closed off II • Being unable to understand the situation 
via the projection of its own possibilities (which are thematically 
unavailable to it), the they-self is aware only of the "general 
si tua tion" . Hence, in a sense the situation is something which is 
already established prior to Dasein's being in it. 
We shall now briefly examine the place of death in authenticity. 
Dasein, in its very existence, is always ahead-of itself in living 
towards the future. The ultimate horizon and possibility of this 
existence is inevitably death, of which Dasein is aware. Hence 
Dasein is always being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode) , and Heidegger 
(1980) refers to this being as "anticipating" or "anticipation" (p. 262). 
furthermore, lIdeath is Oasein's ownmost possibility", and "Being 
towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being" (ibid., p. 263). 
DaSBin I a VWTl self, as ~ ._ .... t._ ..L11 l,.Ut'l 
So, in this distinctive possibility of 
state-of -rrlino. of anxiety (dread) J Dasein 
is "wrenched away from" the "they". If I realise in the depths of 
my being that my death is uniquely my own (nobody else can die in 
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place of me), I then become aware of the fact that this life is uniquely 
my own. Such awareness liberates me in and for my being, and lends 
an intensity to my existence, inviting me to appropriate it authentically 
as my own. The nature of authentic being-towards-death may be summed 
up as follows: 
IIAnticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the 
they-self, and brings it face to face with the 
possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported 
by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, 
in an impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom 
which has been released from the illusions of the 'they', 
and which is factical J certain of itself J and anxious" 
(ibid., p. 266). 
'!he resoluteness accompanying this anticipation ("anticipatory 
resoluteness") is not something which is attained once and for all. 
As Heidegger puts it "Dasein is already in irresoluteness and soon, 
perhaps, will be in it again" (ibid., p. 299). II Irresoluteness " 
here refers to inauthentic being in which Dasein has surrendered 
itself to and is in a sense 1I1ived" by the "they". 
2.2.7 Concluding comments 
Interpreting conscience as a call from the self to the self avoids 
the usual interpretations of conscience in terms of mental faculties, 
intellect. will or feeling, or of "acts" of a person. Such inter-
pretations fail to do justice to man as a being that ex-ists. They 
are fragmentary and fragmenting in their understanding of man, treating 
him as a present-at-hand "system II which might be dissected into compo:nent 
parts. As Heidegger notes J "when one is confronted with such a phenomenon 
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as conscience, one is struck by the ontologico-anthropological inadequacy 
of a free-floating framework of psychical faculties or personal actions 
all duly classified" (ibid., pp. 271 - 2). 
As construed by Heidegger, conscience is prior to any moral guilt and 
so surpasses and transcends any particular moral code. Although 
conscience lies at the very basis of moral guilt and morality in 
general, it cannot be regarded as the voice of society or parents; nor 
does it provide a kind of moral tribunal that judges past or contemplated 
actions. Such phenomena are secondary to conscience as a fundamental 
existentiale of existence. 
Rather than being concerned with particular acts, infringements or 
omissions, conscience involves an awareness of one's mode of being-in-
the-world in general. It is concerned specifically with the distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic modes of being, which, as Steiner 
(1978) has noted, " ... is one of the most decisive (distinctions) in 
Heideggerian thought and in the impact of that thought on modern 
feeling" (p. 91) . 
2.3 Existential philosophers ' views on conscience and/or conscience-
related themes 
For Kierkegaard, the lowest form of despair, in that it is the most 
directly dependent upon external social circumstances J is spiritlessness, 
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which most closely approximates Heidegger's view of inauthentic being. 
Kierkegaard (1944) states that "man is spirit" and that "spirit is the 
self" (p. 17). It would follow, therefore, that a spiritless man 
would be a man who lacked a self. This is the case for Kierkegaard: 
a spiritless person is someone who has been tricked out of his self by 
lithe others ". He knows himself only by what he presents outwardly to 
others J by "externality") being identified with his social role. It 
is by means of social categories and seeing where he stands in the 
system of social differences (in terms of class, status, etc.) that he 
understands and identifies himself. Kierkegaard sees social identity 
as "the outer garments of differentiation" (Norden toft , 1978, p. 244). 
The spiritless person " ... does not dare to believe in himself, finds it 
too venturesome a thing to be himself, far easier and safer to be like 
the others, to become an irni tation J a number J a cipher in the crowd II 
(Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 57). He is scarcely noticed in his despair, 
since he has attained perfection ·and success in all that he does. His 
being normally adjusted to the world adds to his inconspicuousness. 
Indeed, the despair attending such a way of being is not generally 
regarded as despair, becaus e it makes one ls life easy and comfortable. 
One is shrewd in the eyes of the world if one does not venture oneself; 
it is dangerous to be venturesome since one might lose. However, by 
not venturing, " ... i t is so dreadfully easy to lose that which it would 
be difficult tc lese i;-;. a .... er. the- most \it;mturesom~ venture .. . one ~ s self II 
(ibid., p. 52). In not venturing, I gain all worldly advantages and 
yet l ose my self. 
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Kierkegaard (1969) claims that the present age (which, though he 
obviously refers to the period in which he wrote these words, viz~ circa 
1846, seems not to be unlike our own), which is one of spiritlessness, 
boasts much reflective understanding, yet is lacking in passion (p. 77). 
A passionless age gains in scope what it loses in intensity. It has 
abolished the "principle of contradiction", such that the dynamic 
tension between opposites is reduced to lukewarm compromise. Hence, 
among other things, we have superficiality, which results from doing 
away with the v ital distinction between concealment and manifestation; 
flirtation, which results from doing away with the vital distinction 
between real love and real debauchery; and talkativeness, resulting 
from doing away with the vital distinction between talking and keeping 
silent. The latter phenomenon is the same as Heidegger's Gerede 
(idle talk). Kierkegaard, like Heidegger, regards keeping silent as 
a positive phenomenon and not merely as a privation of talking. Hence, 
"only one who knows how to remain essentially silent can really talk -
and act essentially" (ibid., p. 78). Spiritlessness is capable neither 
of genuinely talking nor of genuinely keeping silent . It takes no 
risks in its talkativeness J sticking to "completely reliable II information 
about what so and so has done and said, and dreads the moment of silence 
in which its emptiness becomes apparent. Talkati veness occurs " ... when 
nothing important ever happens to gather the threads of life together : 
with the finality of a catastrophe" (ibid., p. 78). It would seem 
that prp.r.isp-ly in t:hp. CA.J. l of conscience (as conceived by Heidegger)) 
in view of its jolting nature) the "threads of life" are gathered 
together in this manner. 
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It is important to realise, as Kierkegaard observes, that 
"spiri tlessness can say exactly the same thing that 
the richest spirit says, except that it does not say 
it by virtue of spirit. Spiritlessly determined, 
man has become a talking machine, and there is nothing 
to prevent him from learning a philosophical jingle 
by heart just as well as a confession of faith and a 
political recitation" (cited in Nordentoft, 1978, pp. 240-1). 
This suggests that the spiritless or selfless man lives second-hand, 
and reflects what Heidegger says about authentic being, namely that 
it is an existentiell modification of inauthentic being. Upon super-
ficial inspection, spiritless and spirited (inauthentic and authentic) 
modes of being seem alike; it requires a more penetrating and authentic 
perception to distinguish between the two. 
According to Kierkegaard's psychological writings, spiritlessness is 
characterised by the need for self-protection, security and the ex-
elusion of the consciousness of conflict. Spiritlessness is anxiety, 
but this anxiety is concealed and disguised such that it is not directly 
observable. It is precisely the safeguarding of the self, both socially 
and existentially, that is the symptom of anxiety. This spiritless 
safeguarding, by avoiding risks in its not being venturesome, belies 
anxiety at the taking of these risks which is necessary for the spirited 
self. Even though the self has in a sense anaesthetised itself in 
its spiritlc88ness, such that anxiety is excluded just as the spirit is, 
II •• • anxiety is nevertheless present i it is merely waiting" (cited in 
Nordentoft, 1978, p . 255). This view of the spirited self as being 
essentially transparently anxious (as distinct from being characterised 
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by concealed and disguised anxiety, as is the spiritless self), has 
its parallel in Heidegger's view of authentic being, which consists 
in a wordless, anxious self-projection. 
2.3.2 Sartre 
Sartre describes inauthentic being as "bad faith" (llroauvaise foi II) or 
living in bad faith, which essentially involves some or other form of 
self-deception. However, although he devotes an entire chapter (Part 
One, Chapter 2) to bad faith in his major work Being and Nothingness, 
his account will be examined only briefly here, since it has its origin 
in, and so is in a sense overshadowed by, . Beidegger's ana~ysis _ of 
authentic and inauthentic existence. 
Generally speaking, self deception is an attempt to escape from the 
anguish which we suffer when we are brought face to face with our own 
freedom; as Sartre says, lIanguish is the reflective apprehension of 
freedom itself" (cited in Warnock, 1965, p. 55). Self-deception 
consists in pretending to ourselves and others that things could not 
be otherwise; we are not responsible for the way we are and cannot 
change, even if we want to. Sartre vehemently opposes this notion, 
claiming that we most definitely are responsible for the way we are, 
even for the way we feel. Man is free and chooses himself. In 
authenticity one responsibly appropriates this freedom. Sartre has 
been criticised by Heidegger and others for overestimating the extent 
of man's freedom, through not adequately situating this freedom in the 
context of particular facticities. Sartre, on the other hand, has 
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criticised Heidegger for identifying man with the world (through his 
immersion it it) at the expense of giving full weight to his freedom 
and "subjective" reality (see Fell, 1979, pp. 1 f.). Sartre ·s 
criticism seems to hold, however, only if and once we have made a 
radical distinction between subjective (self) and objective (world); 
in his terms between Being-far-itself (etre-pour-soi) and Being-in-
itself (etre-en-soi). It is only after this distinction that the 
world (with which man is in cohesion, in Heidegger's view), through being 
divorced from the subjective, is robbed of its freedom. To argue this 
point more thoroughly, however, seems to be beyond the scope (and 
relevance) of this thesis. 
Sartre distinguishes two main types of self-deception, namely becoming 
thing-like and playing a part. 
(a) Becoming thing-like 
In this kind of self-deception, the person, to protect ,himself from 
recognising his own freedom, pretends to be a thing, that is, he pretends 
to have no choice; to be managed by other people; to be inert. Sartre 
illustrates this kind of self-deception by his well-known example in which 
a girl is taken to a restaurant by a man. In order to preserve the 
excitement of the moment and to delay the moment when she has to make a 
definite decision, she pretends to herself that she does not notice his 
sexual intentions towards her. So when he holds her hand, she (it) 
becomes thing-like; she neither resists by withdrawing it, nor consents 
by responding positively. She allows her hand to rest passively in his 
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hot hands. She is no longer embedded in her situation since her body 
has become what Van den Berg (1972) refers to as "the body one has", 
which " ... has been left, more or less, by its owner ll (p. 50). This 
mode of being thing-like is hinted at in Heidegger's analysis of the 
situation of inauthentic Dasein J in which the situation is seen as a 
present-at-hand mixture of circumstances which is not co-constituted by 
Dasein. Accordingly, even the self (Dasein) becomes present-at-hand 
in such a situation, as if it were a thing. 
(b) Playing a part 
In this kind of self-deception one pretends that one is nothing other 
that what others think one is. One acts out the role which others 
have assigned to one and sees oneself in terms of how others want one to 
be. We also expect certain repertoires of behaviours from certain 
people, and should they depart from these behaviours, we become offended; . 
"a grocer who indulges in day-dreams is offensive to the customer because 
he is no longer wholly a grocer" (Sartre, 1957, p. 59). As Sartre 
observes: 
"We take ample precautions to confine a man to what he 
iSi it is as if we lived in continual fear that he would 
get out, overflow and suddenly elude his position" (cited 
in Warnock, op. cit., p. 58). 
Sartre regards man to be such that his existence precedes his essence. 
It is only through his becoming (in existence) that man is what he is 
(in his essence). In his existence J man is constantly projecting 
himself into future possibilities so that his essence right until his 
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death, is open-ended, not fixed. We can observe in both of these 
forms of inauthenticity (self-deception), the person's attempt to 
establish his essence prematurely (through becoming identified either 
with a thing or with a role) at the expense of his exis tence. By thus 
giving priority to his essence in being inauthentic, he is denying the 
very nature of his being as man. 
2.3.3 Buber 
Buber distinguishes two basic forms of conscience: the surface J common 
conscience which is in effect comparable to the Freudian superego and 
to Heidegger's false IIworldlyl1 or "publicI! conscience (see Section 
2.4.1), and a greater or higher conscience which plumbs the depths of 
existential guilt. It is only with the latter, higher form that we 
will be concerned here. 
Like Heidegger's (authentic) conscience, Buber's higher conscience is 
related to existential guilt and has the positive function of calling 
man to authentic existence. Buber also agrees with Heidegger that 
all understanding of guilty acts (indebtedness) must go back to a 
primal or original guilt. However, for Buber this guilt is not 
synonymous with human finitude; "original guilt consists in remaining 
wi th oneself" (Suber, 1938, p. 203). Accordingly, the authentic life 
is the life of dialogue, in which one responds to the other with one's 
whole being now, entering into an III-Thoul! relationship with the other. 
Buber (1929) proposes that the idea of responsibility should be re trieved 
from the sphere of specialised ethics in which it becomes a free-floating 
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"ought" . Responsibility must re-enter the sphere of lived life, since 
"genuine responsibility exists only when there is real responding" 
(p. 34). That to which one responds is simply what happens to one, 
what is to be seen and heard and felt. Buber adds that "each concrete 
hour allotted to the person, with its content drawn from the world and 
from destiny, is speech for the man who is attentive" (ibid., p. 34). 
Attentiveness is required for one to respond genuinely and so to live 
an authentic life, and the "whole apparatus of our civilization" opposes 
the realisation of this attentiveness. When we fail in our attentive 
responsiveness, we experience the call of conscience: 
"If a form and appearance of present being move past 
me, and I was not really there, then out of the distance, 
out of its disappearance, comes a second cry, as soft 
and secret as though it carne from myself: 'Where are you?' 
That is the cry of conscience. It is not my existence 
which calls to me, but the being which is not I" 
(Buber, 1938, p . 203). 
From the above quotation, we can see that for Buber, conscience is not 
the voice of the self calling to the self, or at least not exclusively. 
Although conscience is my conscience, If ••• in it and through it there 
sounds the voice of the other" (Le Fevre, 1962, p. 29). Buber under-
stands the structure of human life as man with man. The individual 
does not contain the essence of man within himself; man ' s essence is 
contained only in community, in the unity of man with man. It follows 
that if we are to arrive at our essence (authentic being) through 
conscience, conscience must necessarily include the other. 
As can be seen from the above, with regard to both conscience and guilt, 
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the views of Buber are more emphatically and explicitly interpersonal 
than those of Heidegger. 
2.3.4 Morano 
Morano's work, Existential Guilt (1973), is a study of existential 
(ontological) guilt as such, which is not the primary focus of the 
present study. Accordingly, his study will be reviewed here only 
insofar as it relates more directly to conscience. 
For the individual who experiences conscience (in his being guilty), 
there is a discrepancy between his actual situation and his situation 
as he would like it to be. He never enjoys complete mastery of his 
situation (p. 37). There is a denial or lack of awareness, especially 
of self-awareness; the individual denies that awareness of the situation 
which is his. In Morano's words, "there seems to be both ontological 
and psychological barriers to total self-lucidity" (p.3B). 
transparency is unattainable, in that 
"each one's view is necessarily perspectival, bound 
by his past experiences and his specific vantage point 
in space and time and therefore necessarily precluding 
Total self-
any total transcendence of one's one perspective" (p. 38) . 
In one I s moments of "most profound self -discovery" (in conscience) one 
experiences lIagonising isolation", and one only avoids the agony of 
conscience to the detriment of one's self-awareness and human sens-
ibilities (pp. 40-41). 
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Unlike HeideggerJ Morano sees guilt not as residing in man's finitude 
per 5e, " ... but in the discrepancy between this finitude and his as-
piration to transcend it and his regrets for having been dominated by 
it" (p. 47). Nevertheless, the individual gains access to his guilt 
only by some apprehension of his specific finitude. The recognition 
of this finitude is evoked most dramatically for him in the experience 
of Angst, a "spiritual reeling and dizziness", in which there is no 
specific danger " ... but my very existence, my whole being is in doubt, 
and I don't know where I can turn" (p. 47). The individual experiences 
a sense of being lost which is prolonged indefinitely, as if he were 
in a "labyrinthine world" (p. 58). He has deviated from his correct 
path and is alienated from himself. In ontological guilt (in which 
conscience is experienced) "we are outcasts to our true selves", and 
"we are not at home with ourselves" (p. 56). This is clearly 
reminiscent of Heidegger when he writes that the self in the call of 
conscience is anxious and not-at-home (unheimlich). 
2.4 Psychoanalytic and existential-psychological views of conscience 
and/or conscience-related themes 
2.4.1 Freud 
In his structural theory Freud used the term "superego" to refer to 
what is commonly regarded as conscience. However, the meaning which 
he attributed to "superego" is too narrow to do justice to the complex 
phenomenon of conscience, especially in its more fundamental and pri-
mordial aspects. As Buber (1957) has observed, 
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..... the primeval concept of conscience (to which 
Heidegger's conception is akin), if only it is 
understood as a dynamic one rather than as a static, 
judging one, is more realistic than the modern 
structural concept of the superego" (p. 122, parenthesis 
added) . 
Freud conceived of the superego as a moral agency, a structural com-
ponent of the psyche, which consists of the precipitate of all prohibi-
tions, inhibitions and rules of conduct that society impresses upon 
children through their parents and others significant to their develop-
ment. It is what Scheler (1960) referred to as " ... an interiorization 
of yesterday's policeman" (p. 38). Jung (1958) has criticised Freud's 
view for precisely this reason, saying that the superego, by definition, 
is " ... not even a genuine conscience but merely human convention and 
tradi tion" (p. 446). Heidegger (1980) implicitly regards the superego 
not to be a genuine or authentic conscience, but to be a false or 
fallen one. This is reflected when he writes, " ... this 'public 
conscience' - what else is it than the voice of the 'they'?" (p. 278). 
"Conscience" and IIsuperego" are in no way coterminous; indeed, one 
might conceive of situations in which one might have to oppose one's 
superego (as the voice of the "theyll) in order to act in accordance 
with one's conscience (as the call to one's ownmost possibilities), 
and vice versa. As Belaief (1969) points out, if one repudiates the 
internalised rules of the superego but nonetheless enacts one's apparent 
acceptance from fear of social (parental) rejection, ..... the felt sense 
of self-betrayal here results in bad conscience" (p. 74). Whereas 
establishing the superego ..... expresses the wish to preserve as much 
as possible the tender and erotic ties to both parents" (Schafer, 1960, 
p. 168), and serves to counteract the dread of the loss ··of the love 
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itself by keeping in check primarily aggressive but also sexual impulses, 
conscience requires one to risk losing bonds of affection with others 
through being true to oneself. 
Although Freud's fully developed conception of conscience as superego 
bears little relation to conscience, the early stages of his theorising 
establishes the roots of the superego as being firmly grounded in the 
ego. Freud saw the superego as lIa differentiating grade in the ego" 
(1921, pp. 101-1 09), a "precipitate in the ego" (1923, p. 44) and a 
"function" of the ego (1923, p. 73; 1932, pp. 85-86>. It was only 
in his monograph The Ego and the Id (1923), that he combined these 
various components of the ego within a single (though derivative) entity 
which he cal led the "superego ". The superego, then, is a differentiated 
portion of the ego which observes the ego, and it shares this character-
istic at least with the conscience in Heidegger (1980), which always 
remains " ... an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself" (p. 272). 
2.4.2 Jung 
Jung attributes considerable importance to the conscience, believing 
that " ... the chief causes of neurosis are conflicts of conscience and 
difficult moral problems that require an answer" (1949, p. 616). His 
view of conscience will be considered together with that of the develop-
ment of personality , since the two views are closely related and both 
have bearing on Heidegger's conception of conscience. 
Being guided by the etymology of the word "conscience", Jung points out 
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that the phenomenon is a special form of "knowing" or "consciousness" 
concerning the value of our actions. However, that which knows is not 
the lIempirical subject .. or ego, " ... but rather an unconscious personality 
who, to all appearances, behaves like a conscious subject" (Jung, 1958, 
p. 439). It is this unconscious personality which, having replaced 
the ego, performs the act of conscience. Though Jung does not identify 
this "unconscious personality" explicitly, it is probable that it is the 
self (as distinct from the ego), which, as our life's goal, is " ... the 
completest expression of that fateful combination we call individuality" 
(Jung, 1928, p. 238). Conscience, as "an autonomous psychic factor", 
is " ..• a demand that asserts itself in spite of the subject or at any 
rate causes him considerable difficulties" (ibid., p. 446). This is 
reminiscent of the call of conscience in Heidegger which is uncanny 
(connoting unconsciousness), impersonal" (and so not identified with the 
ego), and disregards our wishes, even opposing our will. As Heidegger 
(1980) says "the call comes from me and yet from beyond me" (p. 275). 
When Jung uses the word IIpersonali ty II J he has a very specific meaning in 
mind, and it is with his sense of the word that Heidegger's conception 
of the unique, authentic existence is most compatible. Jung (1934) 
describes personality as follows: 
IIPersonality is the supreme realisation of the innate 
idiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high 
courage flung in the fac~ of life: the ahsoJute a.ffirma-
tion of all that constitutes the individual, the most 
successful adaptation to the universal conditions of 
existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom 
for self-determination" (p. 171). 
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For Jung, personality is not a given but an exceptional achievement. 
That which induces a man to realise his personality through going his 
own way and rising above the "unconscious identity with the mass" (cf. 
the IIthey-selfll in Heidegger) is what is conunonly called "vocation". 
The original meaning of lito have a vocation" is "to be addressed by a 
voice" _ Herein lies the connection between the development of personal-
ity and conscience, insofar as conscience also involves being addressed 
by a voice. In both cases the voice is conceived as :".an inner voice, as 
the voice of the inner man. It is a voice which commands; the individual 
" ... must obey his own law" (ibid., p. 176). The developing personality 
obeys only IIbrute necessity II J and '1, •• needs the motivating force of 
inner or outer fatalities" (ibid., p. 173). Development which was not 
motivated by such necessity would be tantamount to individualism. 
This element of necessity is not sufficient, however; personality will 
not develop unless the individual chooses his own way consciously and 
with moral deliberation. In the absence of necessity, the alleged 
development is lIa mere acrobatics of the willI!; if conscious decision 
is lacking, the development will get stuck in "unconscious automatism" 
(ibid., p. 174). 
In order to obey the inner voice , we need to overcome con ventions. 
Although conventions are collective necessities, in themselves they are 
" ... soulless mechanisms that can never understand more than the mere 
r('I1.ltine of life", a!1d the "creative. life always stands outside convention It 
(ibid., p . 178). The overcoming of conventions and the law (in its 
broadest, non-legalistic sense) " ... falls on l y to the man who knows 
how to put his soul in the place of conscience!!, and the few who are 
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capable of treading this path do so " . .. only from inner necessity, not 
to say suffering, for it is sharp as the edge of a r azor" (Jung, 1928, 
p. 237) . The development of personality, as fidelity to the law of 
onels own being, is both a charisma and a curse, since it involves the 
conscious and unavoidable segregation of the individual from the 
"undifferentiated and unconscious herd", i?Jld the devast~ting isolation 
which this entails. Nevertheless, for Jung (1934), the only meaningful 
life is a life " ... that strives for the individual realisation -
absolute and unconditional - of its own particular law" (p. 181). 
2 . 4.3 Fromm 
Fromm distinguishes two forms of conscience: the authoritarian conscience 
and the humanistic conscience. 
(a) Authoritarian conscience 
This fonn of conscience is II ••• the voice of an internalized external 
authority, the parents, the state, or whoever the authorities in a 
culture happen to be" (Fromm, 1949, pp. 143-4). Fromm regards the 
authoritarian conscience to be synonymous with the Freudian superego, 
and believes that it is possibly a preliminary stage in the development 
of true (humanistic) conscience. That the authoritarian conscience, 
taken on its own, cannot be the basis for a productive and creative life, 
becomes evident when he writes: 
"Paradoxically, the authoritarian guilty conscience is 
a result of the feeling of strength, independence , product-
iveness and pride (which attends asserting oneself in the 
face of the authority), while the authoritarian good 
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conscience springs from the feeling of obedience, 
dependence, powerlessness, and sinfulness (which 
attends submitting to this authority)" (ibid., p. 150, 
parenthesis added). 
(b) Humanistic conscience 
Humanistic conscience, as man's recall to himself, is our own voice, 
independent of external sanctions and rewards, which judges our function-
ing as human beings. Being derived from ~-scientiaJ conscience, as 
Fromm (1949) points out, is " ... knowledge within oneself, knowledge of 
our respective success or failure in the art of living" (p. 158). This 
"knowledge" is not merely cognitive, but has an affective quality, since 
it involves the reaction of the total personality and not only the reaction 
of the mind. Similarities between the views of conscience of Fromm and 
Heidegger become apparent when Fromm writes: 
"Conscience is thus a reaction of ourselves to 
ourselves. It is the voice of our true selves 
which summons us back to ourselves, to live pro-
ductively, to develop fully and harmoniously -
that is J to become what we potentially are" 
(ibid. , p. 159). 
Heidegger, however, would not necessarily go along with the specific 
content imputed to the summons by Fromm (i.e. "to live productively, to 
develop ful ly and harmoniously"). Nor would hi s view of the self be 
in agreement with that of Fromm who would conceive of the self in more 
LL'du.ii...ionally dualistic terms as an entity which exists over and against 
the world, rather than as being-in-the-world. 
Fromm (1959) contends that (humanistic) conscience is, by its very nature, 
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nonconforming; ..... it must be able to say no, when everybody else 
says yes!! and "to the degree to which a person conforms he cannot hear 
the voice of his conscience, much less act upon it" (p. 173). This 
conscience clearly opposes the notion of the conscience as superego, 
which in principle advocates conformity. 
One opposes the demands of one's conscience to the extent that one 
violates the integrity and proper functioning of one's personality. 
Such violation would include crippling oneself through becoming a tool 
for others, and being "selfless", unhappy, resigned or discouraged. 
However, it is extremely difficult to understand the communications of 
one's conscience, for two main reasons: 
1. in order to hear the voice of our conscience, we 
must be able to listen to ourselves, and most people 
in our culture have difficulty doing this, since we 
... .. listen to every voice and to everybody but not 
to ourselves" (ibid . , p . 161); 
2. listening to oneself entails one's being alone with 
oneself, and to be alone i$ difficult for modern 
man who has developed a phobia of being alonei we 
prefer ..... the most trivial and even obnoxious 
company J the mOnt me~.l1ingJ.ess acti vi ties to being 
alone with ourselves" (ibid., p. 161). 
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Our conscience, in not speaking to us directly, has difficulty in being 
heard, and perhaps the most frequent indirect reaction of our conscience 
to being neglected is " ... a vague and unspecific feeling of guilt and 
uneasiness, or simply a feeling of tiredness or listlessness tl (ibid., 
p. 162). Such feelings might be rationalised as guilt feelings for 
not having done one thing or another, whereas these omissions about 
which one feels guilty do not constitute genuine moral problems. 
However, if the genuine though unconscious feeling of guilt becomes too 
strong to be silenced by superficial rationalisations, " ... it finds 
expression in deeper and more intense anxieties and even in physical or 
mental sickness" (ibid., p. 162). One form of this anxiety, which is 
an expression of unconscious guilt, is the fear of disapproval. Though 
man "naturally" wants to be accepted by his fellows, this normal attitude 
has become distorted such that modern man wants to be accepted by every-
body, and so is afraid to deviate in his being from cultural and societal 
norms. The unconscious guilt feeling underlying this fear resides in 
the fact that the individual does not approve of himself in his failure 
to live productively, and so has to substitute approval by others for 
approval by himself. If others disapprove of him, he can no longer 
hide from his own disapproval of the way he is living, and so is forced 
to become conscious of his own genuine guilt. So he seeks in the 
shelter of the approval of others, protection from his conscience and 
the responsibility of living his own unique life. 
2.4.4 Laing 
Being inauthentic J in Heidegger's terms J implies that one has failed to 
- 60 -
appropriate one's own existence; one has forfeited anself to the 
"they" (others). This way of being would seem to suggest that one is 
insecure in one's very own being. It is for this reason that we will 
now examine Laing's work on ontological1 insecurity. 
Laing describes ontological insecurity as it characterises the severely 
schizoid and schizophrenic person. The characteristics of this way of 
being are likely to be less severe and less chronic in the case of 
individuals in their experience of conscience J and what follows should 
be seen in this light. 
The ontologically secure individual may experience his own being as 
real, alive, substantial and whole. He is for the most part clearly 
differentiated from others and the rest of the world, such that his 
identi ty and autonomy are never in question. By contrast, the 
ontologically insecure individual may feel more unreal than real, more 
dead than alive, more insubstantial than substantial, lacking in personal 
consistency or cohesi veness . He is precariously differentiated from 
others and the rest of the world, and so his identity and autonomy are 
always in question. He may also feel his self as be ing partially 
divorced from his body. 
The ontologically insecure person fears losing his identity and autonomy. 
'!lespi te the philosophical use of "ontology" by Heidegger et al., Laing 
uses the term in its empirical sense here since it appears to be the 
best adjective or adverbial deri vati ve of "being". 
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However, as Laing (1965) observes, "it seems to be a general law that 
at some point those very dangers most dreaded can themselves be encom-
passed to forestall their actual occurrence" (p. 51). So to forgo 
one's autonomy (by turning oneself into a lifeless thing such as a 
stone or automaton, a process which Laing calls "petrification") 
becomes the means of secretly safeguarding iti " .. . to play POSSlUTI J to 
feign death, becomes a means of preserving one's aliveness tl (ibid., p. 51). 
This strategy is what Sartre refers to as "becoming thing-like" . In 
like fashion, the individual tries to preserve his identity by never 
revealing his self (through being himself and owning his experience). 
The self becomes detached and disembodied1 , such that it is never revealed 
directly in the individual 's expressions and actions, and it never 
experiences anything immediately or spontaneously. "'!he self's r e lation-
ship to the other is always at one remove" (ibid . , p. 80), and transactions 
between the individual and others (and the world) become meaningless, 
futile and false. '!he self J thus isolated and "shut-up" J cannot be 
enriched by outer experience, and so " ... the whole inner world comes to 
be more and more impoverished J until the individual may come to feel 
he is merely a vacuum" (ibid. J p. 75). This relates to Kierkegaard, 
who claims that the self is lost when it no longer participates in 
venturesome interaction with the world (see Section 2.3.1). 
The unembodied self, engaging in nothing directly, becomes an onlooker 
1 It should be noted that, as Laing (1965) points out, " ... the split in 
the experience of one's own being into unembodied and embodied parts i s 
no more an index of latent psychosis than is total embodiment any 
guarantee of sanity" (p. 68). 
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and observes, controls and criticises what the body does and experiences. 
The unembodied self becomes hyper-conscious, developing a r e lationship 
with itself and with the body which can become very complex. In his 
observation of himself, the individual " ... turns the living spontaneity 
of his being into something dead and lifeless by inspecting it" 
(ibid., p. 11 2) . The individual is self-conscious not only in the 
above sense (i . e. of being conscious of himself) but also in the sense 
of being aware of himself as an object of others' observation . It is 
necessary for him to be self-conscious in the latter sense to ensure 
that his way of being conforms to what he perceives to be others' 
expectations of him, and so to maintain his "false-self system" (see 
Laing, 1965, p. 73). 
The uemptiness, sense of inner lack of richness, substantiality and 
value" which the individual experiences in this condition " ... is a 
powerful prompter to make 'contact' with reality II (ibid. J p. 91). This 
lends support to Heidegger's view that the call of conscience, which 
appeals to one 'to be one's authentic self (and so t o be more real), 
receives its impetus from the (inauthentic) condition in which one has 
surrendered oneself to the "they II • 
2.5 Concluding comments 
It can be seen, from the above r eview, that in whatever form inauthenticity 
(as the source of the experience o f conscience) appears J it involves the 
denial or oppositio n of o ne 's e sse ntial being and the dis-ease which 
follows from this. The "essential being" referred to here i s not 
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intended to imply any pre-determined or fixed nature or essence , as 
suggested by the notion "human nature" (in this regard it would appear 
that man is better understood in tenns of "the human condition" than 
in terms of "human nature 11 ) i lIessential being" encompasses the various 
ways in which our authentic being is characterised by the different 
authors, whether this be in terms of "existence" (Sartre) or the 
development of "personality" (Jung) ~ As Tillich (1959) has noted, 
II ••• however the norm (of what man potentially is) 
is formulated man has the power of acting against it, 
of contradicting his essential being, of losing his 
destiny " (p. 59, parenthesis added), 
It is out of the state of estrangement resulting from this contradiction 
of one's essential being that conscience calls one to reaffirm this 
essential being. 
The focus of the present study is on the psychologica l manifestations 
of (antic) conscience as derived from Heidegger's (ontological) con-
ception of conscience. Accordingly, the aim of this literature-review 
has been to explore, from a psychological perspective, the nature of 
this particular phenomenon within its appropriate context (viz . of 
inauthenticity and authenticity) and not to enter into a philosophical 
c r itique of individua l authors. Philosophers have had more to say 
about conscience than have psychologists, who have either neglected 
thi s area o f human experience or narrowly redefined it (see Section 2.4.1). 
Consequently J this review has concentra-ted more on philosophical than on 
psychological works. Nevertheless, the following (mostly psychological) 
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literature was consulted in compiling this review, but yielded little 
of significance which could not be subsumed under the literature 
presented above: Blum, 1970; Boss, 1962; Bugerttal et al., 1 965, 1984; 
Ching, 1978; Cremer, 1975; Keogh, 197 9 ; Knight, 1964; Loevinger, 
1976; Maddi, · 1967; Rogers, 1967; Schrag, 1963; Underwood, 1974; 
Weyerhaeuser, 1975; Zbinden, 1970. 
- 65 -
CHAPTER 3 
3. METHOD 
In t his chapter, no attempt will be made to provide a rationale for 
the phenomenological method of research as it is used in psychology; 
by now this method has been sufficiently well established to render 
such a rationale unnecessary. Suffice it to say that without such a 
method, one would scarcely be able to gain meaningful access to such a 
diffuse and pervasive phenomenon as conscience wi thin i tS :-. context of 
authenticity and inauthenticity. 
What follows, then, is a description of the procedure which was followed 
in order to arrive at the structure of conscience. 
3.1 Collection of data 
3.1.1 Research question 
Phenomenology deals with phenomena as they are experienced by people 
(subjects) in the everyday lived-world (Lebenswelt). Accordingly, the 
question which one poses in phenomenological research must be aimed at 
the everyday understanding of subjects such that they might describe as 
immediately and spontaneously as possible the world (situation) as it 
is lived by them. As Wertz (1983) observes, what in part makes research 
p~ychological is " . .. a - .... --~--o I..uu.y of iTlan ' :5 pal-tic .i.pation in the immanent 
significations of lived situations" (p . 206). 
The present study poses a problem in this regard, in that we do not 
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have a name, in our everyday language, for the phenomenon being studied. 
It would clearly be most inappropriate to ask an uninformed subject to 
describe an experience of antic conscience as derived from Heidegger's 
ontological conception of conscience. It was, therefore, necessary to 
establish through a close examination of the meaning of conscience in 
Heidegger, the types of concrete, everyday experiences which might 
implicitly reveal the structure of this phenomenon of conscience. A 
question was then formulated to elicit descriptions of these experiences 
from subjects. The rationale underlying this step has already been 
presented (see Section 1.2). 
Subjects were asked to: 
"Describe as concretely and accurately as possible, a 
situation in which you felt you were not being true to 
yourself ll • 
Subjects were required to write a description in response to the above 
request. 
3.1 .2 Subjects 
Descriptions were collected from sixty-four potential subjects. Of 
these descriptions, the four which were psychologically richest were 
chosen for analysis. The four subjects who had written these 
descriptions were all adults, two men and two women, in their thirties: 
Protocol A 
Protocol B 
Protocol C 
Protocol D 
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Kristen 33 
Burt 
Janet 
36 
31 
Leonard 38 
That the most suitable descriptions came from more mature subjects is not 
surprising; to respond meaningfully to the research question required 
a certain degree of self-awareness and self-transparency which, judging 
from their protocols, was not readily available to less mature subjects. 
3.1.3 Interviews 
After reading each protocol thoroughly, the researcher interviewed each 
subject individually on his particular protocol, having in the interim 
pin-pointed areas in the description which were either of particular 
interest or, lacking in clarity, required further elaboration. A non-
directive procedure was adopted in the interviews: subjects were 
prompted either through the researcher's reflecting back to them what 
they had written, or through asking them to tell him more about what 
they had said, without guiding them in any particular direction . Such 
an interview is referred to as the Irinquiry", and appears in transcribed 
form after each written protocol. 
It was decided to adopt this procedure of both asking subjects to write 
a description and interviewing them on this description for two reasons: 
1. it was believed that, c onscience being such a diffuse 
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phenomenon, its structure would be made more 
accessible in a few lengthier, in-depth protocols 
than in many more shorter, superficial descriptions 
(this belief being confirmed in a personal communi-
cation with Professor A Giorgi, 1982); 
2. whereas the written protocol allows for a more 
integrated and ordered description of the 
phenomenon while (possibly) having the drawback of 
being too reflective, the interview, which tends to 
elicit the phenomenon in a more haphazard way, allows 
the subject, to a certain extent, spontaneously to 
re-live the situation as it was originally experienced; 
hence each approach compensates for the shortcomings 
of the other. 
3.2 Analysis of the data 
3.2.1 Method of explication 
The protocols were analysed through implementing a modified version of 
the well-known psychological-phenomenological method developed by 
Giorgi (1975, 1982). Similar methods of analysis have been employed 
by Fischer (1971, 1974) and Stevick (1971) . In the present study, 
Giorgi IS method was modified by including an extra step, as implemented 
by de Koning (1979). 
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The method of explication adopted in respect of each protocol in turn 
may be described in terms of the following steps: 
1. The entire description (i.e. both the written 
section and the inquiry) was read as many times as 
was necessary to grasp a sense of the whole state-
ment. 
2. Having grasped the sense of the whole} the researcher 
returned to the beginning of the text and read through 
it once more with the specific aim of discriminating 
"natural meaning units" (N.M.U.'s). These N ..... M.U. 's 
are discriminations within the subject.ls description 
that are perceived by the researcher when he assumes 
a psychological attitude towards the concrete 
description, and within this attitude, the set that 
the text is an example of conscience. At this 
point, these N.M.U.'s were expressed in the third person 
(whereas the original description is in the first person), 
such that wherever "I"accurred, it was transformed into 
liS" (for "subject II). 
was left unchanged. 
Otherwise the subject's language 
The reason for effecting this 
transformation is that it serves to remind the researcher 
that it is from the perspective of the subject that he 
ought to understand the description and not from his own 
perspective . As Wertz (1983) remarks, lithe researcher 
is interested in the way the situation appears to the 
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subject, the meanings of the objects and events for 
him, and the participation in terms of which such 
meanings arise" (p. 206 emphasis added). The N.M.U. 's 
resulting from carrying out this step appear in the 
left-hand column of Table 
in the Results chapter. 
of the protocols presented 
3. The researcher then reflected on the subject's . everyday 
expressions, now demarcated in terms of natural meaning 
units, and carne up with the essence of that situation 
for the subject with respect to the phenomenon of 
conscience. Each N.M .U. was systematically interrogated, 
through a process of reflection and imaginative variation 
(see Giorgi, 1982a, pp. 12 f; Wertz;, 1983, pp. 209-210), 
for what it revealed about conscience for each subject 
in his particular situation. The ultimate object of 
reflection was not the description itself (despite its 
necessity for this reflection), but the subject's 
actual situation as lived by him. As Wertz (1983) has 
noted J II ••• reflection ultimately addresses the subject t s 
participation in the network of immanent significations 
which make up his lived reali ty" (p. 207). Hence it 
was necessary for the researcher to enter the world 
of the sUbject. 
The results of this step appear in the right-hand column 
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of Table 1 of the protocols presented in the 
Results chapter. The aim of this step is to 
arrive at description which is psychologically 
revelatory. This phase of the research is crucial. 
As Wertz (1983) has observed: 
"The transformation into psychological 
language is not a mere translation into or 
replacement with the abstract, sedimented 
terms of psychology. What is involved here 
is original speaking on the part of the re-
searcher, for this phase is psychology in 
the making" (p. 210), 
4. Next the researcher expressed the transformed meaning units 
(occurring in the right-hand column of Table 1), more 
directly in terms of conscience. The results of this 
step appear in Table 2 of the protocols presented in the 
Results chapter. These central themes (each of which 
expresses more generally the essence of a number of 
transformed N.M.U.Js) were arrived at with a view to 
formulating the General Description. . Consequently, 
it was necessary in places to include in the Specific 
Description of the situated structure, constituents 
of the original protocol which, though necessary to 
make sense of the Specific Description, were not 
iw . .:luueu .in Tctvle 2 becauoe of their being t.oo specific. 
This is the step which was derived from the method of 
de Koning (1979). 
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5. Finally, the researcher synthesised and integrated 
the insights achieved in the above steps (especially 
as expressed in the central themes of Table 2 
referred to in step 4) into a consistent description 
of the structure of conscience. This description 
is referred to as the Specific Description of the 
situated structure of conscience, and appears in 
Table 3 of the protocols presented in the Results 
chapter. The structure is described as being 
"si tuated" in that the Specific Description remains 
faithful to the concrete, individual subject and 
his specific situation. The extent to which this 
Specific Description actually did remain true to 
the situation as lived by the subject was checked 
by discussing it with the subject. Where dis-
crepancies arose between his actual experience and 
the researcher's description, the description was 
modified accordingly. The term "situated" is 
dropped when we move to the General Description in 
which more than one subject (and hence situation) 
is involved. 
3.2.2 Extended Description of the structure of conscience 
The Specific Descriptions of the situated structures of conscience were 
then integrated into an Extended Description. The researcher read and 
re-read the Specific Description and central themes of each protocol until 
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common themes emerged . It should be noted, however, that the 
Extended Description contains not only common themes, but also themes 
which are not necessarily common t o two or more protocols, but which, 
although they might appear in only one protocol, serve to illuminate 
interesting possibilities in the experience of conscience. 
3.2.3 General Description of the structure of conscience 
Finally, the researcher formulated a General Description, which, as 
distinct from the Extended Description, contains only those themes which 
occur at least implicitly in the protocols generally. Taken as a 
whole, the General Description embodies the necessary and sufficient 
conditions, constituents and structural relations which constitute the 
phenomenon of conscience in general. In order to carry out this step 
it was necessary to make a deeply reflective penetration into each situated 
structure, in the light of the others, in order to find common features 
that were sometimes highly implicit. It should be noted at this point 
that, in order for an insight or theme to be generally valid , " ... it is 
not required that it must have already been made explicit in all cases 
but that it can be found in the other cases upon further reflection" 
(Wertz , 1983 , p. 230). OUr aim he re is to establish what is t ypical 
of the phenomenon (viz. conscience) rathe r than what is universal 
(Professor D Kruger, personal communication, 1984). 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. RESULTS 
This chapter will take the following form: 
4.1 Protocol A 
Table 1 
Table 2 
Table 3 
4.2 Protocol B 
Table 1 
Table 2 
Table 3 
4.3 Protocol C 
Table 1 
Table 2 
Ta.ble 3 
Kristen 
Qualitative Analysis 
Central themes expressed more directly in 
terms of conscience 
Specific Description of the situated structure 
of conscience 
Burt 
Qualitative Analysis 
Central themes expressed more directly in 
terms of conscience 
Specific Description of the situated structure 
of conscience 
Janet 
Qualitative Analysis 
Central themes expressed more directly in 
terms of conscience 
Specific Description of the situated structure 
of conscience 
4.4 Protocol D 
Table 
Table 2 
Table 3 
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Leonard 
Qualitative Analysis 
Central themes expressed more directly in 
terms of conscience 
Specific Description of the situated structure 
of conscience 
4.5 Extended Description of the structure of conscience 
4.6 General Description of the structure of conscience 
In the left-hand column of Table 1, wherever the researcher's words 
appear (either in the form of a question or a clarifying remark) they 
have been demarcated by the use of brackets. The acronym IINROC II , 
occurring in the right-hand column of this table, stands for "not 
revelatory of conscience". 
In order to avoid making this chapter (and thesis) disproportionately 
lengthy, the qualitative analysis of only the first two protocols has 
been presented here. The remaining two protocols (C and D) may be 
found in their original form, though demarcated in terms of meaning 
units, in the Appendix. Should the qualitative analyses of these 
protocols be required, they may be obtained from the researcher. 
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4 . 1 PROTOCOL A KRISTEN 
Table 1 : Qualitative Analysis 
Discriminated meaning units expressed Discriminated meaning units expressed 
as much as possible in SIS language 
and based upon the perspective that 
the description was an example of 
conscience. 
As 5 advanced in her position, 
more directly in psychological 
language and with respect to rele-
vancy for the phenomenon of con-
science. 
In view of the status, material 
was promoted} drove a company car, security and respect from colleagues 
getting an above average salary, 
there was no reason for her to 
leave . She was told she was 
apparently respected by the staff. 
which S was granted in her job, she 
saw no reason to leave it. 
2 The decision (to leave) came when, She decided to leave when she found 
in one of S' s regular disagree.- herself saying something meaningless 
ments with her boss, she heard which she had not consciously in-
herself uttering a sentence which tended to say. 
meant nothing. 
3 S realised she hadn't even been 
really listening to what was 
being said , nor had she bothered 
to construct a sentence making 
sense. 
S realised that she had not been 
involved meaningfully in the 
situation in which she found herself. 
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4 S was bored with the set-up, she 
didn't really want to be there 
and she wasn't suited to the 
work she was doing. 
5 But because of the above (being 
promoted, driving a company car, 
getting an above average sa.lary, 
being respected by the staff) S 
had stayed, thinking it was the 
"right!! thing to do. 
6. S decided to leave, but not to 
S experienced her situation as 
boring and uninviting, and felt 
unsuited to her work. 
5 remained in the situation in 
which she did not feel at home 
through implicitly accepting what 
she perceived to be the general 
view that it was the right thing 
to do. 
S decided to find work to which 
go into a similar jop. in another she would be more suited, even 
company, but find what she knew though this might have entailed 
was more her type of work, even sacrificing the material benefits 
if it meant dropping in salary, associated with her current job. 
and losing the car. 
7 (You mention that you were 
bored with the set-up in your job 
and you didn't really want to be 
there. Can you tell me a bit 
more about that?) 
S found that although she was 
doing work that was important, 
Despite the occasional sense of 
achievement , S constantly experienced 
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and although she sometimes came 
away feeling at the end of the 
day. _. "Oh I I ve achieved some-
thing, I've done something that 
was good, 11 she had the constant 
underlying feeling that she was 
not actually satisfied. 
8 (5 felt that) she was doing things 
which she was thinking and not 
feeling. 5he was thinking it was 
good and thinking it had potential 
an underlying feeling of dissatis-
faction. 
5's behaviour was prompted by her 
thinking, and she was not committed 
to her behaviour at the affective 
level. It was her faith in the 
and it probably had potential, and potential which she saw in the 
for that reason she stayed. because situation. which led her to remain 
it had potential she was sure, and in it. 
therefore she must get that 
potential. 
9 But 5 wasn't really interested 
whether they (the company) made 
one million profit that year and 
forty million the next year, and 
ba.sically that was what her objec-
She ~·!.aS!l1 t interested 
in setting the objectives which 
you had to set every three months, 
that she would conduct an interview 
5 was not interested in the dictated 
objectives which she was expected 
to strive for, and saw them as un-
important. 
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on such and such a day and she 
would get the statistics by such 
and such a time. She really 
couldn't see any importance in it. 
10 In terms of the whole she could see 
why it was important. But where 
she was concerned, it just held no 
relevance for her at all. 
11 Basically it ended up that S was 
working for a salary and for a rise 
at the end of the year and the 
objectives that were set during the 
year would go to determine whether 
she got an increase or not. The 
objectives that were being set for 
her were so inane in her opinion J 
that she thought how could she get 
a salary increase on such rubbish. 
12 Though S was getting paid well, she 
S could see the importance of the 
objectives in terms of the entire 
organisation, but they lacked 
relevance for her personally. 
Ultimately, S experienced herself 
as working for long-term, impersonal 
goals, the basis of which she found 
inane and degrading . 
S felt that she did not deserve the 
wasn't getting the salary that other good salary she was being paid in 
personnel managers ... or she could view of the work she was doing . 
have got if she had gone to another 
company, because the change would 
have increased the salary a few 
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hundred, simply by changing jobs, so 
although S wasn't getting as much as 
she could have got in another com-
pany, she at the same time felt that 
her work didn't justify what she was 
getting. 
13 And yet S didn't feel that she was 
prepared to go through all the 
rubbish that she had to go through, 
like this one not liking the meals 
downstairs,and in the canteen the 
manager speaking badly to the 
Blacks, and having to sort that 
problem out. She just thought, 
why couldn't they get on and sort 
their own problems out, why must 
she go in there. She almost 
justified her salary, not by the 
thinking she was having to do, but 
with the endurance and the tol-
erance she was having to undertake. 
She just thinks she was there f or 
the wrong reasons. 
14 (You didn't really identify with the 
goals that were being set for you?) 
S endured and tolerated much that 
was unpleasant to her in order to 
stay in her position and obtain 
her salary. She thinks she was 
there for the wrong reasons. 
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S did identify with the goals that 
were being set for her. She used 
to get quite excited really when a 
planned objective had been reached 
and she had contributed to that in 
selecting the right people because 
they could not have done it without 
the right people . 
15 But at the same time there were 
so many factors that apparently 
seemed beyond (her re,alm of in-
fluence), that it seemed almost 
irrelevant whether S chose the 
right people or not. If the 
economic situation went down, then 
those people were fired, and al-
though they had proved themselves 
to be the right people, they had 
got what they were meant to get, 
the other factor is beyond anybody's 
control, they were sent off. Then 
they found themselves having to look 
for another group of people, but the 
calibre they had to look for was not 
the same, and they had to produce 
the same results. 
S would get excited when an ob-
jective, to the attainment of 
which she had contributed, was 
reached. 
S would doubt the relevance of 
her contributions in the face of 
the uncontrollable factors which 
could randomly rob these contri-
butions of their value, rendering 
them futile. 
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16 There were certain procedures that 
were taking place there that 8 
couldn't agree with, and she felt 
that other practices could have 
been used that were perhaps more 
humane. 
17 8 has a conflict about business. 
8he doesn't know that business needs 
to be a cut-throat thing, yet it 
seems (to her) to be the only way 
that people are able to operate in 
business. 8he thinks that one can 
combine a humane approach to busi-
ness and still meet objectives , but 
one will meet them in a pleasanter 
environment. 
18 What was happening in 8 ' s situation 
was that the economic state was be-
coming very tight and people were 
becoming very angry and goals were 
having to be met, but the manager 
was looking at things in (terms of) 
short-term aims and not long-term 
effects. 80 if they could make 
sure that they could get. rid of 
8 disagreed with the inhumane 
practices carried out at her 
work , and felt that better 
alternatives were possible. 
NROC 
NROC 
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everybody who was perhaps a little 
bit superfluous, then make those 
(remaining) others work harder, which 
in itself is okay that the others 
work harder but then when it is time 
to get more people to come in, they 
are not seeing the effect that it 
is having on the morale of the people 
who have had to stay, as are the new 
people who are going to come in. 
Because they (the new employees) 
are going to know what the company 
does i n the hard times, and in a 
hard time that company just gets 
rid of people , so they come in with 
an insecurity immediately that people 
who have stayed and worked hard are 
resentful and also insecure, because 
they actually have got nothing more 
except that they have kept their jobs, 
which is perhaps a big thing, but 
they have had to work double and the 
company has given them nothing else. 
And should that economic situation 
arise again, they may be the next to 
go, and what have they got from it? 
And so it seemd to S that while they 
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were O~ the one hand achieving some-
thing, on the other hand - which 5 
thinks might have been greater than 
what they were achieving - they were 
creating an atmosphere amongst these 
people who were being forced to do 
something and not really doing it 
willingly, and not with the will to 
do it. 
19 (They were just parts in a big 
organisation without being given 
their due as people?) 
5 assents to the question. And 
then there would be all those 
various training courses, to 
motivate and to consider and to 
respect and to negotiate, but when 
it came down to the crunch, there 
was no such thing as negotiation 
and no such thing as consideration, 
5 perceived a discrepancy between 
the policies the company advocated 
to be adopted (humane policies 
emphasising consideration and 
negotiation) and the policies 
actually adopted by the company 
in practice (policies involving 
coercion). S saw no way of 
it was a case of the manager say- assenting to objectives that were 
ing, "These are your objectives J dictated in a manner which pre-
and I don't really care hew you feel cluded her own personal involvement 
about them, you just do them." in them. 
Yet in the training and in the 
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interactions, they were saying, 
"You have to agree on your objec-
tives, you must agree on them, other-
wise you are not going to achieve 
them J if you don't agree. II Bu t 
the way it was put across, there was 
no chance of agreeing. 
20 S takes herself as an example. While explicitly acknowledging 
"What are your objectives, Kristen?" and praising S's objectives, SiS 
(her boss would ask), and S would boss would tacitly and in effect 
say J "I would like to see more ignore them. 
industrial relations being done, 
how I plan this and that to do it . " 
ItOh, that is an excellent idea 
Kristen", and then (she would) 
write it down. "I want you to do 
this Kristen, I want you to do the 
stat s for this and this." 
21 But S would say, "What are we get-
ting from these stats ? " "Well its 
going to prove to England or to 
whoever that we have achieved this 
and done that" J and S would say J 
"But we did this last year and 
nothing c ame out of it so why must 
S was forced to give precedence 
to the objectives that were 
dictated to her, even though these 
were, to her, pointless objectives. 
As a result, her own objectives 
were sometimes eliminated entirely. 
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I do it this year?" 
"No) we have got to do it." So 
that would take precedence over 
industrial relations, and, in fact, 
certain things just eliminated all 
of SiS own objectives. 
22 50 5 would be doing her own object- SiS own objectives acquired a 
ives only when she could. But they mere peripheral status and her 
weren't becoming the issue. Now situation seemed unreal to her. 
that 5 is out of it, it has dis-
tanced itself, but while she was 
there, it was like it wasn't real. 
23 5 had a new chap corne and work with 
her, and she thought, well, she 
couldn't tell him what was going on 
because she didn't want to in-
fluence (him) - maybe it was just 
her own perceptions of the whole 
thing. She didn't want to in-
fluence (him) - he was terribly 
excited about corning (into the 
company), and doing his work; what 
he had been told (to do), and he 
was there for three months and he 
said, he started to express what 5 
When a new employee joined the 
company, 5 was at first reluctant 
to influence him with her per-
ception of the work situation, 
since she suspected that her view 
might not have been shared by 
others. However, when he began 
to express feelings similar to 
her own regarding the work situa-
tion, she felt that she could 
openly share her reality with him. 
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was feeling or had been feeling, 
and 8 thought, okay, now they could 
talk. Because prior to that 8 was 
not, she did not feel in a position 
that she could tell him what was 
getting on her nerves and what 
wasn't right and what shouldn't 
have been done. 
24 While 8 was trying to (work pro-
ductively in her situation) and 
not achieving (this), she thought 
it (her failure) must just be part 
of herself. And he (the new em-
ployee) said it was just nothing 
(compared) to what he had expected, 
the whole thing was just a game, 
which was not even a nice game. 
25 One would be rated at the end of 
the year, like A, B, C, DJ E, and 
a C would be the good average which 
most of them would get, and to be 
a B or A one had t.n De a.bs0!t.!tely 
like a six to ten worker. Doing 
all sorts of things after work. 
When he (the new employee) approached 
The new employee confirmed the 
reality of 8's perception of the 
situation as an artificial and 
unpleasant one, whereas before 
she had doubted this reality 
and saw her difficulties as 
being part of herself. 
The symbols by which the employees 
were rated each year were fairly 
2rbitrarily assigned and lacked 
meaning. 
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somebody and said: "What must I 
do because I want to get the 120% 
bonus", they couldn I t answer. So 
these things were just symbols. 
They had no meaning attached to 
them. 
26 50 this is what the whole job was. 
A lot of words with no real signi-
ficance. 
27 (You mentioned that you thought it 
was the right thing to do, to stay 
in your job, although you didn't 
enjoy it and you were bored, you 
felt it was the right thing to do . 
Just tell me a bit more about that?) 
5 had felt that perhaps she had got 
5 saw her job as being devoid 
of all real meaning, while 
attempting to sustain the facade 
of meaningfulness. 
S remained in her unpleasant sit-
into the syndrome of nWhat is adult?!! uation since, to have left it, she 
(In terms of this syndrome) you 
don't go chopping and changing 
jobs - 5 had been to university, 
had a decent job - and not many 
people have a decent job - and you 
don't just throw up everything and 
would have had to go against what 
she believed to be generally ex-
pected of a woman of her age and 
background. 
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start again at something new, and 
definitely not at S's age. That 
really would be a bit irresponsible 
and perhaps not in the so-called 
adult way. 
28 Every time that S wanted to change 
or do something different, she did 
it and had continued opposition 
from those around her, that she 
shouldn't have done it, that she 
should be this and should be that. 
29 S had got into a position which she 
recognised as being a very good 
position and recognised herself as 
having a responsibility. She 
wasn't doing a job that perhaps she 
Whenever S wanted to break away 
from her previous ways of being, 
she did so, despite opposition 
from those around her, who pre-
scribed how she should be. 
S was reluctant to leave her 
situation since she held a good, 
responsible position which she 
regarded as an achievement to 
have attained. This position 
could have done ten years ago. She carried with it the trimmings, 
had moved. She hadn't dropped in 
her (salary) ... she had progressed, 
and therefore she believed because 
she thought that that job had 
securities and status which people 
in general regarded as valuable. 
She doubted the realisability of 
her own aspirations, which she 
potential and that ~he could progress felt might merely be fantastic, 
further in it, and thought, well, 
stop chasing rainbows and thinking 
that something is better somewhere 
and was tempted to accept the 
received reality, in terms of 
which she had fulfilled her status 
- 90 -
else . Just get together and stay. 
(She thought to her'self that) she had 
all the benefits everyone seEmed to 
strive for and she had the security 
everyone seemed to think one must 
have and she had status and repu-
tation and she had the job. She 
had a job, and that is what you do 
when you are grown UPJ is to have 
a job. 
30 So S also in her own mind thought 
maybe she was just thinking things 
that weren't there, maybe she just 
fantasised in that she had illusions 
about things that were better. 
Maybe she must come to terms with 
reality and that was what life was 
all about, dull and monotonous, and 
get on with it. 
31 80 actually all the time, 8 was 
actually pushing away from her 
feelings, her own gut feeling, she 
supposes J she was ignoring what she 
was really feeling and she was 
rationalising it with all the out-
as an adult. 
S doubted the reality of her own 
possibilities, and thought she 
might have to come to terms with 
the everyday reality which she 
found dull and monotonous. 
S was actively avoiding her own 
gut feelings in her attempt to 
sustain and live in terms of 
reality as socially defined. 
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side arguments, that she had been 
told and taught and recognised that 
that was how it happened to people 
as they went from one stage to the 
next. 
32 S was continually saying to herself, S realised that what made her 
"Now stop thinking (that there's a 
better job)". She recognised that 
there wasn't a better job, and she 
recognised that changing her com-
pany and going into the field that 
she knew she had experience in, she 
didn't think for one moment that 
she was going to find contentment 
there (in a new job). Because 
people said to 5, "If you are not 
happy here, go and get another 
job, you can get it", and S recog-
nised that she could get it . She 
had qualifications, she had ex-
perience and she had the necessary 
experience, but she realised - she 
at least liste ned to herself there, 
and said "That is not different to 
what this is because it's not s o 
much the job that is the is sue, but 
unhappy was not so much the 
particular company itself that 
she worked for, but the general 
approach and policies of this 
company, which were shared by 
most other companies she knew, 
and on this point she did not 
allow herself to be persuaded 
otherwise by the people around 
her. 
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the content is going to be the same; 
the approach is going to be the same, 
because this is what business is." 
5 had visited other companies on 
business, and she had seen how they 
were working, and their approach 
wasn't much different to the 
company she was working for. 
33 50 5 wasn't, she thinks that when 
things started falling into place, 
she realised she wasn't actually 
thinking things were greener some-
where else, she realised they were 
as bleak everywhere else, but in 
that bleakness you can have satis-
faction, whereas what S was doing, 
she was having that bleakness with-
out satisfaction. Even if she 
moved to another company, not 
another pharmaceutical company, but 
just engineering or something, she 
would initially have had that "Ah, 
this is more satisfying", but only 
because she was mixing with a 
different thinking person. But 
once the acquaintances and relation-
S found no fulfillment in her 
work situation, and saw t he work 
as being intrinsically unfulfilling. 
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ships had been established, the 
essence of the work, the content of 
the work was going to be the same, 
and therefore her feeling about it 
was going to be the same. Her 
attitude towards it, her satis-
faction that it wasn't fulfilling, 
(were going to be the same). 
34 The right thing to do then, S 
supposes, to answer R's question 
(lililhy did you stay?"), was because 
of outside, it wasn't right . for S, 
but it was right for what she had 
been led to believe was right . 
It was right in that context. It 
was not right for S. 
35 (You said that eventually you de-
cided, the decision came when you 
had one of your usual disagreements 
with your boss, and you heard your-
self uttering a sentence which 
meant nothing. Could you say a 
bit more about that?) 
S wishes she could remember 
S stayed in her situation not 
because it was the right thing 
to do for her personally, but 
because it was right within the 
context of socially approved 
values. 
5 prereflective ly utte red a non-
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the sentence. She just knows it sensical sentence, and only 
was nonsense, absolutely nonsensical, realised this through its being 
she doesn't even think the words 
linked. She only realised she had 
been talking nonsense when she re-
cognised the look on her (boss') 
face. Her face told S that what 
she had said was, she couldn't 
fathom out what S was saying. 
36 S then reflected, and thought, 
"My God, now I have obviously corne 
to the limit. If I am able to 
mirrored in the perplexed ex-
pression on the face of her boss. 
On reflection, S was shocked at 
being ambiguously present (she 
was simultaneously there and 
stand here in front of her and be also not there) to her boss while 
somewhere else while an apparently a seemingly important issue was 
importaht issue is being discussed." being discussed, and this inc i-
S really doesn't remember what the dent constituted a turning point 
issue was. for her. 
37 S had got to the point where nothing S fails to remember the particular 
was important, and that is probably 
why she doesn't remember it (the 
issue) because everything was just 
going into the other, everything 
was as unimportant and as insigni-
ficant and the issues were being 
made about those insignificant 
issue as at this stage everything 
seemed undifferentiated to her, 
all things being equally unim-
portant and insignificant, and 
issues were being made of these 
matters which were of no conse-
quence to S. 
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things and 5 was responding to 
something like - she can perhaps give 
an example. 
38 The riots . . . and they (the workers) 
were commemorating it, and she 
(8 I s boss) said, IIHave you checked 
that they are all at work?", so 5 
said J nYes, that area is and that 
What had once been 5's work-
project had lost all significance 
for her, such that what arose as 
issues for her boss in the work 
situation, were non-issues for 5, 
area is and Ben's checking up on the since they were devoid of signi-
other two, but this one isn't. ficance for her and failed to 
It was the 16th of June, it was ten move her . 
o'clock in the morning, and they 
had not arrived at work. "What 
are you going to do Kristen?" 
(asked 5 's boss). 50 5 knows 
that on this occasion, which she 
doesn't think was the one that she 
mentioned (5 apparently thinks she 
mentioned an occasion in her 
written protocol), S said, !lWell 
what do you want me to dO?1I 
because what can you do when you 
are fifty miles from 50weto and 
its ten o'clock in the morning and 
you haven't a clue where to find 
the people anyway. 5 found the 
- 96 -
question inane and therefore the 
answer was appropriate. But this 
was what S was continually having 
to deal with. Situations and 
questions, expecting answers, which 
didn't have any ... there was not 
significance in them. Maybe Shad 
got to the point where those things 
did have significance but she just 
wasn 't seeing it. 
39 There was another example where S 
had not been able to find a Vet. 
Rep. They had advertised and they 
S begins to get annoyed with the 
set-up at work, wants to throw 
it up, and no longer cares about 
had advertised, and they had gone it. 
to colleges and they had gone to 
universities. They had gone into 
the Farmer's Weekly, the Landbou, 
the works , , and the manager downstairs 
was getting into an absolute tizz. 
He was obviously going back to her 
(S I S boss) and saying J "What is 
going on?1I And every week S would 
be reporting on the progress that 
had or hadn't been made and the new 
ideas that had been implemented, but 
she wasn't getting into a frenzy, 
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and she wasn't getting excited, she 
wasn't screaming and she wasn't 
crying and she wasn't throwing her 
hands up in alarm, and she (S's 
boss) came to 5 one morning and S -
maybe this was also a point where 
she thought, "Dammit, forget the 
rest of this J I don I t care. II 
40 She (5's boss) went to S and she 
said, "What have you done?" in a 
very aggressive, accusing tone, 
and she said J "I am $0 upset (and 
she banged her hands on the desk) 
I am so upset with you Kristen, 
because it is your responsibility 
to make sure that Ben does his 
work, and he's not doing his work, 
and you haven't got your Vet. Rep." 
S said, "Well J can you give me any 
idea of what more could be done in 
this instance?" lilt doesn't 
matter what could have been done 
and not been done Kristen, but you 
don't seem to be perturbed about it.'1 
So S said J "Because I am not throwing 
my arms up and I'm not having a 
SiS boss expressed her anger to 
S . concerning SiS apparent lack 
of involvement in and concern for 
her work. 5 justified herself by 
saying that she need not show her 
anxiety and concern in order to 
feel it. S was exasperated with 
her boss' demands which she believed 
to be unreasonable. 
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tantrum and because I'm not scream-
ing, doesn't mean that I am not per-
turbed. It means that I'm aware of 
the situation and that I am not go-
ing to let it get out of hand." 
She said, IIBut you just don t t seem 
anxious." So S said J !lWell I don It 
have to show my anxiety, I am as 
concerned as you are, I'm doing 
perhaps more than what you are doing, 
and I am just not showing it. But 
you cannot come to me and tell me 
that I am not doing anything and 
I am not anxious because I am not 
letting everyone know where I am." 
S said, "Anyway what do you want me 
to do?" 8 asked her at that stage. 
She said," I don't know I I don I t 
know", and S just walked out. 
41 8he (8's boss) called 8 baok after-
wards and said that she apologised 
but she was so worried she didn't 
know what to do. 8 said they 
could think of something to do, 
but what got 8 was the fact that 
she was getting or supposed to be 
5 was annoyed by her boss' wanting 
her to control things beyond her 
realm of influence, since S saw 
this to be futile. 
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getting agitated over issues that 
were being controlled by other 
people to the point that they could 
be, and she (S's boss) was asking 
S now to control environmental 
factors, which she found unreason-
able and which she found totally 
pointless. 
42 She (S's boss) wasn't using the 
fact that the environmental 
factors were creating a situation, 
and in that, they could combine 
and find a resolution. She (S's 
boss) was wanting to change the 
environmental factors and S was 
constantly being confronted with 
why she had not changed the environ-
mental factors and economy and this 
nonsense in her mind. 
43 (It was completely out of your ... ) 
5 thinks people can control the 
environment up to a point, you can 
control what is happening up to a 
point, but you can't (control it 
S's view of the set-up at work 
differed frcm that of her boss, 
since she wanted to work con-
structively with the givens of the 
situation whereas her boss wanted 
to change these givens. 
S wa.s affect-.ed by her boss I response 
of agitation to the work situation 
with which she could not identify 
herself. 
44 
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completely). 5 was getting the 
feeling she (5's boss) was almost 
asking 5 that sort of thing, (like 
to) change night and day. She 
(5's boss) wasn't letting things 
ride their course, because things 
had to move and they would change, 
and in that moving and changing, as 
long as you are doing perhaps more 
than you might have done in easier 
times, when the change comes, you 
are ready for it , and you can cope 
with it. 5he (5 ' s boss) just 
wasn ' t allowing that motion to take 
p l ace , it was a case of push push, 
get nowhere, know she was getting 
nowhere, but because of the anxiety 
of the economy and the pressures 
that were corning down on her, no-
thing seemed to be in perspective, 
and 5 was getting the eff ect of 
this agitati on . 
While 5 could see it (the situation 
involving the anxiety-provoking 
problem),she just didn't want to 
bear it, she coul dn't see the need 
5 no l onger saw the need to 
tolerate the demanding situation 
at work, but initially rationalised 
her remaining in it by blaming her 
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that she had to tolerate it for personal life for her unhappiness. 
ten hours a day. There were factors However, through discussions with 
in her own personal life that were 
aggravating the situation at work. 
If 5 had had a diffe rent personal 
life at that time, she perhaps 
would not have reacted in the same 
way at work, but she rationalised 
it in that way , that maybe that was 
another reason why she stayed, be-
cause she kept thinking, "Well, donlt 
blame work for everything." But in 
discussions with people working with 
her, and with her own feelings be-
coming stronger and stronger . . oshe 
knew it was not only her personal 
life and not only the work situation, 
she was in the wrong place. 
45 If the objectives were right for 5, 
other people, and her feelings 
becoming increasingly stronger, 
she realised that she was intrinsi-
cally in the wrong place. 
5 was not happy about the goals 
she could tolerate the work position which were set for her, and not 
.... if she was working towards 
something - but she had nothing to 
work towards and she was not having 
to tolerate those inanities as far 
as she was concerned for nothing. 
being committed to these goals, 
she felt she had nothing to work 
towards in the future. Conse-
quently, she was unable to view 
the meaninglessness of her present 
situation as being in the service 
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46 (You mentioned earlier on that you 
thought you weren't in the right 
place, and that you could be some-
where else without being there. 
You said that when you were talking 
to her (your boss) and the sentence 
didn1t make sense, you said that it 
was a shock to you that you were 
there, but you weren't really there) 
Physically, S was standing in front 
of her (boss), but emotionally and 
mentally she was not there at all. 
She was not applying herself, she 
was not getting involved. 
47 (Could you tell me how you felt 
once you did give up your job and 
get out of that situation? Did 
things change at all, did you feel 
any different when you gave up your 
job and so on?) 
S definitely felt different. 
of a desired future, and hence 
found it intolerable. 
S was ambiguously present to her 
situation: her presence lacked 
engagement and involvement. 
Having resolved to leave her 
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Nothing changed in the environment, 
nothing was different (in the en-
situation at work, 5 felt strong 
and confident that she would be 
vironment). The same issues arose, able to cope with whatever the 
but within herself - and she didn't 
even feel that she didn't have to 
worry about it (work in general) 
because she actually was concerned 
about everything that was going on 
till the moment she left. But what 
she did feel was that she actually 
now could face anything that she 
had to face. She had the strength. 
48 (5 felt that) she actually didn't 
need all those things that she was 
convincing herself that she did 
need. Like the motor car, like 
the salary, like the flat, that 
sort of thing. 
49 It was an incredible sense of re-
lief ... an incredible sense of ... 
there is something in the future, 
whereas before 5 had got to the 
point where there was nothing. 
That she was going to wake up and 
do that for the rest of her life -
situation demanded of her, even 
though the situation itself had 
not changed. 
5 felt that she did not actually 
need the material benefits accruing 
from her job which had contributed 
to her remaining in that job. 
5 felt great relief in that the 
future now held some promise for 
her, and no longer seemed like a 
repetition of the routine and 
vacuous past. 
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wake up, go to work, go horne and 
go to sleep . 
50 S just thought, there is light and S felt hopeful about the future 
there is hope and there is s omething and could see that there was 
positive in her life and she can see something positive in her life 
it and she is going to experience it. which she could look forward to 
51 There was a sense of relief and at 
the same time knowledge that she 
could get through without those 
things which she thought were so 
important. 
52 S thinks she also felt very good 
within herself. She actually had 
risked it (resigning from her job), 
she hadn't ... she had done it on her 
own. No-one had said II Do it II, no-
one had said ... she just had en-
couragement the other way - she 
shouldn't do it and yet she knew 
that with all the surprise around 
her, that it was the right thing. 
experiencing. 
Repetitious of NMU's 48 and 49. 
S felt good within herself at 
having risked doing something 
which stemmed entirely and ex-
clusively from her own resolve, 
and which was discouraged by others. 
However, judging from the response 
of surprise of those around her, 
she knew she had done the right 
thing. 
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53 (They were actually surprised ... ) 
(S's colleagues were surprised) that A colleague of S's expressed dis-
she could give up (her job). S 
had one chap come to her and he 
walked into her office and said, 
"I don I t believe you are going" J 
and S said, "Well, \<,1hy not?1I He 
said, ItI just donlt believe you are 
going to really give up everything." 
He said, "I would have thought that 
a woman in your position and at your 
age would be happy to be where they 
were and would stick to it." 
54 (S I s colleague) said J liDo you know 
what, I actually admire you ... II 
S thought, "Well hell, I didn't 
expect it from him." He said, "I 
don't think I would have the 
courage to do it." And S said to 
him, lilt's got nothing to do with 
courage, it's got something to do 
with need. I have to do it hp.-
cause I am not going to die here. II 
55 He said, "Yes I know, I'm dying 
belief and astonishment at S's 
abandoning her well-established 
and desirable position at her 
stage in life. 
When S's colleague expressed his 
admiration of her courage in re-
signing, she told him that she 
acted out of need and not courage. 
She resigned since she experienced 
herself as dying in her work 
situation. 
When S's colleague confessed that 
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but I've got responsibilities that he also felt that he was dying in 
I have to keep. 1\ S said, "Well his work, S pointed out to him that 
you don't have to make that as an he need not succumb entirely to 
excuse to stay in a place that is his situation, even though he 
going to kill you, or in any job had responsibilities to fulfill 
that is going to kill you. I mean, via his work. 
take it into consideration, but don't 
let it be your deciding factor. II 
56 S had others come to her and say, 
"No, you can't really be leaving. 
It' 5 not fair J you belong here II J 
and she had that loyalty to them. 
She had a loyalty, for all her dis-
like of the work, she had a loyalty 
to the company. She said, "Ja, I 
had the same feeling of loss on one 
hand and I am going to be losing 
contact with people I like, but at 
the same time, it's right for me, 
that's why I am doing it." 
57 People would come to S and say, 
"Why are you leaving? Don't you 
like the work here?" But it was 
only after S had made her decision. 
Before that decision nothing like 
Colleagues expressed their dis-
appointment at SIS leaving them 
and the company. Even though 
S felt she would be losing con-
tact with people she liked and the 
company to which she felt loyal, 
5 was going to leave because it 
was right for her to do so. 
SiS decision to leave threw into 
question the taken for granted 
assumption of others that she 
enjoyed her work. 
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that had been mentioned or even 
approached. 
58 (5 believes that) there are so many 
people in many positions when they 
don't actually want to be there. 
They are scared and they also try 
thinking} "I've got to stay here 
because that is what it is all 
about" J and thinking J "Well, life I 5 
got to be like that." 
59 5 felt good, she felt good within 
herself that she had actually come 
to a decision and that she would 
actually leave and not do what she 
thought was "right .1I & 
60 (You decided in terms of your own 
feelings or ... ) 
5 decided in terms of her own feel-
ings and her own beliefs. Perhaps 
her own inner knowledge that - her 
'inner knowledge that she wasn't 
where she wanted to be, and she was 
pretending that she was. Perhaps 
5 believes that many people re-
main in undesirable positions as 
they do not see any other alter-
natives in life. 
5 felt good within herself that 
she had decided to do what was 
right for her, and not what 
seemed right in terms of the 
received reality. 
5 decided in terms of her own 
personal knowledge and beliefs. 
She realised that. she t.,J'-3.S not 
where she wanted to be, though 
she had been pretending that she 
was, and in confronting her self-
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she confronted her knowledge of 
herself and tried to do something 
about it. 
61 Across the way there was another 
instance (of S's stance clashing 
with that of her colleagues/the 
company). They had an open day 
at work to celebrate their 75 years, 
S thinks it was, and the man who 
was supposed to be doing it had been 
going to S - one of the managers -
he had been going to S to organise 
various personnel matters) but he 
had been doing all the arranging and 
it had been his absolute pride and 
joy, that he had got that far, and 
he then got terribly ill and had to 
go to hospital for a heart operation. 
He was near to retirement. He was 
going to retire within two years 
and S was then called in and told 
that she would have to take over 
the whole project and do it, but she 
would have to work in conjunction 
with this Mr X (sic) and she was 
told to go and visit him in the 
knowledge (that her situation was 
not right for her), she tried to 
act on it. 
NROC 
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hospital and find out what he had 
done and to carryon from there. 
62 S did this but she also realised 
that this was the thing that was 
keeping this man going. He had 
planned almost a year beforehand 
what he was going to do and how he 
was going to do it, because it was 
quite a big celebration within the 
company, and S thought well okay 
fine, she'd do all the odd jobs for 
him and do all the organizing and 
so the strain could be taken off 
him, but he could still call it his 
own project and call it his own 
success or non-success as he wished 
to. And when he came out of hospi-
tal S let him take over almost from 
where he had left off, she having 
done up to that point, and the day 
went off quite well. 
63 After the day (of the celebr~tion) 
S was called in and she was asked, 
"Why didn't you do this and why 
didn I t you do that?" and she said, 
S helped her sick colleague to 
execute his project, without 
overriding his decisions or 
robbing him of his responsibility 
for it. 
S was reprimanded by her superiors 
for realising her colleague's 
project in terms of his directives 
rather than in terms of more 
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"Well, talking to Mr X we decided 
that we wouldn't." At the same 
time S had decided that it was his 
decision, it was his work as he was 
involved with it, and S wasn't going 
to go in and change everything that 
he had planned for a year. 
64 S was then told, "Well you did 
realise that you were being tested, 
didn't you?" And S said yes, she 
realised she had been tested but 
that didn't mean to say that she 
had to walk over the man. She was 
told, "Oh, how do you think you are 
ever going to get ahead if you don't 
walk over h irn?" And that was the 
idea then, that you just took over 
and you did everything your own way 
and you ignored him, and you ignored 
everything that he had done. 
65 S said, "Well, if that is the way 
you work in business then you must 
carryon, but I'm not working that 
way. I'm not prepared to walk 
over people to get myself satis-
desirable (to her superiors) 
alternatives, which she might 
have contributed. 
S's humane values clashed with the 
more ruthless ones of her superiors. 
S refused to be involved in a 
situation in which it Has 
necessary to violate others in 
order to promote her own satis-
faction, since she would not feel 
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faction. Because I will get there 
and I won't be satisfied so there 
won't be much point ... 
66 But then 5 went down to the head 
of the company and he almost told 
her the same thing, and he said 
that she had to be more demanding, 
she had to be more prepared to walk 
over people, because that is what 
the game was. How did 5 ever 
think that anyone else got into the 
positions they got into? 
67 And 5 said, "Well, my feeling was 
that the man's life was important, 
and I thought his morale was impor-
tant and I didn't think that after 
the heart op, that I came in and 
he was almost made redundant. I 
didn't think that was going to do 
him any good and I wasn 't prepared 
to do it." 
68 But it (5's taking the well-being 
satisfied under these conditions. 
When 5 spoke to the head of the 
company, he confirmed the views 
of her other superiors, saying 
that that was how things were. 
S expressed her concern for and 
consideration of her colleague 
in doing her job. 5he was not 
prepared to lay this aside in 
the service of greater efficiency or 
having herself promoted. 
S remained firm in her stance, 
of her colleague into consideration) even though others were against 
definitely worked against her. her because of it. 
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They held it against her and they 
didn't like what she had done and 
she just thought that she was not 
going to sit there and walk over 
people because she wanted to get 
ahead. 
69 (5 thought that) she could get there Repetitious of NMU 65 . 
(ahead) . If she couldn't get there 
on her own qualifications and on her 
own work then she was not going to 
get there. And she was not going 
to get there by stamping allover 
people. 
70 And 5 thinks that after that there 
arose that feeling of just going to 
work; just going to work because 
that was what her job was, not be-
After 5's disillusionment with 
her bosses, she felt that she was 
just going to work out of sheer 
habit without feeling any enthu-
cause she really wanted to be (going siasm. Her whole being was not 
to work) - her whole being wasn ' t involved; her involvement was 
there. 
71 5 was walking there (to work) as an 
empty shell - she was just present-
ing herself, getting on with the 
work, and becoming like an auto-
partial. 
5 experienced herself at work as 
being empty and insubstantial, 
routinely getting on with her 
work and becoming lifelessly 
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maton. automatic. 
72 There was nothing, there was no joy S experienced no enthusiasm or 
in it (her work), there was no joy in doing her work, which 
pleasure in it, there was no feeling lacked feeling and was experienced 
in it. It was more of a case of 
this must be done, therefore they 
did it. S would do this and S 
would do that but nothing more and 
almost nothing less. 
73 Perhaps S spent a lot more time 
(at work), but she didn't spend it 
as being dictated to S. 
S spent time at work without 
feeling anything. She withheld 
feeling. She didn't spend herself; herself from her work situation 
she wasnlt there. 
74 It was almost an uncanny sensation 
sitting in that office and walking 
up and down the stairs, because S 
felt that her body was there but 
her mind and everything else, or 
she, was somewhere else, thinking 
of better things. 
75 S knows that the feeling that 
that incident (covered in NMU's 
and experienced herself as being 
absent . 
S felt uncanny at work: she 
experienced her body as being 
there, but she and her concerns 
were somewhere else. 
S lost respect for the people 
with whom she worked, and this 
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61-69) invoked in her at the time 
was utter disgust for those people 
and they went down in her estimation 
so dramatically that after that she 
couldnrt respond to them or respect 
them as she had in the past. And 
she thinks that probably also added 
to her feeling of, well, what was 
she doing there because she was 
working with people that she had no 
regard for and yet she stayed 
because it was the right thing. 
It was a crazy situation. She 
thinks that was all. 
Protocol A Table 2 
played a part in her questioning 
why she stayed in her situation. 
Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience 
1. S felt out of place in the situation in which she found herself . 
2. S experienced a lack of meaningful involvement and commitment in 
her situation which was intrinsically unfulfilling. She perceived 
the situation as precluding her own personal involvement and 
initiative, and experienced her behaviour as being dictated by 
others and the situation. 
3. S was not living towards a desired future; the future was 
experienced as being uninviting. 
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4. There was disagreement between SiS own values and those of others. 
5. S experienced an emptiness and lack of genuineness in others and 
in their communal practices/behaviour. 
6. S was unmoved, no longer cared, and inhibited the expression of 
her feelings. 
7. S behaved in an empty, lifelessly automatic manner, not being 
committed to her behaviour at the affective level. 
herself as dying. 
She experienced 
8. In withholding herself from her situation, S experienced herself 
as being absent, and felt uncanny and disembodied. 
ambiguously present to her situation. 
She was 
9. S experienced feelings of unreality through ignoring her own gut 
feelings and neglecting her own project in favour of realising 
the objectives of others. 
10. S lived in terms of the received reality (thereby sacrificing her 
own reality/self) for the sake of the material and emotional 
security which accrued from this. 
11. S felt uncertain about her own reality, which opposed the received 
reality. 
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12. A new colleague, in responding in a manner which was overtly con-
gruent with SIS own reality (as distinct from the received reality), 
lent substance to this reality and enabled her to share it with him. 
13. A crucial incident occurred when S behaved prereflectively in a 
manner which was totally out of keeping with the usual, expected 
response in her situation. 
14. S began to assert her reality over and against that of others. 
She confronted her experience and self-knowledge and began to act 
on it. 
15. Having acted in terms of her own experience, S felt strong and the 
future held promise for her. She felt good within herself at 
having acted in terms of her own reality, though her action had 
stemmed not from courage but from grave need. 
16. S's acting in terms of her own reality (in leaving her job) threw 
into question the taken-for-granted reality of others. 
Protocol A Table 3 
Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience. 
S was not meaningfully involved in her situation at work. She felt 
0Ut of pl=.ce there a!"!.d experienc8c the situation as uninvitingJ boring, 
dissatisfying and intrinsically unfulfilling. The future for her 
held nothing towards which she wanted to work: she was not committed 
to the goals which were set for her to the exclusion of her own parti-
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cipation, finding them inane, degrading and lacking in personal 
relevance. She experienced her work as being dictated to her. Hence 
she was unable to view the endurance of her unpleasant current situation 
as being in the service of a desired future, and found her own contri-
butions futile. 
S disagreed with the inhumane practices carried out at work and exper-
ienced a lack of genuineness in her colleagues and the work in general, 
there being a discrepancy between professed values and behaviour which 
contradicted these values. The situation was devoid of all real 
meaning for her, and she was unmoved, no longer cared and did not 
express her feelings. She worked out of sheer habit, without feeling 
or enthusiasm, and experienced herself as being empty, insubstantial 
and lifelessly automatic. She withheld herself from her situation 
and experienced herself as being absent . She felt uncanny: she was 
not in the situation, though her body was, according to her experience. 
In that S pretended that she was where she wanted to be, although s he 
felt that she was intrinsically in the wrong place, her presence lacked 
engagement and involvement. 
She was not committed to her behaviour at the affective level, her 
actions being prompted by what she thought she ought to do. She 
neglected her own project in favour of realising the objectives of 
others, and in ignoring her own gut feelings, she experienced a feeling 
of unreality. She thought it right to continue to live within the 
context of socially approved values and she endured her most unpleasant 
situation for the sake of the material and emotional security that 
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followed from it. She was influenced by what she perceived to be the 
received reality, to feel that life by its very nature was dull and 
monotonous, and she feared opposing this received reality. 
When a new colleague started work with S and expressed an affective 
response to the work situation that was similar to her own covert 
response, she was able to share her reality with him. She had pre-
viously felt uncertain about her reality, and had lacked faith in her 
aspirations and possibilities. However J he confirmed and lent sub-
stance to her reality, and through discussions with others she realised 
she was intrinsically in the wrong place, and began to feel more and 
more strongly about this. 
A turning point came for S when she found herself prereflectively 
uttering a nonsensical sentence to her boss. An important issue was 
being discussed, and yet the entire state of affairs was undifferen-
tiatedly unimportant to S. She was ambiguously present to her 
situation, being simultaneously there and not there. 
Following the above experience S began to assert her own reality over 
and against that of others, and to take herself seriously. She began 
to confront her self-knowledge and to act on it; she resigned from 
her job. She felt strong and confident and realised that she did 
not really need the securities she had felt she needed. 
held promise for S, and she felt hopeful about it. 
The future 
S felt good within herself at having risked doing something which was 
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based entirely and exclusively on her own resolve and which was dis-
couraged by others. She had acted in terms of her own reality and 
not the received reality. However, she felt that she acted not out 
of courage but out of need, since she experienced herself as dying in 
her work situation. 
S's leaving her job threw into question the taken for granted assumptions 
of her colleagues, disturbing the status quo. She was able to point 
out to a colleague that he was not a total victim of his situation in 
which he felt trapped, but that he could do something to transform it. 
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4 . 2 PROTOCOL B BURT 
Table 1 Qualitative Analysis 
Discriminated meaning units expressed 
as much as possible in SiS language 
and based upon the perspective that 
the description was an example of 
conscience. 
Discriminated meaning units ex-
pressed more directly in psycho-
logical language and with respect 
to relevancy for the phenomenon 
of conscience. 
When S was about 15, he went through At the age of about 15, S went 
2 
a stage of tremendous religious through a stage of tremendous 
turmoiL. inner turmoil. 
S was brought up Dutch Reformed. 
His grandfather was not only a DRC 
minister, but also editor of the 
official DRC magazine . His father 
was nominally a member of the DRC 
but did not agree with the church 
on most issues, and barely went to 
church. His mother, on the other 
hand, was devoutly DRe, went to all 
the servl CAR; "nn W-3.B a.. !!".e!'!'be:r of 
all the women's societies of the 
church. The rest of his family 
is also devoutly DRC, many of his 
S was raised in terms of the 
predominant religious values of 
his culture and society, many of 
the members of his family being 
devoutly supportive of and actively 
involved in the religious institution 
associated with those values. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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father's uncles and cousins being 
ministers. 
S felt confused about all the 
different brands of Christianity, 
never really doubting that Christ-
ianity in its broadest sense was 
the true religion, though. 
S once heard a story about a man 
in China who prayed to the true 
God to reveal which religion was 
the true religion. He came to 
accept Christianity. So S, too, 
prayed to God, asking Him to reveal 
the true Church to him. 
Through a lot of reading, talking 
Though being assured of the truth 
of the predominant religion in 
its broadest sense, S felt con-
fused about the different sub-
classes of that religion . 
Basing his approach on the 
example of another about which he 
had heard, S appealed to God for 
the truth to allay his confusion. 
Through much dialogue with others 
to people and literally agonising both in person and via literature, 
nights of wrestling with the issue, and having spent time agonisingly 
S became convinced that the wrestling with his confusion, S 
Catholic Church was the true Church. became convinced of the truth. 
This (being convinced that the SIS conviction put him in a con-
Catholic Church was the true Church) flictual position in which the 
put S in a tremendous predicament. truth implicit in his conviction 
S came from a thoroughly Afrikaans was in direct opposition to the 
7 
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community who were all at least 
nominally DRC. There was also 
the thought of his whole DRC-
committed family. Yet he was 
convinced of the truth that the 
Catholic Church was the only true 
Church. 
5 felt absolutely compelled to do 
standpoint of his family, 
community and culture. 
5 felt absolutely compelled to 
something about it (his conviction). act on his conviction. 
8 
9 
5 started wi thdrawing from his 
friends and family, because he 
felt like a traitor to the cause. 
5 eventually plucked up the courage 
to tell his mother that he felt he 
had to become a Catholic. 
10 5 ' s mother begged him to wait until 
he was 21. 5 couldn't promise her 
that. He started qoing to the 
Catholic Church. 
5 began to withdraw from signi-
ficant others since he felt that 
in holding to his conviction he 
was betraying their cause. 
5 eventually plucked up the 
courage to share with his mother 
the necessity which he felt to 
act on his conviction. 
When this significant other 
begged 5 to delay any living 
out of his conviction until he 
reached an age commonly considered 
to be the age of discretion, 5 
could not promise to do this, and 
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11 SiS grandmother came to visit once} 
and his mother begged him not to go 
to the Catholic Church that Sunday. 
He was so upset by the conflict of 
her request and honesty to his own 
convictions that he compromised by 
getting 'flu. 
12 S's mother told his grandmother 
about the whole issue anyway, and 
his grandmother came into his room, 
shut the door, and just said, 
"Your mother told me. And I just 
want you to know that I am bitterly 
disappointed in you," and left. 
S felt unbelievably hurt . Yet he 
could not do anything about it. 
13 S's father also talked to him about 
immediately began to act in 
accordance with his conviction. 
When S found himself in a position 
in which he felt torn between 
either appeasing a significant 
other by complying with her in-
sistent desire that he go against 
his conviction , or being true to 
his conviction, he was so upset 
by this conflict that he com-
promised by falling ill. 
After hearing from S's mother of 
his failure to meet her (his 
grandmother's) expectations of 
him} SiS grandmother expressed 
to him her bitter disappointment 
in him. S felt incredibly hurt 
at being thus rejected and yet 
could not change the situation. 
SiS father repeatedly brought to 
it (his wanting to become a Catholic) his awareness the fact that, in 
almost every day , telling him how 
unhappy he was making his mother, 
standing by his conviction, he 
was the source of great unhappiness 
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that she was crying herself to 
sleep every night. 
14 5's father thought he was just 
being a fool. K church is a 
church for him (5's father) and he 
just couldn't see that it was an 
issue for S. He lost his temper 
with 5 time and again. 
15 Despite it all, S eventually 
to his mother. 
S's father being unable to share 
SiS determination to act on his 
resolve repeatedly became angry 
with him. 
In spite of the strong opposition 
became a Catholic as soon as he left from significant others, and 
school at the age of 17. specifically his parents, S acted 
in accordance with his convictions. 
16 In a sense S feels he did not have 
a choice. He had to become a 
Catholic. If he had not, he would 
not have been able to live with 
himself. 
17 Much has happened to S since. 
is now 36 and no longer a Catholic. 
He doesn't know if he is even a 
Christian. Yet he has never 
To the extent that he would not 
have been able to live with him-
self had he not done so, S felt 
compelled to act in accordance 
. with his conviction which, in a 
sense, precluded choice on his 
part. 
Al though S nc longer lives il' 
accordance with this conviction , 
he feels that at the time it was 
not a mistake to have acted in 
thought it a mistake to have 
become a Cathol ic . 
18 S had to do it (to become a 
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Catholic). He was compelled to do 
it, in a sense, despite tremendous 
pressure from his parents and the 
society in which he lived . 
19 One thing that will always remain 
with S is the feeling of total 
isolation and loneliness he 
experienced at the time. He had 
nobody close to him who understood 
or encouraged him. 
it on his own. 
He had to do 
20 (Becoming a Catholic) was probably 
the most difficult thing S has ever 
done in his life, yet he knows he 
had to do it. If he hadn't 
(become a Catholic) , he doesn't 
know if he would have been able to 
live with him8clf. 
21 To S this experience was the most 
profound experience of emerging 
accordance with his conviction. 
Despite tremendous pressure from 
his parents and society to the 
contrary, S felt compelled to 
act in accordance with his con-
viction. 
In his conviction S experienced 
a feeling of total isolation and 
loneliness, having nobody close 
to him who understood him or 
offered him support. 
to act on his own. 
He had 
Though acting in accordance with 
his conviction was probably the 
most difficult thing S has ever 
done, he had to do it, since, 
failing that, he is uncertain as 
to whether he would have been 
able tu live with himself. 
NROC 
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from bei ng untrue to himself. 
22 (When did you begin to experience 
the turmoil and conflict you speak 
of here?) 
23 
S has difficulty in ascertaining 
when he first experienced the 
turmoil and conflict, which was a 
long time ago. 
There was a long period of search-
ing and thinking and reading and 
talking to people and finding out. 
But then there was a time 
-
S cantt 
remember when it was - when S 
realiaed that this was what he was 
looking for, or that this was the 
truth. 
24 The moment S got to that point (of 
having found what he was looking 
for, or the truth) he felt obliged 
in a way to do something nhnut:. it_ 
But it was only when the conviction 
of the truth of the matter was there 
- that he had this conviction in 
S has difficulty in pinpointing 
when the experience of turmoil 
and conflict began for him. 
After a long period of exposing 
himself to the field of his 
concern through dialogue with 
others and with literature, there 
came a time when S realised that 
he had found what he had been 
looking for, or the truth. 
When S became convinced of the 
truth or the answer to his 
questioning, he felt obliged to 
act on it . 
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his mind that this was the truth, 
that he had to act on it. 
25 It was when he was convinced of the 
truth and felt obliged to act on 
it, but was not yet doing so, that 
S experienced being untrue to him-
self. 
26 The experience of not being true to 
himself wasn't a clear thing - that 
S could say it was exactly at this 
point or that point. 
27 For a long time S felt that (the 
It was when he was convinced of 
the truth and felt obliged to act 
on it but was not yet doing so, 
that S experienced being untrue 
to himself. 
For S the experience of being 
untrue to himself could not be 
explicitly located in time. 
For a long time S was aware of 
Catholic Church was the true Church), what he was ultimately to accept 
But as the truth, but not very but it wasn't that convincing. 
there was a point where S was 
absolutely convinced, and he thinks 
that that was when it (the exper-
ience of being untrue to himself) 
started. 
28 (Could you just tAll m~ a bit ~cr6 
about what carne before your being 
convinced that the Catholic Church 
was the Church?) 
convincingly. But when S reached 
the point of being absolutely 
convinced of this truth, he began 
to experience being ~ntrue to 
himself. 
29 
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S thinks that what led to his being 
convinced that the Catholic Church 
was the Church was that none of the 
other Churches could guarantee 
things - they couldn't guarantee 
what they said was true and each 
Church had something else to say. 
The Catholic Church said, lIWe have 
an infallible Pope - what the Pope 
says is infallible and we can 
guarantee that it is true ... 
That and the fact that it was 
-
it 
had a long tradition of having been 
around for two thousand years as 
compared with the other Churches. 
Up to 1600 or so there was only 
one Church. These sort of things 
S read about in books. 
30 And S spoke to people who were 
Catholics. 
priest. 
He spoke to a Catholic 
31 One of the things that put S off 
most was the Dutch Reformed Sunday 
NROC 
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S entered into communication with 
people who were members of a 
religious group other than his 
own (Catholics). 
One of the things which put S 
off his own Church was that he 
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school he was in - the prejudice 
of the Sunday school teacher. He 
could not believe in his Sunday 
school teacher and what he stood 
was so blatantly prejudiced that S for. 
couldn't believe a word of what he 
said. 
32 (S's inability to believe his SiS inability to receive answers 
Sunday school teacher) just made him from his Sunday school teacher 
ask more and more and more and more (to believe .him) led him to 
- he read more, and - he can ' t say question more and read more. 
much more than that. 
33 S doesn't know if this is relevant 
at all, but one of the things that 
attracted him (to the Catholic 
Church) was the music - the 
Gregorian Chant. S liked the 
discipline and the organised way of 
doing things and the difference in 
attitude the Catholics had compared 
to Protestants. Generally, the 
God of the Catholic Church was far 
jollier. 
34 (How did you experience the being 
convinced - the actual knowing 
that this was the truth? Could 
What attracted S to the Catholic 
Church were aspects such as their 
attitudes and approach which were 
different, in ways which S liked, 
from thoseof his own Church. 
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you just tell me a bit more about 
how you felt?) 
S just knew it - with absolute 
certainty. It was a fact. 
35 And then S eventually told his 
mother (that he felt he had to 
hecome a Catholic). And she tried 
to persuade him to become an 
Anglican. She said, I'Please, just 
S experienced his conviction 
with absolute certainty, as a fact. 
When S eventually told his mother 
about his feeling of having to 
act on his conviction, she tried 
to persuade him not to do so but 
to pursue another course which 
not a Catholic - become an Anglican. was more acceptable to her and 
I mean, basically they're just the which was just the same according 
same - they have the same ceremonies, to her judgement, which was in 
the same things, but just not a 
Catholic." 
36 And there was no way S could 
(become an Anglican). It was not 
the outward show, or what (the 
Church) presented itself like - as 
ceremonies or anything (that con-
cerned S). (Whether or not) the 
Catholic Church hFld ~.n altar OY 
candles or music or anything like 
that - that had nothing to do with 
the point. It was the teaching 
terms of superficial criteria. 
S could definitely not comply 
with his mother's wishes since 
for him the external, superficial 
trappings, upon the similarity of 
which her judgement was based, 
were of no consequence; what 
matte~ed to him was at a more 
fundamental level (the teaching 
itself). 
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itself (that mattered). The 
externals could have been anything. 
37 It's difficult for 5 to say what he Though he stood firm in his 
felt. He was totally convinced, conviction, S was filled with 
but (his conviction) filled him a feeling of absolute dread, 
with a feeling of absolute dread as because he knew he had to act on 
well, because he knew that he had his conviction. 
to do something about it. (He 
experienced) that feeling of real, 
real dread, once he knew that that 
was the truth for him. He knew 
he had to act on it. 
38 (Knowing he had to act on his con- Knowing he had to act on his 
viction) really filled 5 with dread conviction filled 5 with dread 
because he knew what he had to do. because he knew that it meant 
He knew it meant having to go opposing all of his meaningful 
against everything and everybody supports - his parents, his 
who at that stage was meaningful to background and his culture. 
him - lik" his parents and his 
background and his language group. 
39 S "muld stick ont. 1 ikt::! e. 50re i-h" ..... h _ ........ .....,J In acting in accUL"ddnCe with his 
he knew that, and he was very scared. conviction 5 would no longer be 
an inconspicuous, taken-for-
granted member of his group; he 
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40 (You mention that you felt com-
pelled to do something about it -
could you tell me more about that?) 
would stick out as being different 
and separate from the group, and 
he was very scared. 
S felt he had to (become a Catholic). S felt he had to act on his 
Nothing could stop him. 
41 S doesn't think he's ever had such 
sleepless nights - he's never had 
problems with sleeping - but he had 
night after night of just rolling 
around, thinking about what he had 
to do, because he knew he had to 
do it. It was just that sort of 
conviction. He had to do it, 
there was no stopping it at all. 
42 Technically, S supposes he needn't 
havt: ,utlcume a Catholic}J because 
one is free J but that conviction 
was so strong that he would have 
been false if he hadn't listened 
conviction; nothing could come 
in the way of his doing so. 
At the daunting prospect of having 
to act on his firm and compelling 
conviction, S spent night after 
night in a state of troubled 
restlessness, the extent of 
which he has not experienced 
before or since. 
Though he realises that in some 
sense he was free to have acted 
differently, S's conviction was 
so strong that he feels he would 
have been inauthentic had he not 
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to it. 
43 S didn't hear a voice, but it was 
like an inner thing - it was an 
inner conviction - something 
telling him that that was right 
and that is what he's got to do. 
44 (The conviction was) not just some-
thing separate from S. It was 
really something deep down basic in 
him, that was telling him that that 
is what he's got to do. 
45 (You mention that you felt you 
should withdraw from your friends 
and your family. Could you tell 
me more about that?) 
acted in accordance with it . 
S experienced an inner conviction 
which told him what was right and 
what he had to do. 
S experienced his conviction as 
a basic, essential and integral 
part of himself which was telling 
him what to do. 
(S withdrew) just to protect himself. Feeling sore and vulnerable, S 
S just accepted that he would be 
rejected. And (he withdrew) to 
save himself that extra hurt 
because he was so sore as it was. 
46 Before they could do something 
wi thdrew from significant others 
to shield himself from the 
further hurtful effects of their 
rejection of him which he expected 
and accepted. 
Before significant others could 
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about it, 5 started cutting himself react to his position, 5 began 
loose so that it wouldn't be so bad, to distance himself from them so as 
so that it wouldn't r eally matter to soften the blow of their re-
so much. action (which he expected to be 
one of rejection of him). 
47 Because 5 knew what people thought 5 knew that people reacted nega-
generally, about the Catholic Church, tively to the stance which he was 
in the sort of circles that he moved about to adopt. 50 he withdrew 
in. He knew what they felt - a 
lot of prejudice, a lot of ridicule 
and, a lot of things like that. 
And he didn't want them to ridicule 
him. So it was like removing 
himself from them to save himself 
the pain. 
48 (You also say you couldn't promise 
your mother that you would wait 
until you were 21 to become a 
Cathol ic . 
that?) 
Could you elaborate on 
S jll~t couldn't (premise his mother 
that he would wait until he was 21 
to become a Catholic). He would 
have been too disloyal to himself 
from people to protect himself 
against the painful experience 
of being ridiculed by them. 
S could not comply with his mother's 
wishes for him since in so doing 
he would have been too disloyal 
to himself. 
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(to have done so). 
49 5 thinks he was disloyal to himself 5 thinks he was disloyal to him-
in a sense because more than a year self in that, for a considerable 
before he became a Catholic he was period after he had experienced 
already convinced and knew that that his conviction, he failed to act 
was what he had to do. But the on it, in the face of tremendous 
pressure in the town was tremendous~ social pressure in opposition to 
his course of action. 
50 5 thought of every sort of way of 
trying to get out of becoming a 
5 explored all the possibilities 
of being able to avoid acting out 
Catholic. He thought, IIIsn't there his conviction, but, there being 
some sort of loop-hole?" J but there 
wasn't a loop-hole. There was 
nothing. He had to do it. 
51 What made it easier was that SiS 
parents were transferred to another 
town. So he went to a completely 
new environment, and he thinks that 
made it much easier. 
52 S could go and see the priest and 
he just saw to it that he stayed 
away from the sort of people his 
friends mixed wi th, and so on. It 
no feasible out, he had to act. 
Changing his environment made it 
much easier for S to act on his 
conviction. 
Repetitious of NMU 51. 
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made it easier. 
53 But even if they had stayed in the 
same town 5 knows he would still 
have done it. 
54 For S, becoming a Catholic was 
being loyal to himself. 
55 And 5 still feels proud of it when 
he thinks back on it (his becoming 
a Catholic) - he still thinks it's 
the most courageous thing he ever 
did. It's a lot for a bloody 
sixteen year-old. 
56 In those days (of the incident 
described by 5) S was very close 
S knows that even if circumstances 
had not changed to make it easier 
for him, he would still have 
acted on his conviction. 
For S, acting in accordance with 
his conviction was being loyal 
to himself. 
s experiences a sense of pride when 
he reflects on how he acted in 
accordance with his own convictions, 
and the courage this required. 
At the time of the event being 
described, S was very close to 
to his mother. He shared basically his mother and shared his life's 
everything with her. 
57 5' s mother had a trem"ndoll~ 
emotional hold over him. 
experiences with her. 
S experie~ced hia mother as 
having a tremendous emotional 
hold over him. 
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58 There was this tremendous conflict 
of wanting to do what she (S's 
mother) wanted S to do, and having 
to do what he felt he himself had 
to do. Of knowing he had to do 
what he was absolutely convinced 
of. And it caused him real, real 
agony to try to decide . 
S experienced real agony in try-
ing to resolve the conflict between 
wanting to appease his mother on 
the one hand, and on the other 
hand knowing he had to act on the 
absolute conviction stemming from 
himself, which action, though it 
would render him true to himself, 
would alienate him from his mother. 
59 This was a request where SiS mother ISS I S mother I s request of him was 
whole way of asking him was begging 
him, absolutely begging him with 
tears 1n her eyes, and he knew that 
if he went to the (Catholic) Church 
that Sunday (on which his mother 
had asked him not to go on account 
of his grandmother's visit) it 
would really have upset her - it 
would really have worried her 
tremendously. 
60 S didn't know what to do. The 
that now (in retrospect) he thinks 
that he compromised in some uncon-
scious way by getting sick, because 
so intense, insistent and 
emotionally loaded that he knew 
that if he had failed to comply 
with it, he would have greatly 
upset and worried her. 
The conflic t (between the "strong 
pull" exerted by - his mother in her 
request and the opposing "pull" 
in the direction of what he himself 
felt he had to do) was so great 
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he wasn't really very sick at all, 
but he thought, "Well, I 'm sick 
enough to stay in bed", to solve 
that one (his conflict). 
61 S couldn't just not go to the 
Church that Sunday, that would have 
been going against his own convict-
ions too blatantly. But if he 
could say he was sick, that wasn't 
so bad. 
62 (Could you tell me a bit more about 
the incident with your grandmother 
- when your grandmother came in to 
speak to you?) 
S was lying in bed and it was on 
the Monday. He couldn't just be 
sick for the Sunday, so he had to 
be sick for a few days. So he 
started getting sick on Friday and 
he was still sick on Monday. He 
thinks he was up on TIJ8Sd2Y; he's 
not sure, but he was in bed for a 
few days. And he didn't know his 
mother had spoken to his grandmother 
for S that the only means of 
solving it available to him was 
to make a neurotic compromise by 
falling ill. 
For S to go against his own 
convictions deliberately 
(blatantly) was unacceptable to 
him; to do so seemingly without 
his compliance (through being ill) 
was more acceptable. 
NROC 
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at all, because she was terrified 
that his grandmother would find out 
(that 5 wanted to become a Catholic). 
But she (5's mother) apparently did 
tell his grandmother, because she 
just came into SiS room quite 
unexpectedly , shut the door, and 
came to the bed. 
63 5he (5's grandmother) just stood 
there (at 5's bed) and looked at 
5 with her twisted face, and just 
said, "Your mother told me II J and he 
went ice cold and got increasingly 
anxious. 
64 5he (5's grandmother) said, "Your 
mother t01d me , and I just want to 
tell you that I'm bitterly dis-
appointed in you," and just walked 
out again. And 5 felt like an 
absolute criminal . 
55 S felt cO bad. He really felt 
that the feeling was bad. He felt 
bad, he felt intrinsically bad. 
When SiS grandmother confronted 
him with her knowledge of his 
project, he became very anxious 
and was transformed bodily to a 
state of being II ice cold ". 
5 felt like a criminal after being 
confronted by his grandmother's 
bitter disappointment in him in 
his opposition of, and failure to 
fulfil~ her expectations of him. 
5 experlenced a bad feeling and 
felt intrinsically bad himself. 
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66 (Though he felt intrinsically bad) 
there was nothing 5 could do about 
it. Although that is what she 
(his grandmother) said and every-
body else said, there was no way he 
could do anything else (other than 
become a Catholic). 
67 (5's conviction was one) that was 
bigger than being bad in their 
eyes - and his own eyes, perhaps. 
68 (You say your grandmother said to 
you, "Your mother told me" J and 
you immediatel y felt cold. How 
was this?) 
(Becoming a Catholic) was the only 
thing that he was thinking about 
at the time and it was such a big 
isst!e in the far:lily o.S ;..;ell. 
father talked to him about it every 
day and his mother tried to con-
vince him (that he should not 
Though he felt intrinsically bad 
in the face of his grandmother 
and significant others expressing 
their disappointment in him, 5 
could do no other than act in the 
very way (namely in accordance 
with his conviction) that gave 
rise to their negative reaction. 
S's conviction was of such great 
import that the negative appraisal 
of himself by others, and perhaps 
even by himself, seemed less 
significant in comparison. 
S was preoccupied with his con-
viction at the time of the inci-
dent with his grandmother, and 
it was also an issue in his 
family, with both his parents 
trying to dissuade him from 
acting on it. 
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become a Catholic) as well. 
69 What made 5 go cold was that feeling 5 was bodily transformed in 
of rejection, because he thinks we 
all want warmth and acceptance, and 
(his grandmother's reaction) was 
such a blatant rejection that he 
fe lt incredibly alone. 
totally abandoned. 
He felt 
becoming cold from a feeling of 
blatant rejection in which he 
experienced extreme aloneness 
and total abandonment. 
70 . Then S started thinking what an evil 5 then began to devalue the 
old woman his grandmother was, just extrinsic source of his pain in 
to make it not so sore. order to l essen its intensity . 
71 (Could you go into the part your 
parents played a bit more?) 
For SiS mother (the issue surround-
ing SiS conviction) was a question 
of religious faith, for her it was 
something serious. For his father 
it was not such a serious thing, it 
was basically just a social issue, 
of ar.CArt:' ~!"!.C'e by others and that 
sort of thing. 
72 5 thinks that in her own way his 
For SiS mother the issue of his 
conviction was a serious matter 
of religious significance, whereas 
for his father it was less serious 
- a matter of social acceptance. 
5 thinks his mother wanted to 
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mother wanted to understand. She 
couldn't understand at all which 
made it extremely difficult - 5 
tried to explain it to her - how 
he got to things and so on, but 
he could see by the look on her 
face that she didn't understand. 
73 5 was really close to her (his 
mother), which made him feel so 
frus trated. That he couldn't get 
her to see his way at all. 
74 5's father tried to talk to him 
understand the issue, but despite 
his attempts at explaining it to 
her, she failed to understand, as 
was evidenced by her facial ex-
pression, which made things 
extremely difficult for 5. 
Being really close to his mother, 
5 felt very frustrated at his 
complete inability to bring her 
around to seeing the issue from 
his perspective . 
At first, 5 tried to sustain 
about it as well, argued with him argumentative conversations, 
night after night and initially 5 initiated by his father, about 
tried to talk to him a bit, and then the issue, but then, thinking 
he thought, "No, this is getting they were achieving nothing, 
me nowhere" J so he just said remained silent. 
nothing. 
75 When 5 said nothing his father got S's father reacted to his silence 
all irritable and angry and it would wi t h irritatio n and anger, ae6ing 
always end up with him shouting 
that 5 was j ust being diff icult and 
just headstrong and wouldn't listen 
5 as just being difficult, head-
strong and unreasonable . 
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to reason. 
76 (How did you feel when you eventually 
did become a Catholic?) 
5 felt a tremendous sense of relief 
- and happiness as well. It was 
a tremendous sense of relief - just 
knowing that he had done what he 
had to do. There was none of the 
conflict anymore, knowing "live got 
to J I've got to." 
77 5 had done it (become a Catholic), 
and that was it. A feeling of 
real satisfaction. 
78 (You say you did not have a choice, 
you had to become a Catholic. 
Could you go into that a bit more?) 
5 supposes he had a choice (in the 
matter of becoming a Catholic or 
not) - there was nothing forr.i.ng 
him - he couldn't be thrown into 
jailor anything like that, there 
was no physical reason stopping 
After he had acted on his con-
viction, S felt a tremendous sense 
of relief and happiness, and 
experienced the absence of the 
former conflict, knowing that he 
had done what he had felt compelled 
to do. 
5 experienced a feeling of real 
satisfaction at having acted on 
his conviction. 
5 supposes that he was free (he 
had a choice) not to act on his 
conviction insofar as therE- was 
no physical reality which forced 
him to act in accordance with it. 
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him from not becoming a Catholic. 
79 There was just that inner convict- S's inner conviction, which he 
ion, that feeling of having to do experienced as demanding action 
it (become a Catholic) was so strong on his part, was so strong that 
that S couldn't do anything else 
but do it. It was a compelling 
thing. It compelled S to do it. 
S couldn't have lived with himself 
if he hadn't done it. 
80 (S feels that) it's quite strange 
to say that even now, when he's 
he felt compelled to act. Had 
he not acted, S would not have 
been able to live with himself. 
Even now, with hindsight, S still 
knows, after a considerable period 
not a practising Catholic, he still of time, that when he decided to 
knows after sixteen,seventeen years, act on his conviction he made the 
that it was the right decision. right decision even though his 
present being no longer accords 
with that conviction. 
81 S still thinks back, and when he 
thinks of what he did, he has a 
feeling of satisfaction knowing he 
did what he had to do. 
82 (You say you couldn't have lived 
with yourself if you hadn't become 
a Catholic. Could you say anything 
When S reflects on what he did, 
he feels satisfied in t he know-
ledge that he actually did what 
he felt compelled to do. 
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more about that?) 
5 would have hated himself. And 
he thinks it would have nagged him 
all the time. He would have had 
this feeling of wanting to punish 
himself. There would have been 
this nagging thing that he was 
untrue to himself, not true to 
himself. 
83 It wasn't an issue really - 5 had 
to do it, that's all there is to 
it. If he hadn't done it - it's 
even difficult for him to think of 
- because he just knew he had to do 
it. Even if he was killed in the 
effort, even if he died in the 
effort , he would have had to do it. 
84 (You say that you didn ' t think it 
was a mistake to become a Catholic, 
although you are no longer one now 
. . . ) 
S sees his whole religious develop-
ment as a (development)- like from 
Had S not acted on his conviction, 
he would have felt self-punitive 
and, in not being true to himself, 
would have felt constantly troubled. 
Whether or not to act on his 
conviction was not an issue for 
5: he knew he had to do it. 
Not even fatal consequences would 
have prevented him from doing it. 
It is difficult for him even to 
conceive of not having done it. 
5 sees his whole religious history 
as a development from one sphere 
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being Dutch Reformed to becoming a 
Catholic was a development. 
85 Since then (becoming a Catholic) S 
has grown some more, and in a 
sense, he feels hels outgrown the 
Catholic Church. The Catholic 
Church is not enough anymore. 
They're too limiting. 
86 But that (S's outgrowing the 
to the next. 
Since his commitment to his 
conviction, S has outgrown that 
commitment, which he experiences 
as restrictive. 
SiS outgrowing his commitment 
Catholic Church) was not so much a was more a matter of gradual 
matter of being true to himself, development than of being true to 
that was just a question of develop- himself as such. 
ment e S we·nt on and then slowly 
started changing over the years. 
87 So for S there's no contradiction 
whatsoever, none whatsoever. 
88 Just the fact of having done it 
S sees no contradiction between 
his former commitment to his 
conviction and his present departure 
from it . 
Having acted on his conviction 
made S so mur.h m0~e ~ m~ture person, matured S, who had low 581f-esteem. 
he thinks. It gave him a sense of 
worth . He never thought very much 
Being able to commit himself to 
what he perceived to be valuable 
of himself, but that's the one thing gave him a sense of worth. 
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he could do, he could stand up for 
something - he could stand up for 
what is valuable. 
89 It gave 5 dignity and self-respect. S's commitment to his conviction 
For himself - he still found it gave him dignity and self-respect. 
difficult to look people in the At this point he was unable to 
eyes, in the face J and say, 1I1Im sustain these feelings openly in 
a Catholic"; he couldn't do that. the presence of others, being 
unable to confront them with his 
comrni trnen t . 
90 But inside himself,S knew that he 5 had a private, inner knowledge 
was strong, that he had done some- of his strength and courage at 
thing that took tremendous courage. committing himself to his con-
And so inside somewhere, although viction. However, as yet he 
it was difficult for him to handle found it difficult to share his 
it with people outside, S knew on commitment with others. 
the inside - under his skin - that 
that was right. 
91 (As time went on, did you feel any 
different about knowing on the 
It just a lso beca me on the outside · Initially 5 felt too vulnerable 
as well. At the beginning 5 was to live his commitment openly in 
- 148 -
so terrified of getting hurt more 
and more) because he felt held had 
enough. 
92 As S felt better on the inside, he 
relating to others, but later 
on he was able to do this. 
As he began to feel more secure 
started being more open about things within himself, S began to be 
as well to other people and even- more open with others about his 
tually he even took a bit of delight, commitment, even taking delight 
he thinks, in - people would ask him, in disclosing it to them. 
IIAre you going to church today?!!, 
and he'd say, "Yes ll , and then they'd 
say, "Well come with us _ II And he'd 
say, IINo, I'm going to the Catholic 
Church", and the sort of look of 
horror on their faces - held quite 
enjoy that. To be a bit shocking 
and outrageous. 
93 It was an enormously big issue for 
S at first. But eventually it 
didn't matter at all what people 
thought - he really didn't care. 
. 94 A major thing Wry ,'3 with SiS fa!TIily 
too. Once he'd done it (become 
a Catholic), they accepted it 
completely, even his mother who 
Initially the evaluations of 
himself by others concerned S 
greatly, but eventually they 
did not matter to him at all . 
Once Shad operlly ac ·ted on his 
conviction J "his family, including 
his mother who had been so upset 
at this prospect, accepted it 
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was so - cried herself to sleep 
every night - today she couldn't 
care a damm - she really couldn't 
care a damm. 
95 And 8's father respected him for 
96 
the first time in his life. The 
day 8 became a Catholic, he (8's 
father) came into SiS room and gave 
him a hug, which is something he 
hardly ever did, and said he hoped 
he ' d be happy now. 
And the look of admiration - it was 
the first time 8 saw that in his 
(father's) eyes. He always ridi -
culed 8. That was the first time 
8 felt he was worth anything. 
97 (Could you tell me more about the 
feeling of loneliness and isolation 
that you experienced at the time?) 
It was just that feeling that 8 
was in this (the issue concerning 
his religious commitment) completely 
on his own .. 
completel y. 
SIS acting on his conviction 
gained his father's warmth and 
respect. 
8 perceived a change in his 
father's attitude toward him 
from ridicule to admiration J and 
8 felt worthy for the first time. 
In grappling with his conviction, 
8 felt completely on his own . 
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98 Even the Catholic priest S went to 
see. S eventually, after a lot 
of real agonising about it, went 
When 5, after much agonising on his 
own, consulted another whom he 
expected would be able to under-
to see a priest. The local Catholic stand his situation, he experienced 
priest. And S told him how he felt. the other as being unable to under-
And, even at that time - this is not stand him. 
just thinking about it now when S 
says this - but he reme~ers at the 
time feeling J "This guy feels 1 1 m 
a bit cuckoo." It's not the sort 
of thing people get upset about at 
that age. S knew he didn't under-
stand. He couldn't understand that 
it was such a big issue for S. He 
said, ja, he'd help S. S said he 
wanted to become a Catholic and he 
(the priest) said okay, but then he 
must get his parents' permission, 
for example. It was, like, S 
could see he thought S was a bit 
funny. 
99 Lots of people thought S was a bit 
weird, a bit strange, that he was 
not like other people, he didn't 
take things the way they were. 
It made S feel incredibly alone, 
S felt estranged from others in 
that, unlike them, he did not 
accept things as they were. 
Lacking their support, he felt 
i ncredibly alone. 
because he didn't get any 
support from anybody. 
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100 And the friends 5 had at school 5ince 5's friends ridiculed that 
who he started withdrawing from, to which he felt committed, he 
they just ridiculed the withdrew from them, and felt 
Catholic Church generally. extremely lonely. 
They made fun about the 
Catholic ceremonies and things 
like that. 50 5 just felt 
very, very alone. 
Protocol B Table 2 
Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience 
1. 5 questioned the prevailing views of his community and wished to 
depart from their taken-far-granted values, lacking faith in the 
people who embodied these values. 
2. 5 appealed to God and spent time dialoguing with others to try to 
ascertain what was right for him. 
3. 5 experienced what was to be the truth for him only vaguely at first, 
and then gradually more certainly. 
4. SIS truth was experienced as coming from deep within himself, as a 
basic, essentia l and integral part of himself, over and against 
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the truth of his community, with which he could not identi fy . 
5. S experienced dread at the prospect of confronting his truth, since 
living this truth would entail oprosing others and risking their 
re jection of him, and he feared being expcsed in no longer being 
a taken-for-granted member of the group. 
6. S withdrew from others, feeling that he was betraying them in 
privately not sharing their values. 
7. S felt torn between the conflicting alternatives of being-for-
others and authentically being himself (being true to his own 
experience) . This situation of conflict was so overwhelming that 
he prereflectively compromised himself by falling ill, thereby 
abdicating his responsibility for openly choos ing either alternative. 
8. In experiencing his truth, S felt alone and isolated from his 
community. 
9. Through o thers' negative evaluation of him, S felt bad and with-
drew to shield himself from further re jection anticipated from 
them. 
10. S felt absolut.ely r.()mp~l l€-d to live his truth, S1-nee, f ailing 
thi s, he would not have been able t o live with himself. 
11. S's truth (hi s reality) was initially experienced tentatively and 
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privately; only later was it l ived openly and responsibly. 
12. So long as S's truth (reality) was known but not yet lived openly. 
he felt false end untrue to himself. 
13. When S lived his own truth (real ity), he felt liberated (especial l y 
from the emotional hold of significant others), and, contrary to 
his expectations, was accepted by others . 
14. Having lived his truth, S experienced satisfaction and relief, as 
well as increased self-worth, self-respect and dignity. 
Protocol B Table 3 
Specific Descri ption of the situated structure of conscience 
S was experiencing tremendous turmoil and conflict concerning religious 
commitment. He began to question the prevailing views of his community 
in th i s area, and to depart from their taken-for - granted values. Being 
unable to bel i eve in the people who embodied these values, he opened 
himself up to other possibilities. S appealed to God to allay his 
confusion and spent much time in dialogue with others and agonisingly 
wrestling ~ith the issue. 
as follows: 
The truth for him then progressively emerged 
IIliLially he was vaguely aware of what was later to become the tru th 
for him. Later this truth appeared to him with certainty, as a f act. 
He experienced it as coming from deep within himJ as a basic, essential 
and integral part of himself. S felt a closer affinity, and could more 
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easily identify with this truth than with that prevailing in his 
community. 
S was filled with absolute dread at the prospect of having to act on 
his conviction, since he realised it meant opposing all significant 
others in his life. He was afraid of being exposed, of no longer being 
a taken-for-granted member of the group through living his truth. 
Troubled and restless at this daunting prospect, S began to withdraw 
from others, as he felt he was betraying their cause. S first expressed 
hi's conviction to his mother who implored him not to actualise it 
immediately. He felt torn between the conflicting alternatives of 
being-for-others (through failing to live out his conviction) and being 
for himself by being true to his own experience (and living out this 
conviction) . This conflict was so overwhelming that he at one point 
prereflectively compromised himself by falling ill, thereby abdicating 
his responsibility for openly choosing either alternative. S felt 
totally isolated in his conviction, since he perceived nobody else in 
his community as be i ng able to share his truth/reality. Through others' 
evaluation of him, especially that of his grandmother, he felt intrinsi-
cally bad, and withdrew further to shield himself from the pain of their 
anticipated rejection of him. However, despite continuing opposition 
from his family (his mother's being upset with him; his father, unable 
to understand him, being angry with him; his grandmother's rejection 
of hi~ ~·.'hich h~ ::;: )~p2ri 8nC :2: d ii"'. going icy-cold in his body) J S ultimately 
felt compe lled t o live his own truth since, fa i ling that, he would not 
have bee n able to live with himself. Hence the truth for 5 was at 
first experi e nce d tentatively and privately and only later lived openly 
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and responsibly . When it was known but not yet lived, S felt false 
and untrue to himself. 5, in acting on his conviction, loosened his 
mother's strong emotional hold over him. Once he had lived his truth, 
contrary to his expectations, he was accepted by others. He experienced 
feelings of satisfaction, relief and happiness, having accomplished what 
he felt compelled to do. He matured as a person, increasing in self-
worth, dignity and self-respect. 
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4 .3 PROTOCOL C JANET 
Protocol C Table 
See the Appendix for the original protocol demarcated in terms of 
meaning units. 
Protocol C Table 2 
Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscie nce 
1. Having lived openly with others in terms of her own reality, it 
became more difficult for S to ignore this reality in a situation 
in which it had previously been ignored. 
2. S felt it necessary to remove herself from the situation in which 
she was unable to live truly in terms of her own experience. 
3. S felt ill at ease in her situation, as if she were in the wrong 
place. 
4. The reality of SIS self-congruent experience was called into 
question by others and the passage of time seemed to be denied 
since nothing seemed to have changed and they refused to allow for 
changes in S. 
5 . S felt pressurised by others to be in a way which was congruent 
with their expectations of her, and so to deny her own experience. 
6. S believed her own experiences (world) to be inaccessible to others 
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and so was unable to share them with others. 
7. S could not become actively involved in her situation. 
8. S's situation and relationships seemed to be superficial, empty 
and alienating. 
9. S felt vulnerable and exposed in that she was no longer able to 
adopt the role or social facade with which she would previously 
have coped in her situation. 
10. With full awareness, in being-for-others S played a role which was 
incongruent with her own experience, and became increasingly de-
tached and estranged from herself in the process. 
11. S felt totally alone and isolated, since that which she presented 
to others and was shared by them had nothing to do with herself. 
12. As a compromise between relating to others authentically (which 
she felt unable to do) and not relating to them at all (by leaving 
their company), S related bodily in a less explicitly articulate 
manner (by dancing in their company). 
13. S becaT.e extYemely anxious at experiencing a loss of self and at 
feeling disembodied. 
14. S felt she had to withdraw and distance herself from others (to 
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whom she was giving herself over) in order once more to get in 
touch with what she was experiencing personally, and so to re-
gather her fragmented self. Her withdrawal was also supported by 
her feeling of utter exhaustion at having constantly to maintain 
a facade. 
15. On her own, S's perceptual (and particularly tactile) experience 
became extremely intense and distinct, and, through tending to 
her body and acting physically, she felt more embodied and more 
fully present to her situation. 
16. After a period of recuperative and self-integrative withdrawal 
from others, S was able to relate to others from her own perspective 
on the world, her sense of self being restored. 
17. S was careful to take heed of her own experience, it being pre-
ferable to be a stranger to others (in being true to herself) 
than, through abandoning herself to others, to be estranged from 
herself . 
Protocol C Table 3 
Specific Description of the situated structure of conscience. 
S returned to her home environment, having previously left it because 
::;lte had felt unable truly to be herself there. In the intervening 
period (away from home), she had moved towards coming to terms with 
her own reality and with herself: she had established a new network 
of relationships within which she found it possible to be more truly 
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herself, and had severed relationships with those whom she experienced 
as having expectations of her to be in ways which were incongruent with 
herself. However, when confronted once again by the social and cultural 
context of the well-established environment of her past, she felt ill-
at-ease, and the very reality of her more recent and self-congruent 
experience away from home was called into question for her. Contri-
buting to the sense of unreality, was the way in which the entire 
situation at home had remained so unchanged since SIS departure that 
it seemed to her as if time stood still. S felt pressurised by the 
others to continue to be at horne as if she had never been away, and 
so to deny the experiences of her recent past and the changes she had 
undergone. She was unable to share the latter experiences with these 
people, as they seemed to be so far removed from their world; and she 
believed her new-found reality to be inaccessible to them. She initially 
was true to herself in this situation, and felt strange and in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. Her situation was experienced as being 
incongruous with her present way of being, and she did not want to be 
there, being unable to become actively involved. The others had 
difficulty in relating to her, implying that she was not being herself, 
and wanting her to revert back to being the way they had come to know 
her. S found the situation and the personal relationships therein to 
be superficial, empty and alienating . She felt vulnerable, being less 
able to adopt the role and social facade with which she would previously 
have got by in this situation. Being too tired to resist the social 
pressure on her to be in a way which met the others' expectations of 
her, and not wanting to spoil the convivial atmosphere, S reverted to 
her former way of being, though this felt foreign to her. Accordingly, 
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she experienced a disjunction between the way she had been away from 
home and what she now presented to these people at home. She was 
gi ving herself over to the way she had al;;ays been with the others, 
and now, in being-for-others, as distinct from feeling strange in 
relation to the others, she fitted in with them but began to feel in-
creasingly estranged from herself, and this estrangement increased the 
more she departed from her own experience. She felt totally alone 
and isolated, and though the others accepted her in her being- for-
t hem, this acceptance meant nothing to S , since she knew that what they 
accepted was not truly herself. S felt that that which she presented 
to others and which was shared by them had nothing to do with her self . 
She was ambiguous l y present to her s i tuation; i n being-for- o t hers she 
felt as if she stood detached from herself, playing a ro l e of which she 
was constantly aware. S did not want to leave the company of the 
others, thereby risking offending them, and yet was unable to re l ate 
to them in an explicitly articulate manner; so she danced in their 
company as a compromised way of be i ng-with-them . S experienced a 
l oss of self, and felt disembodied, as if her body were disappearing. 
Her extreme anxiety was experienced bodily via her heart beating 
painfully. At this point she felt she had to withdraw and distance 
herself from others; it no longer made sense to communicate with them. 
She did not know who she was, having lost her sense of self, and she 
needed to be on her own to get in touch with what she personally was 
experiencinq, and to regather her fragmented self. She needed a 
period of transition in which she could stop being-for- others and get 
in touch with hers elf. Her withdrawal was also supported by her 
feeling of utter exhaustion at having to maintain a facade. Once she 
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was on he r own, her pe rce ptual experience of her situation was 
extremely intense and distinct, her tactile perception being particu-
larly acute. She tended to her body, and in acting physically, she 
once again felt more embodied and more fully present to her situation. 
Having restored her integrity and mustere d up her resources in her 
period of absence from the others, she was able to relate to them once 
more - this time from her own perspective on the world. Her sense of 
self was restored as was her sense of time; she could view her exper-
iences at horne and away from home as having occurred chronologically. 
S was now careful to take heed of her own experience so as not to 
abandon herself to others and so lose herself again. It was preferable 
for her to be a stranger to them than to be a stranger to herself. 
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4.4 PROTOCOL D LEONARD 
Protocol D Table 1 
See the Appendix for the original protocol demarcated in terms of 
meaning units. 
Protocol D Table 2 
Central themes expressed more directly in terms of conscience 
1. S knew that the situation in which he found himself was not right 
for him, and yet he remained in it owing partially to reasons of 
material security. 
2. S felt unable to exercise his own initiative in this situation J 
since what he did was dictated by others, with whose values he 
disagreed. 
3. S experienced a radical difference between his way of being in 
this situation and how he was in more familiar situations, and to 
continue in this situation required a forced effort of will on his 
part. 
4. As S's tasks became increasingly meaningless, he eventually felt 
such revulsion for what he was doing that he experienced a com-
pulsion to discontinue which was so great that it seemed to pre-
clude freedom of choice or decision on his part. 
5. SIS acting in terms of his own experience of the situation was seen 
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by others as being extremely odd. 
6. S was not fully involved in what he was doing, and so acted 
superficially and with reservation, experiencing his situation 
and the goals set in it as being unreal, untrue, empty and worth-
less. He relied on the worth accorded to these goals by others 
to sustain his motivation. 
7. S was living against (in conflict with) himself in behaving in 
accordance with the expectations of others and his situation, 
which were in direct conflict with his own feelings and experienced 
reality. 
8. S expended much energy in concealing his genuine feelings from 
himself and others, fabricating expressions and behaviour which 
in no way reflected his true experience. 
9. S revealed to others only what he thought they wanted to see and 
so isolated himself from them; they could not understand or get 
to know him since he concealed himself from them. Neither did 
he get to know others: in relating to them as people-to-be-deceived 
(of his true feelings, intentions, etc.), he was not genuinely 
open to their responses to him. 
10. At the prospect of being confronted publicly with his inauthentic 
behaviour, S was filled with dread, although at the time he was 
unaware of the source of this dread in that he was for the most 
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part successfully concealing from himself his own inauthenticity. 
11. S felt trapped in being forced to confront and own up to his being 
in a way which was not in keeping with how he actually was. 
12. At the height of S's inauthenticity (when he could not, in the 
presence of others J avoid the recognition that he was not being 
true to himself) he felt exposed and transparent to the gaze of: 
others to the point that he felt that he was disappearing. 
13. S sought confirmation of his existence and worth in the gaze of 
others, but all he perceived therein was hostilitYJ which was 
interpreted by him as proof of his being transparent in his be-
trayal of them and of himself. He felt shame at being thus 
exposed, and guilty about his betrayal of others. 
14. S experienced a loss of his bodily self when he became identified 
with his pretence and with others' experience of him. He lost 
his solidness and centredness. He also lost his freedom (he was 
at the mercy of others in their experience of them) as well as 
his limits (his feelings were located in others). 
15. S realised that he knew neither himself nor others, and longed 
for being (and feeling) at home with familiar others. 
16. S experienced inauthenticity as a ravaging of his self, and saw 
this experience as a comment on his way of being (his life) In 
general, rather than as an isolated event. 
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Protocol D Table 3 
Specific Qescription of the situated structure of conscience 
S experienced his present situation against the backdrop of his previous 
pleasant work situation in which he had felt free to be himself more 
fully. He had been given the freedom to exercise his own initiative, 
within broad limits, and found the values of others to be roughly con-
gruent with his own. The work environment had been experienced as 
being inviting, and there had been no discontinuity between SIS way of 
being at work and his way of being outside of the work situation. 
However, owing to financial considerations, S had left this situation 
and found himself in his present one. 
5 knew at the outset that his present situation would not be right for 
him, it being reminiscent of a previous work situation in which he had 
compromised himself drastically. This former situation had become in-
creasingly meaningless for 5; his work was dictated strictly by others, 
and its quality was deemed irrelevant by them. Eventually he exper-
ienced such revulsion for his work that, despite the conventionally 
desirable benefits which accrued from it (and he had willfully continued 
in view of these benefits), he had a compulsion to discontinue which was 
so great that it seemed to preclude freedom of choice or decision on his 
part. His resignation had been regarded by his bosses to be so incon-
ceivable as to be regarded as indicative of emotional disturbance on 
5's part, yet 5 viewed his act as reflecting an emerging integrity. 
Consequently 5 felt that he was betraying himself in his present 
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situation, which was ess~ntially a repe t ition of the earlier o ne. He 
felt ill at ease, that he did not belong here; he disliked the 
materialistic philosophy underlying the work , concern f or the well-
being of others being made subordinate to production and efficiency. 
Being only partially committed to his work, he worked superficially 
and with reservation. He experienced the situation as being unreal 
and untrue and was unable to maintain a sense of integrity there. He 
found the goals set at work to be empty, and relied on the worth accorded 
them by others to sustain his motivation in achieving them. It was only 
through an effort of will that he could work, since he was living against 
himself and experienced conflict between what he regarded as his inner 
feelings and reality and the outer expectations of him. He expended 
much energy in concealing from himself and others his true feelings 
(such as those of revulsion), pretending enthusiasm and fabricating 
expressions and behaviour which in no way reflected his true experience. 
He revealed to others only what he thought they wanted to see, and so 
related t o them not as people in their own right, but as people-to-be-
deceived as to his real feelings and values. Accordingly, he was not 
genuinely open to their responses to him, interpreting them in terms 
of his hidden agenda (of deceiving them). 
S found it necessary to conceal his genuine experience from others since, 
if they were aware of his experience, he would have to have left this 
s; tll~t i0!!' 03. 8 he ~· .. o'...!ld i.O longer have been able to live this lie which 
would have become exposed. 
S had abandoned himself completely to a pretence; he lived this pretence. 
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As he had never revealed himself to others, they were unable to see 
who he was. They did not understand or know him, nor he them. 
As an event approa·ched in which S was to be confronted · publicly 
with his behaviour and way of being (which had not been in keeping with 
himself), he experienced apprehension and dread of an unknown source. 
Whereas, in his day to day work situation S was able to avoid confront-
ing his thoughts and feelings through pretending to himself and others, 
he was unable to avoid this confrontation in this event in which his 
past behaviour was being recognised publicly. He felt trapped in being 
forced to confront that which he most wanted to avoid, and wanted to 
flee and to be at home. 
When S became the focus of attention in this crucial event, he felt 
that he was disappearing. He sought in the gaze of others, reassurance, 
confirmation of his existence and a hoped for reflection of something 
good in himself. However, all he found in their gaze (and he acknow-
ledges that they might not in fact have experienced him in this way) 
was hostility and confusion, which he interpreted as being proof of 
their being able to see through to what he had done to them (viz. 
betrayed them). He felt shame at being expose~ and transparent in his 
betrayal of them, as well as guilty. They saw through his mask 
(pretence) as being false, and, since the self which he knew was com-
plete ly hidden from them, there remained of S nothing substantial which 
they might perceive (they saw right through him). All they saw was 
someo ne capable of deceit. 
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S experienced a loss of bodily self. In contrast to his everyday 
experience, in which S is aware of himself as a body through which he 
is centred in the world and which he knows in its solidness and weight, 
his present experience was that of his body being a complex of unspecifi-
cally situated feelings, which moved without substance or weight. He 
became identified with what he perceived to be the others' experience 
of him, with their dislike of him. In so becoming, he lost his sense 
of self as well as his freedom. He was at the mercy of others (what they 
fe l t, he became). He had lost his limits; what he felt was no longer 
restricted to his own body, but was located in others. He could no 
longer sustain his pretence, and this was frightening for him, as he 
changed and perceived others as changing. He realised that he knew 
neither them nor himself, since he had never seen their response to 
his genuine self. After this experience/event, S longed to return to 
the known reality of being (and feeling) at home with familiar others. 
S only understood his experience as it is described much after the 
event, with distance from it. The inauthentic experience for him is 
dramatic, ravaging and obliterating, and entails living a pretence 
without having access to the self underlying the pretence. This 
experience was seen by S as a comment on the way he was living in 
general, on what was going wrong in his life, consistently, and not as 
an isolated event. 
4.5 
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* Extended Description of the structure of conscience 
The situation in which conscience is experienced is one in which the 
person feels ill-at-ease, and, while being reflectively fully aware of 
this' J fails either to remove himself from the situation or, through 
exercising his own initiative, to transform it, for fear of losing 
emotional and/or material security. He longs for a feeling of at-
homeness but, in feeling that he does not belong and that others will 
2 
not be able to share his world , he protects this world by concealing 
it from their (potentially) harmful gaze, thereby preventing others 
from getting to know him and him them3 , and so confirms and compounds 
his feelings, becoming increasingly detached, lonely and isolated. 
Others (in whom he lacks faith) and his relationships with them are 
perceived as being superficial, and lacking in genuineness. The 
situation, already experienced as meaningless, unreal and empty, be-
comes more so for him through his lack of care, engagement and involve-
roent in it . In that he ignores his own gut feelings and fails to take 
any initiative, his way of being is experienced by him as being dictated 
by others and by the situation . Insofar as he is thus uncommitted to 
his behaviour4 at the affective level, his actions and general mode of 
being are monitored reflectively and sustained through a n effort of 
willS which becomes exhausting. In the hopes of rendering the situation 
more bearable, he tries (though in vain) to see it through the eyes of 
* Footnote numbers in thi s section refer to clar ifying points which are 
to be found at the end of this description. They are included here 
rather than in the fol lowing chapter since they are directly amplifi-
catory of the Extended Description rather than gener ally d iscursive. 
Acknowledgement is due to Brooke (1983) for this procedure. 
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others who (ostensibly) find it worthwhile. There is a tear in the 
texture of his existence, a disharmony between inner and outer insofar 
as he lives a pretence constituted in the process of his being-for-
others; his genuine experience is neither reflected nor given expression 
in this pretence. He is ambiguously present to his situation, both being 
there as well as not being there6 being with others and yet not being 
with them and so feeling alone. 
in feelings of: 
His primary attunement is reflected 
1. ambivalence, in being torn between the conflicting 
alternatives of being-far-others and authentically 
being himself; 
2. betrayal, beth of himself (in being in a way which 
is untrue to himself) and of others (in not sharing 
their way of being and of seeing things while 
associating with them as if he did); 
3. guilt, arising from his betrayal of others and of 
himself; 
4. shame, at the prospect, both real and imagined, of 
being exposed in his pretence and hence exposed as 
S0ii1E:011e who stands O'ut CiS a no longer inconspicuous J 
taken-far-granted member of the group; 
5. dread, at the prospect or actualisation of breaking 
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with the received reality and the security this 
reality affords, and standing entirely on his 
own; the latter source of this dread is initially 
unknown since he is for the most part successfully 
concealing from himself his inauthenticity (and 
hence his authentic experience which i solates him 
7 from others) . 
In giving himself over so fully to his pretence and to others' exper-
ience of him (he becomes how they experience him), the person uncannily 
l oses his sense of bodily self in that (a) his body seems to disappear, 
(b) he ignores and begins to lose touch with his feelings, (c) he feels 
that he l acks substance and (d) he lacks centredness and boundaries. 
He also becomes transparent to the (hostile) gaze of others in two 
senses, firstly, in the sense that they can "see through II his pretence 
and so are aware of (aspects of) his authentic experience which he is 
trying to conceal from them; secondly, in the sense that in being 
completely identified with their experience of him, he lacks substance 
of his own and so, there being nothing of him to see, he becomes corn-
pletely transparent (i.e. invisible). Concommitant with this loss of 
self is a l oss of freedom; the person is at the mercy of others ' 
experience of him. 
Temporality (lived time) is such for the person that time appears t o 
stand still insofar as others are seen as denying change or the possibil-
ity of change in him, and the future is seen as a repetition of the past. 
He does not live towards a desired future , his own project being neglected 
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in favour of his realising the objectives of others . 
The person's own (authentic) experience is initially vague, uncertain 
and extremely fragile. However, as time passes and he continues to 
interact inauthentically with others and his situation, his authentic 
experience gains substance and becomes more real. His reality is 
experienced as coming from deep within himself, as a basic, essential 
and integral part of himself. The more he withholds himself from the 
situation while remaining in it, the .more forcibly his own reality 
thrusts itself upon him, demanding a response. Eventually being in 
this (inauthentic) mode becomes so ravaging and obliterating of the 
person's integrity/self, that he feels a compul sion , so strong as to 
preclude freedom of choice to the contrary, to live his authentic 
experience. Initially he might not own the living of this experience 
in that it might be lived quite prereflectively in the form of parapraxes8 . 
However, in order for him to progress from experiencing his reality 
only tentatively and privately to living it openly and responsibly , it 
is necessary that he temporarily withdraw from the influence of others. 
Furthermore, as his own experience becomes more real and pressing, he 
begins to feel vulnerable and exposed in the eyes of others since he is 
no longer able to adopt the roles and facades in which he had previously 
taken refuge. After this self - integrative withdrawal, in which the 
person has more securely and r eflectively appropriated his own reality, 
he is able to relate t o others from his own perspective on the world, 
being restored to his bodily self. ~hrough the person's openly living 
out his own experience, the e ve ryday, taken - for-granted reality of others 
is called into question. His behaviour brings to ligh~ the fact that 
- 173 -
the situation in which they find themselves is not an absolute given 
of their existence, and can be understood and lived in a manner other 
than that which they have taken as given. 
others a glimpse of freedom. 
His behaviour thus allows 
Following his resolution (through living and hence revealing his pre-
viously concealed authentic experience~ the person feels both liberated 
(especially from the emotional hold of others) and a renewed sense of 
self-respect and strength. The future once again holds promise for 
him. The inauthentic experience is lived before it is fully understood, 
and is seen not as an isolated happening, but as a comment on the way 
the person is living his life in general. 
Comments on the Extended Description 
1. It should be noted that the person's experience of conscience 
dawns as feeling ill-at-ease in the situation (lithe II situation 
rather than Ilhis II situation since by defini tien he has not made it 
his own). Initially he is not yet fully aware of not living the 
situation in terms of his authentic experience of it. 
2. As has already been shown (see Section 1.2), world, self and ex-
perience are inseparable and so each implies and is implied by the 
others in this description. 
3. The person also fails truly to get to know others since, in relating 
to them as people-to-be-deceived (as becomes evident l ater in this 
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description), he is not genuinely open to their responses to him, 
interpreting them in terms of his hidden agenda (of deceiving 
them) . 
4. The term tlbehaviour ll is used here not in a narrow behaviouristic 
sense, but in the broadest possible sense to include not only actions 
but also speech, facial expressions and other non-verbal behaviour, 
and other modes of being which are comparatively easily accessible 
to others in the person's environment. 
5. The term "willI! is used here in the sense reflected in Ilwill power ll 
whe~e the person's will does not function co-operatively in the 
service of his wishes, desires or needs, but constitutes an attempt 
to oppose them instead (see May, 1977, p.20S). 
6. This state of ambiguous presence is conventionally described by 
people in dualistic terms: "I was there in body but not in spirit." 
However, phenomenally speaking, the person has withdrawn from the 
environment, both social (Mitwelt) and physical (Umwelt), and this 
environment assumes a certain backgroundedness. Straus (1 969) 
describes this withdrawal from his social and physical environment 
and finally his corporeal being as man I s performing an · "ekbasis ". 
He sees this "ekbasis II or "excarnation II as a prerequisite for con-
ceptual thinking. 
7. 1nauthenticity and authenticity are inextricably linked in that the 
person can realise that he is being inauthentic only to the extent 
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that he is in touch with his own authentic experience. He cannot 
be ~ of not being true to himself unless he has a sense of his 
(own) self. This does not preclude the possibility of his pre -
reflectively being untrue to himself without yet being aware of it, 
insofar as his senseof (his own) self is as yet relatively undeveloped. 
8. The clearest example of this occurs in Protocol A, when Kristen 
utters a nonsensical sentence to her boss (N.M.U. 35). For para-
praxes as disclaimed action, see Schafer (1976, pp.131f.). 
4.6 General Description of the structure of conscience 
The situation in which conscience is experienced is one in which the 
person feels ill-at-ease and, while being reflectively fully aware of 
this, fails either to remove himself from the situation or, through 
exercising his own initiative, to transform it, for fear of losing 
emotional and/or material security. In feeling that he does not belong 
and that others will not be able to share his world, he protects this 
world by concealing it from their (potentially) harmful gaze, thereby 
preventing others from getting to know him and him them, and so confirms 
and c ompounds his feelings, becoming increasingly detached, lonely and 
isolated. The situation, already experienced as meaningless, unreal 
and empty, becomes more so for him through his lack of care, engagement 
and involvement in it. He is uncommitted to his behaviour at the 
affective l evel ; his actions and general mode of being are monitored 
reflective ly and sustained through an effort of will which becomes 
exhausting. There is a rupture in his existence between inner and 
outer, insofar as he lives a pretence c ons tituted in the process of 
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his being-for-others; his genuine experience is neither reflected 
nor given expression in this pretence. His primary attunement is 
reflected in feelings of betrayal (of self and others), guilt (arising 
from this betrayal), shame (at the prospect , both real and imagined, of 
being exposed in his pretence), dread (at the prospect or actualisation 
of breaking with the received reality and the security this reality 
affords) and ambivalence (in being torn between the conflicting 
alternatives of being-for-others and authentically being himself). In 
giving himself over so fully to his pretence and to others' experience 
of him (he becomes how they experience him), the person uncannily loses 
his sense of bodily self, lacking substance, centredness and boundaries, 
and becoming transparent to the (hostile) gaze of others. Concommitant 
with this loss of self is a loss of freedom; the person is at the mercy 
of others ' experience of him. Being inauthentic is so ravaging and 
obliterating of the person's integrity/self, that he feels a compulsion , 
so strong as to preclude freedom of choice to the contrary, to live his 
authentic experience, which thrusts itself upon him, demanding a response. 
In order to take this step it is necessary that he withdraw from the 
influence of others in order more securely to appropriate his own reality. 
He is then able to relate to others from his own perspective on the world, 
being restored to his bodily self . Following this resolution (through 
1 
revealing what is concealed) J he fee ls liberated and a renewe d sense 
of self-respect and strength. The inauthentic experience is lived 
1 It should be noted that this particular resolution, while it seems to 
be the most complete and fulfilling (judging from the protocols), need 
not necessarily occur. It may be side-stepped through the person's 
leaving the situation in which he could not be true to himself without 
first revealing himself in it. An example of this occurs in Protocol D. 
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before it is fully understood, and is seen not as an isolated happening 
but as a comment on the way the person is living his life in general . 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Examination of psychologically significant areas related to 
conscience 
When we examine the results of the present study, we find that they 
shed light on certain significant areas of psychological concern and 
interest, namely the self, the other, the body, inner and outer, 
temporality and meaning, and awareness. These areas will be discussed 
separately here, although to make any clear-cut distinctions between 
them (such as between self and body; meaning and awareness etc.) would 
clearly be artificial. It is not intended to imply such distinctions 
here (as will become obvious in what follows); these subjects will be 
dealt with separately purely for the sake of achieving a degree of focus 
and conceptual clarity_ Each subject (phenomenon) will be seen in 
terms of how it appears in conscience. The way in which the phenomenon 
emerges in the context of the experience of conscience will be seen in 
terms of the psychological-phenomenological world-view, and the im-
plications it has for this world-view. In the course of the discussion 
of these areas, where appropriate, a dialogue will be entered into with 
the writings of authors presented in the literature review (Chapter 2). 
5.1.1 CCD.3ciei'iC6 and self 
In this study, what is of particular interest as regards the self is the 
fact that self, world and others are so intimately related, this being 
in keeping with the view of Heidegger (and phenomenology ~n general) 
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that self and world (and hence others in that there is no world without 
others) are inseparable. Heidegger sees man as being-in-the-world-
wi th-others . In inauthenticity the person's situation (world) is 
perceived by him as being unreal and empty as if it were a facade. 
Likewise J he begins to experience himself as unreal, insubstantial ("as 
1 
an empty shell"-Protocol A, N.M.U. 71 ), and as a false front adopted 
to appease others. From a Freudian perspective, the "subject's per-
ception of the world in terms of how he is himself would be regarded as 
projection on his par·t of his inner psychic reality onto the external 
world. From our perspective I however, the person is seen as "realizing 
his self" only in terms of the world; the world is " .... our horne, a 
realization of subjectivity" (Van den Berg , 1972, p. 40). The self is 
inseparable from others, and this is borne out when the person sees him-
self in the glance of others; he sees his disapproval of himself (in 
his being inauthentic) in the gaze of others (see D, 62-63). When he 
feels confused about himself he sees this confusion in others (D, 11), 
even though he later acknowledges that they were not feeling confused. 
This suggests ·that when the person lacks clarity as regards himself 
(he is confused), he lacks a clear understanding of others. 
It seems that how one feels and being aware of how one is feeling are 
of particular importance in one's sense of self and in one's being one-
self authentically (A, 72-73 ; C, 66). How one feels might be loosely 
ascc=i~tcd ~ith one's mood or stat8-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) in Heidegger 
1Hereafter a capital letter followed by a number will refer to, respect-
ively, a protocol and a particular N.M.U. within that protocol. 
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(although Boss (1979, pp. 109-114) distinguishes between feelings and 
moods) since how one feels does reflect how one finds oneself in-the-
world. This suggests that, in order to know and be ourselves authenti-
cally, we have to take into consideration, at the outset, how we already 
find ourselves (Befindlichkeit) in-the-world. That our state-of-mind 
is of particu~ar importance in our being ourselves (i.e. in each of us 
being his ownmost self) i s suggested by Merleau-Ponty (1962) when he 
observes that "that sector of our experience which manifestly has no 
sense and no reality except for us II J is "our affective milieu" (p .. 180) .. 
In inauthenticity we suppress our feelings and become detached from our 
lIaffecti ve milieu". 
The phenomenon of conscience alerts us to the fact that, except under 
certain circumstances such as in the experience of conscience, we are 
for the most part not aware of ourselves. We are too caught up in our 
engagement in the world to be aware that it is our selves that are thus 
engaged. As Heidegger noted, we are mostly inauthentic (i .e. we have 
not owned our existence). It is most appropriate in this context to 
examine Ricoeurls notion of the self. 
Ricoeur (1978) claims that the first truth, "I am, I think", 
II ••• remains as abstract and empty as it is invincible; 
it has to be mediated by the ideas, actions, works, 
insti tutions, and monuments that. objectify it. It is 
in these objects, in the widest sense of the word, that 
the Ego must lose and find itself" (p. 43) . 
So the self, then, is mostly lost in "ob jects II in the course of one IS 
engagement in life. It is only through the act of reflecting , which 
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is II ••• the effort to recapture the Ego of the Ego Cogito in the mirror 
of its objects, its works, its acts n (ibid., p. 43), that the self 
can once again be appropriated. In the act of reflection, II ••• we have 
to recover the act of existing, the positing of the self, in all the 
densi ty of its works n (ibid., p. 45). The self as being at first lost 
and then reappropriated through the act of reflection is best described 
in the words of Ricoeur himself: 
"I must recover something which has first been lost; 
I make 'proper to mel what has ceased being mine. I 
make 'mine I what I am separated from by space or time, 
by distraction or 'diversion' J or because of some 
culpable 'forgetfulness'. I am lost, 'led astray' 
among objects and separated from the centre of my 
existence, just as I am separated from others and as 
an enemy is separated from all men. Whatever the 
secret of this 'diaspora', of this separation, it 
signifies that I do not at first possess what I am" 
(ibid., p. 45). 
The importance of reflection in establishing the sense of self is 
evidenced in the present study (C, 70). More generally, reflection 
might (though not necessarily) be implied in the very structure o f 
conscience, insofar as withdrawal is characteristic of this structure, 
and withdrawal is conducive to reflection. 
One's sense of self is not a given of one's existence, but rather a 
personal task to be fulfilled (C, 57). This is echoed in the words of 
Ricoeur when he writes It ••• the positing of self is not given, it is a 
task, it is not geqeben, but aufaegeben" (ibid., p. 45). This implies 
that the self is not a static, unchanging entity, but rather stems from 
continuous reappropriation, through reflection, of oneself from the 
ever-changing engagements with "objects II (in the widest sense of the 
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word) in which one is for the most part immersed. 
5.1.2 Conscience and the other 
The other (or others) is (are) of crucial importance in the experience 
of conscience. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an experience of 
conscience which does not involve others, insofar as it is only in the 
context of one's relationships with others (even though they might be 
"internalised" others) that one experiences not being true to oneself. 
In Heidegger's terms, without the "they" we could scarcely develop a 
"they-self" and so could in principle not be inauthentic, and, by im-
plication, would not experience conscience (as a call away from this 
"they- self" to the authentic self). Quite possibily one first becomes 
aware of one IS inauthentic behaviour through its consequences and its 
perceived effect on others, before becoming aware of the behaviour it-
self (D, 66). It is through one's feeling ill-at-ease in the company 
of others that one becomes aware of the (authentic) self which feels ill-
at-ease. It is only through losing myself (in the "they") that I find 
myself (in conscience). Just as in terms of our ontogenesis we are 
aware of others before we acquire any form of self-awareness J so through-
out life we become aware of ourselves (no more so than in the experience 
of conscience) through our first becoming aware of others in our inter-
action with them. Being inauthentic is thus a precondition for being 
authentic; as Steiner (1978) has it: 
tlThere must be inau thentici ty and 'theyness' J I talk I 
and Neugier, so that Dasein, thus made aware of its 
loss of self, can strive to return to authentic being ... 
Verfall (fallenness) becomes the absolutely necessary 
pre-condition for that struggle towards true Dasein, 
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towards possession or, rather, re-possession of self, 
which defines man's exposure to the challenge of the 
ontological" (p. 96, parenthesis added). 
One experiences conscience only to the extent that one is called away 
from others in their imrnersement in the received reality. In all of the 
protocols, the non-conforming nature of conscience is clearly evident. 
The incompatibility of conscience and superego emerges here, especially 
in the cases of Burt (Protocol B) and Janet (Protocol C), both of whom 
actually had to oppose their parents' wishes in order to respond to 
conscience. That conscience is non-conforming is made quite clear 
in the views of Heidegger, Jung and Fromm (see Sections 2.2.4, 2.4.2 and 
2.4.3 respectively). 
When one responds to one's conscience (as the call to be authentic) by 
living out one's own experience, one lends substance through one's 
actions to what was initially seen by others as something too non-con-
formist to be regarded even as a possibility. One might then find that 
others actually share one's perspective but did not have the courage to 
express their viewpoint, or to live it out (A, 52-55). In this way, 
through one's resolutely acting in terms of one's conscience, one is 
able to co-disclose the authentic possibilities of others, as Heidegger 
has pointed out (see Sect i on 2.2.6). 
5.1 .3 Conscience and the body. 
As used here, the term "body" does not refer to a purely physical 
organism completely detached from a "mind II or meaning, but refers rather 
to the phenomenological understanding of the body as exemplified by the 
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view of Merleau-Ponty: 
"The body itself precisely as a body J is an existence and 
therefore of a subjective nature. The body itself is a 
subject and therefore does not derive its subjective 
character from a principle distinct from itself 'I (Kwant J 
1963, pp. 14-1 5 ) . 
Insofar as we are our bodies, the self is always situated since the 
body is always situated. To be authentic is to be-in-the-world from 
one's own standpoint. It is precisely as a body that I have a particu'-
lar standpoint, or point of view on the world. As de Waelhens (1967) 
has it: 
"By this mode of facticity (viz. bodily situatedness) 
each of us draws in the world, for himself and for 
others, an appropriate perspective at the same time 
he acquires a point of view, or more exactly a mode 
of participation sui generis in existing reality" (p. 161, 
parenthesis added). 
When one is inauthentic, however, one is not fully present to one's 
situation from one's own perspective; one is ambiguously present to 
this situation (A, 35-36). This ambiguity is reflected in the work 
of Heidegger where he sees it as the inauthentic state-of-mind 
(Zweideutigkei t) (see Section 2.2.2). 
In being inauthentic, one experiences oneself as being hollow, empty 
and insubstantial. These characteristics are shared by the ontologically 
insecur~ person described by Laing and may be regarded as antic manifesta-
tions of Heidegger's ontological notion that man is the basis of a lack 
or nullity (see Section 1.2). 
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If one is able to be fully present to one's situation, and so to live 
fully and engagedly in the world, one is then also fully embodied. In 
the words of Jager (1985), "a fully inhabited world is at the same time 
also a fully embodied world", and "bodily existence floods over into 
things, appropriates them, infuses them with the breath of life, draws 
them into the sphere of its projects and concerns" (p. 55). In contrast 
to this authentic mode of being, inauthentic being involves alienation, 
which " ... is ultimately the failure of inhabitation and embodiment" 
(ibid., p. 55). The other also plays a part in one's relationship to 
one' 5 body: "He can make the relationship closer. He can enlarge the 
distance" (Van den Berg, 1972, p. 69). When one feels ill-at-ease 
with the people in one's company and with one's situation in general, 
one becomes detached from one's body/self (A, 70-74; C, 36, 55, 62). 
In inauthenticity, though one attains a certain degree of freedom 
through one's not being fully situated (one sees the world in a manifold 
way through the eyes of others), this freedom is without substance since 
one is disembodied and so one lacks a spontaneous and vital lived 
freedom (D, 12, 85). As Heidegger says, in inauthenticity Dasein 
is Ueverywhere and nowhere II (see Section 2.2.2). This suggests that, 
in order truly to be free, we need to accept our situatedness. The 
only freedom available to us is a situated freedom. It is when 
subjects act in terms of their own (and hence situated) experience 
that they p.xre:r-; pnce e. re!!e~oJed sense of freedom. 
An interesting similarity emerges between being inauthentic and being 
envious, in that both these ways of being share the characteristic of 
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excarnation. As in inauthenticity, in envy one experiences 
" .. . being excarnated 1 constituted by a sense of bodily absence or 
detachment from one's body, a radical ekbasis1" (Titelman, 1981, p. 197). 
This being self -detached from one I s body which occurs in envy serves to 
facilitate cne's attempt to merge or fuse with the envied other. 
Implicit in both inauthenticity and envy is a devaluing of one's own 
perspective in adopting that of the other (another). One I S own stand-
point is abandoned for that of the other; this might suggest that in 
both inauthenticity and envy, one lacks self-esteem. Envy seems to be 
a type of inauthenticity, such that to be envious would entail being 
inauthentic, although being inauthentic would not necessarily imply 
being envious. 
Initially, the researcher was surprised to discover excarnation to be 
a constituent of inauthenticity (and hence of conscience). However, 
on reflection this is not so surprising. In being a body I am clearly 
a human being that is separate from other human beings; if I am hurt 
physically, there is no doubting that it is ! who feels pain. Hence 
the body individualises, and as Merleau-FDnty has noted, that sector 
of our experience which is distinctly our own is our "affective milieu", 
which is inseparable from our bodies (see Section 5.1.1). Now in 
inauthenticity we are trying to escape precisely that which is our 
own, namely our own existence. It therefore makes sense that we 
should abandon our bodies in becoming inauthentic . 
1 See point 6 of Comments on the Extended Description, Section 4.5. 
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5.1.4 Inner and outer 
In the experience of conscience, the distinction between the surface 
of things (outer) and what lies beyond this surface (inner), emerges 
significantly. As one becomes increasingly inauthentic, the dis-
crepancy between inner (onels own experience) and outer (what one reveals 
to others) becomes greater, such that eventually one believes that 
one's experience is inaccessible to others (e, 38). ene keeps one's 
reality hidden from others, pretending to oneself that this reality is 
not really important, and one plays a role which is familiar to others 
and accepted by them as being oneself (C, 30). This is reminiscent 
of Sartre when he speaks of self-deception through playing a part 
(see Section 2.3.2). 
In inauthenticity, things (in the broadest sense of the word, including 
oneself) ~ not how they seem to be; there is a discrepancy between 
appearance and what is regarded as reality. What is real, further-
more, is identified not with externals, but with what is inner; one's 
authentic experience/self is experienced as coming from deep within 
oneself (8, 36; D, 25). What comes from within is regarded as one's 
own and authentic , and in inauthenticity it is as if one lacked any-
thing inside, since one feels empty. 
Though, on face value, it might seem incongru9us to speak of "inner II 
and "o u ter 11 or "inside" and "outside!! in the context of phenomenology 
insofar as these terms might be regarded as implying Cartesian dualism 
(where "inner" refers to mind or pure subjecti vi ty; "outer" to matter/ 
body and pure objectivity) , this is in fact not the case. Van den 
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Berg (1972) argues that " ... the pure subject, the completely 
unsubstantial inner man, does not exist" (p. 40, emphasis added). 
It is important to note that what he denies existence is not inner man 
as such, but an inner man that is not substantial, that is, inner man 
thatis not connected with the world (and hence others). 'ilia t Van den 
Berg vouches for the existence of inner man as such was confirmed in a 
personal communication with him (1984) . We all have experience of 
private thoughts, secrets, hidden feelings and so on, and these 
experiences are phenomenal evidence of inner man. 
5.1.5 Conscience, temporality and meaning 
In being inauthentic, one experiences one's situation as being meaning-
less; one feels empty and is unmoved by one's situation. The future 
becomes uninviting, and concommitant with this, the present loses its 
meaning (A, 38, 45). What is meaningful calls one forth into the 
future; when one lives a meaningful life one has things to look 
forward to. In inauthenticity one does not have one's own future; 
in giving oneself over to others J one sees the future as others .(the 
"they II) see it, and feels that one's life should unfold in a manner 
which is in keeping with how "one" lives one's life (A, 29, 30). 
One is irresponsible in the sense that one fails to respond genuinely 
to one's situation in terms o f one's own understanding and possibilities 
(see Buber, Section 2.3.3). In extreme inauthenticity one becomes 
depressed and experiences oneself as dying (A, 54, 55). 
In the experience of conscience, one is called forward to one's own-
mos t possibilities. Authentic existence is always directed towards 
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the future, while taking the past into account as the basis of future 
pcssibili ties. Conscience I • •• • calls us back in calling us forth II 
(Heidegger, 1980, p. 280). 
There seems to be a conflict between being secure in one 's habitual 
mode of being (for-others) and venturously risking oneself (in being 
true to oneself) (see Kierkegaard, Section 2.3.1). Howe ver J there 
comes a point where the price one pays in being inauthentic (feeling 
life less, unfree, lacking in substance) becomes so great that one is 
prepared to risk losing one's security in favour of once again feeling 
alive. When one then resolutely acts in terms of one's own experience, 
the future becomes inviting once more, and "there is light and there 
is hope and there is something pcsitive in (one's) life" (A, 50). 
5.1.6 Conscience and awareness 
My self, like my body, is for the most part lived prior to any knowledge 
or awareness of mine concerning it. One of those instances in which 
I do become most explicitly aware of my-s elf, however, is in the 
experience of conscience (see Laing on self-consciousness, Section 2.4.4). 
That one becomes aware of oneself in the experience of conscience 
should not be surpri sing in view of the fact that both "conscience" 
and "consciousness" share the same root, namely conscientia (see 
Section 2.1). Furthermore, this self-awareness comes to the fore 
when one experiences discomfort in being ill-at-ease in one's situation. 
The relationship between discomfort and awareness (particularly self-
awareness) is described well by Harding (1973) when she writes: 
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"As has been truly said, consciousness arises only 
at the point of discomfort. Just aS J in common 
parlance, 'necessity is the mother of invention I J so 
conflict might be called the mother of awareness. 
When all goes well for us, we swim with the current; 
it is only when things do not go well that we become 
aware of the conditions of our lives and arouse our-
selves to play an active role in regard to our own 
fate" (p. 201). 
That consciousness arises only through suffering is echoed by 
Dostoevsky when he states that " ... suffering is the sole origin of 
consciousness" (cited in Kaplan, 1964, p. 465). It is through being 
aware of the way we are being ("the condi tions of our lives") that we 
arouse ourselves to play an active role in : our existence. 
is reiterated by May (1977): 
liMy argument is that self -consciousness itself - the 
person's potential awareness that the vast, complex, 
protean flow of experience is his experience, a fact 
that often takes him by surprise - unavoidably brings 
in the element of decision at every point" (p. 204). 
This point 
In one's awareness of one's existence, one is faced with having to 
choose, and one becomes anxious at this prospect. In this context 
one thinks of Sartre's view of man as having to choose himself (see 
Section 2.3.2), and Heidegger 's view of authentic Dasein as being 
anxious (see Section 2.2.5). The need for one to choose consciously 
in one's authentic development is recognised, not only by all the 
existential philosophers presented here (see Section 2.3), but also by 
Jung (see Section 2.4.2). 
Al though in ontological terms, Dasein as such is guilty. (see Section 1 .2) , 
_. 191 
at the antic level of concrete experience this guilt only becomes an 
issue to the extent that one is both aware of certain possibilities 
of onels existence which are calling one, and yet fails to realise 
these possibilities (8, 24, 25). In the present study, in the case 
of each of the subjects, the experience of conscience arises at the 
point of conflict where the subject becomes aware of certain definite 
possibilities of his existence (in the case of Kristen and Leonard, 
to resign from their current places of employmenti in the case of 
Burt, to become a Catholic; in the case of Kristen, to abandon her 
lIo1d self" role), and yet has not resal ved either to realise or 
abandon these possibilities. It is only when a decision is made 
responsibly (i.e. through responding to these possibilities - see 
Buber, Section 2.3.3), that the situation is resolved. It is in 
principle impossible to be free of ontological guilt. However, in 
order to be authentic, one has to be resolutely guilty, i.e. to be 
guilty in a way which one has responsibly chosen. It is only when, in 
authenticity, one does not resolutely appropriate one's existence as 
one's own that one might actually experience1 the pangs of ontological 
guilt. 
It can be seen from the above that awareness (being aware of how one 
is living one's life) is intrinsic to conscience. Authentic being 
is characterised by Heidegger as IIwanting to have a conscience" (see 
1 The experiences referred to in lIexperiences of ontological guilt" 
are those experiences which might reveal the implicit presence of 
conscience and guilt as onto l ogical (see Section 1.1 and 1.2). What 
is ontological cannot in principle be experienced directly as such since 
it would then be referred to as "on tic II. 
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Section 2.2.5) . It follows that being authentic would then entail 
wanting to be aware of how one is living onels life. In that awareness 
only dawns at the point of discomfort or conflict, we might conclude 
that being authentic, therefore, entails a readiness for discomfort or 
conflict (cf . Heidegger's view of authentic being as being characterised 
by a readiness for anxiety, Section 2.2.5). In this regard it is 
appropriate to quote Van den Berg (1966): "An existence devoid of 
sickness l acks the stimulus to live just as an existence devoid of 
mental problems degenerates into complete insignificance" (pp. 73-74, 
emphasis added). 
5.2 Biographical context 
I should like to suggest here that a certain life-history is likely 
to predispose certain people (namely those who have lived this particular 
history) to be more susceptible t o experiencing conscience than others, 
or conversely, that people who are particularly susceptible to 
experiencing conscience are more likely than not to have experienced 
the essential features of the life-history presented here. It should 
be stressed that no causal connection or relationship is being implied 
between this life-his tory and the experience of conscience. It is 
simply due to the striking structural similarities between the experience 
of conscience and this biographical context that the two are brought 
together here. 
The particular biographical context with which we are concerned here 
is that presented by the Swiss psychoanalyst, Alice Miller, in her 
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book entitled The Drama of the Gifted Child (1981), the original and 
more apt title of which was Prisoners of Childhood (1979). 
Miller (1981) claims that "for the majority of sensitive people, the 
true self remains deeply and thoroughly hidden" such that " ... many 
a gifted person lives without any notion of his or her true self" (p. ix). 
In the structure of conscience arrived at in the present study, the 
uncertainty with which the person experiences his own reality (lltrue self 11), 
at least initially, appears quite clearly (see also point 7 of the 
Comments on the Extended Description, Section 4.5). People whose true 
selves are hidden from themselves and others , live out an "idealised, 
conforming, false" self, such that the true self is in "'solitary con-
finement' within the prison of the false self" (ibid., p. ix). These 
people are said to suffer from narcissistic disorders. Miller 
describes two extreme forms of these disorders, and considers the one 
to be the . reverse of the other. She refers to these forms, namely 
depression and grandiosity, as " ... the two sides of the medal that could 
be described as the 'false self', a medal that was actually once given for 
achievements" (ibid., p. 43). Neither the grandiose nor the depressive 
individual is free in his being; both are compelled to fulfill the 
"introjected mother 's" expec tations : " ... whereas the grandiose person 
is her successful child the depressive sees himself as a failure" 
(ibid., p. 45). Depression is seen as a loss or giving up of one's 
ureal self " and consists of a denial of one's own emotional reactions 
and feelings; grandiosity is a defence against depression. The 
grandiose person can forget the l oss of his "real" or · "true ll self so 
long as he is able, through his outstanding achievements, to be the 
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object of admiration of others. However, the self-respect he gains in 
this manner is fragile and tenuous, since he is excessively dependent 
on admiration from others, and this admiration is contingent upon 
qualities, functions and achievements of his which might at any point 
fail him, forcing him to confront his emptiness. In the present study, 
denial of their emotional reactions and feelings is evident in the 
subjects' not being committed to their behaviour at the affective level; 
the importance which Kristen and Leonard attach to succeeding in their 
occupations hints at the possibility of a grandiose defence on their part 
against their basic feelings :.of lifelessness (depression) . The latter 
intepretation, however, lacks sufficient ground to be definite. 
Narcissistic disorders are seen by Miller as having their origins in the 
early emotional adaptation of the individual. In the course of healthy 
development, the infant (and later child) has available to him a parent 
(care-giver) who regards and respects him as the person he is at any 
given time, especially as regards his emotions and sensations and his 
expression of these. Ideally, the child is umirrored" by the mother 
such that he finds himself "in his mother's face" (ibid., p. 32). 
In his mother's being sensitive to and reflecting his needs and feelings, 
the child develops a sense of who he actually is, relatively free from 
expectations on the part of the mother as to how he should be. In 
the case of the child who is later to suffer from a narcissistic 
distur~~!'!cc j h::' .. :cvc::-) such relati v81y uncluttered and uncontaminated 
mirroring is unavailable. His mother is unable to tolerate the ex-
pressing of certain feelings, such as anger, frustration, sadness, and 
vital spontaneity. The reason for the mother's inability to tolerate 
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the expression of certain feelings lies in the fact that, as a child, 
she could only express these feelings at the risk of being rejected 
by her own parents. So, without realising why (i.e. prereflectively), 
she inhibits these same feelings in her own child so as to avoid the 
restirnulation of the old anxieties associated with their expression. 
If the child must risk losing his mother's love, then he cannot experience 
these "forbidden" feelings J even secretly J II just for himself" (ibid. J 
p.10). He then accommodates himself to parental needs, reflecting 
only those aspects of himself (and themselves) which they wish to see. 
Instead of the parent mirroring him, he comes to mirror the parent, and 
both denies and loses access to himself in the process. He remains 
without a mirror, and for the rest of his life might seek this mirror 
in vain (ibid., p. 32). A clear example of one's seeking a reflection 
of oneself (in vain) in the other, appears in the present study in the 
case of Leonard (Protocol D). 
Accommodation to parental needs often (though not always) leads to the 
development of the lias-if personality II, or what Winnicott refers to as 
the "false self" (ibid., p. 12). When Miller describes this personality, 
she might just as well be referring to the structure of inauthenticity 
as it emerges in the present study: 
nThis person develops in such a way that he reveals 
only what is expected of him, and fuses so completely 
~.!i th ~, .. hat he r8vzal::; that .. . ona could scarcely have 
guessed how much more there is to him, behind this 
'masked view of himself' (Habermas, 1970). He cannot 
develop and differentiate his 'true self'J because he 
is unable to live it. It remains in a 'state of non-
communication'J as Winnicott has expressed it. Uhderc 
standably, these (people) complain of a sense of 
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emptiness, futility, or homelessness, for the emptiness 
is real. A process of emptying, impoverishment, and 
partial killing of his potential actually took place 
when all that was alive and spontaneous in him was cut 
off" (ibid., pp. 12-13, latter parenthesis added). 
There are at least two import?nt structural similarities between 
conscience as researched in the present study and the biographical 
context presented above: 
1. both involve a rupture in one's existence 
between inner and outer, such that one 
becomes a being-for-others which opposes 
one's authentic experience; 
2. both involve a sacrifice of one's freedom, 
individuality and vitality in the service 
of being secure in others' acceptance of one. 
Fromm (1949) makes an explicit connection between an inhibited child-
hood and (guilty) conscience when he writes: 
"The scars left from the child's defeat in the fight 
(for freedom) against irrational authority are to be 
found at the bottom of every neurosis. They form a 
syndrome the most important features of which are the 
weakening or paralysis of the person's originality and 
spontaneity; the weakening of the self and the sub-
stitution of a pseudo selr 1n wn1cn tne fee11ng of 
'1 am' is dulled and replaced by the experience of 
self as the sum total of others I expectations; the 
substitution of autonomy by heteronomy; the fogginess 
or , to use H.S. Sullivan's term , the parataxic 
quality of all interpersonal experiences. The most 
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important symptom of the defeat in the fight for oneself 
is the guilty conscience" (pp. 157-158, parenthesis added). 
5.3 Conscience and psychotherapy 
In the present study it becomes evident that the authentic self is 
always ready for anxiety. Not only is this fact borne out by the 
structure of conscience (and hence authenticity/inauthenticity) as 
discovered in this study; it is also supported by the literature: for 
Heidegger, conscience (and hence authenticity) emerges from the depths 
of anxiety (Section 2.2.5); for Kierkegaard, the spirited (authentic) 
self is transparently anxious (Section 2.3.1); and Jung (1934) points 
out that " ... the growth of personality (which coincides with authenticity 
in Jungls use of the term "personality" - see Section 2.4 .. 2) is synonymous 
with an increase of self-consciousness" (p. 184, parenthesis added), and 
self-consciousness entails conflict, which is associated with anxiety 
(see Section 5.1 .6). Tillich (1959) makes the point that " ... anxiety is 
existential in the sense that it belongs to existence as such and not to 
an abnormal state of mind as in neurotic (and psychotic) anxiety" (p. 49). 
If anxiety is intrinsic to existence, and authenticity involves 
appropriating one's existence as that which it is, it follows that if 
one values authenticity one must be prepared to be anxious without 
r egarding anxiety as an extraordinary or undesirable state .. This implies 
that if the psychotherapist and his client hold store in being authentic1 , 
1 
In this regard , Bugental (1965) regards authenticity as "the central 
concern of psychotherapy" (pp. 31 f.). 
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the psychotherapist should not see anxiety, in all cases at least, as 
a "symptom" of some or other disorder which ought to be alleviated, 
but rather as the point at which authenticity might emerge. Clearly 
the psychotherapist's judgeme nt of the nature of the anxiety experienced 
by his client will be informed in each particular case by the breadth 
of his experience and the depth of his psychological insight. In any 
event, his task cannot be seen as that of guiding his client towards 
"normali ty" in an attempt to avoid this anxiety: to value authenticity 
on the one hand and to regard I1normality" as a way - ai-being to be 
strived for involves a contradiction, since the notion of "normality" 
is loaded with the "theyll and how IIthey" say "one" ought to live one's 
life. This does not suggest , however, that the task of the psycho-
therapist is to encourage the client not to conform so as to assert 
his own individuality (authenticity) over and against others and society 
in general. The aim of the psychotherapist is rather to be an un-
cluttered presence for the client, and so to provide an atmosphere 
which is conducive to the client's discovering his own (authentic) 
experience, thereby facilitating him in living that life which is 
uniquely his own. In the words of Bugental (1965), psychotherapy 
" .... is not the treatment of an illness. It is a daring to confront 
self - and-world. It is not a learning to adjusti it is a facing of 
infinitive un-adjustability" (p. 42). 
'It:: the clie .. t wh0 is particul drly suscept ible to experiences of con -
science, the uncluttered presence referred to above i s unlikely to have 
been available i n the p a st. In Mil ler' s t erms, the psychotherapist 
would do well to facilitate suc h a client's regression to his past as 
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the source of his loss of self. Lomas (1963) refers to this regression 
as a "hopeful return to the past" (p. 90). Now, in re-living his past 
in psychotherapy, the client can experience for the first time the 
sadness j pain and narcissistic rage that attended his loss of self. 
It is only when the client can experience these painful feelings at the 
loss of his self which were denied not only expression, but also aware-
ness in childhood, that he can properly mourn this loss, without defend-
ing against it through becoming, for example, depressed or grandiose. 
Referring to such a client in psychotherapy, Miller (1981) writes: 
"He will discover in himself a need to live according 
to his 'true self' and no longer be forced to earn love, 
a love that at root, still leaves him empty- handed since 
it is given to the 'false self', which he has begun to 
relinquish" (p. 57). 
The client's return to his past in order to _live more fully towards 
his future makes sense in terms of the point Van den Berg (1972) makes 
when he claims that " ... an accessible future means a well-ordered past" 
(p. 92). The client has lost his "true self" in the past. In order 
for the future to become more accessible to him he needs to return to 
the past in an attempt to salvage his self. This is reminiscent of 
Heideggerls description of conscience as a call that " ... calls us 
back in calling us forth" (see Section 2.2.4), and the following 
statement made by Scheler (1960) is appropriate here: "History com-
f=~c.s us from the power of the history we live" (p. 41). 
In returning to our past and making sense of it, we are freed for the 
future. 
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In genuinely experiencing and being himself, the client might experience 
anxiety that is so intense that he might fear that he is becoming 
psychotic. May (1969) is not surprised by this, since 
1I ••• consciousness of one's own desires and 
affirming them invokes accepting one's originality 
and uniqueness. It implies that one must be prepared 
not only to be isolated from those parental figures 
upon whom one has been dependent, but at that instant 
to stand alone in the entire psychic universe as well (p. 81). 
Clearly the psychotherapist must be able to "hold" the client and con·~ 
tain his anxiety in his exploration of his hidden world of feelings. 
Any rejection experienced by the client as coming from the psychotherapist 
might dispose him (the client) to lapse once again into his inauthentic, 
IIf alse self" mode of being. 
5.4 Conscience compared with being-guilty 
What follows will be a brief comparison between the structures of 
being-guilty as researched by Brooke (1983) and of conscience as it 
came to light in the present study. 
What emerges most strikingly is the fact that conscience i s a far more 
diffuse phenomenon than is being-guilty. In the mode of being in-
authentic out of which conscience calls one to "come into existence It 
(Roqers' (1967) expressinn for becoming authentic), the person has 
abandoned the very basis of his being: he no longer owns his own 
experience as such, and feels insubstantial and uprooted, lacking a 
centre. By contrast being-guilty, while also being a pervasive 
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phenomenon, takes as its starting point and presupposes the person's 
having a basic standpoint in the world within a network of established 
world-relationships. Guilt arises through the damaging of precisely 
these world-relationships which are presupposed by the person in being-
guilty, and yet are not appropriated by the person in conscience, until 
such time as he actually lives his authentic experience. The very basis 
of the self is in question in conscience, whereas in being-guilty it is 
only certain world relations (specific acts and/or omissions) which become 
the issue. The person in being-guilty is more in possession of himself 
than the person in conscience, whose sense of self is fragile in that 
he is scattered in his being-for-others. 
Nevertheless, what is perhaps the most significant structural similarity 
between conscience and being-guilty is the fact that the person experiences 
a rupture in his existence between what is revealed and what is concealed, 
between inner and outer, in both cases. In conscience, the person 
hides his authentic experience from others (and, to a degree, himself), 
while presenting to them what they expect of him. In being-guilty, the 
rupture exists between the person as he was prior to his guilt-provoking 
act and/or omission, and how he is now, after the act. He presents to 
others the former ha~onious way of being, while hiding from them his 
mode of being which is culpable. other less striking similarities 
are as follows: in both conscience .and being-guilty, others are 
expe!"iencec. negativ£ly, either as lacking in i.lli.deTstanding- and hostile 
(conscience) or as accusatory (being-guilty); in both modes of being 
the person feels isolated from others (this follows from the rupture 
in his existence) i the most satisfying resolution of both conscience 
- 202 -
and being-guilty involves the closing of the rupture between what is 
revealed and what is concealed. 
'!he relationship between the structur.es of cons .... cience and being-guilty J 
as these structures appear in the present study and that of Brooke 
(1983) respectively, may be seen most meaningfully in terms of inauthen-
ticity. Both modes of being involve being inauthentic. However J 
whereas conscience entails a failure to appropriate and openly live 
one's experience (existence) in general terms, being-guilty involves 
concealing and failing to appropriate specific constituents of one's 
existence, namely those of one's acts/omissions which damage world -
relationships. 
5.5 Limitations of the present study and suggestions for further 
research 
Although within the scope of the present study this would not have 
been possible, it would have been desirable to analyse the protocols 
of more subjects. This study is a step towards uncovering the 
structure of conscience and authenticity and inauthenticity related 
to this phenomenon. The essence of structure or meaning is that it 
is the unity in diversity. We arrive at the structure of a particular 
phenomenon by tracing the common thread or invariant theme which runs 
through the many different instances of that phenomenon. It is 
through one's examining many varied examples of a particular phenomenon 
(conscience in this case) that what is typical of the phenomenon emerges. 
In the case of the present study in which only four instances of 
conscience were analysed in detail, it was at times dif(icult to discern 
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whether or not a particular theme formed part of the invariant meaning 
(structure) of conscience. To rectify this limitation, it would not 
be advisable to obtain much shorter protocols from many more subjects. 
In that conscience (within its context of authenticity and inauthenticity) 
is such a diffuse and pervasive phenomenon, one requires more than brief, 
superficial descriptions from the life-world of one's subjects. Further 
research, tapping the experience of more subjects, is required in the 
area of conscience. 
Although a more adequate question fails to spring to mind, the research 
question asked in the present study tended to bias subjects' responses 
in the direction of descriptions of inauthenticity. As a result, the 
emergence out of the inauthentic mode of being through each subject's 
living out his own experience has not always been described adequately, 
in the researcher's opinion. A case in point is the description pro-
vided by Leonard (see Protocol D in the Appendix). More thought and 
research in this area might yield a question which rights this bias. 
Phenomena in which one explicitly or implicity denies the reality of 
one's own existence might all be regarded as instances on inauthenticity. 
An obvious example of such ,a phenomenon would be envy, in which the 
person tries to live vicariously through the envied other, " denying 
his own facticity and possibi lities in the process (see Titelman, 1981). 
It ~'-'01J.ld be =- ';·!crthl.'lhile u::1a.e rtG.kir:.g to study these phenomena and} at 
the level of structure, to explore the relationship between each 
phenomenon and the others, as well as its relationship to inauthenticity 
as such. 
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Despite the limitations of the present study, it is hoped that it has 
at least revealed that conscience, when understood in its broader and 
more original sense, is a phenomenon worthy of serious consideration 
and further research, insofar as it plays a significant role in the 
destiny of each individual. 
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APPENDIX 
PROTOCOLS C AND D 
PROTOCOL C JANET 
11After I'd been away from home for 18 months, I went back to visit. 
Many things in my life had changed in that 18 months (among other 
things, we moved to another province, I got divorced, and began working 
full-time again). 
2/My children and I left for Johannesburg on a Thursday morning - 13 
hours by car. That evening I attended a typical Afrikaans meeting 
and felt very strange and ill at ease after 18 months in Grahamstown. 
3/0n Friday we spent the whole day in the busy city, and on Friday 
evening we drove the further 120km to my home-town. 
4/1 was very tired when we arrived home. At home my father was there 
together with all his friends. They were waiting to hear how things 
were going with me and all that had happened to me. It was pleasant 
51 to see everyone, but for a moment it felt as if time was standing 
still. It was as if I had never been away from them. 
I couldn't even begin to tell them everything that had happened to me 
in the year and a half . It felt like a lifetime in which they had had 
no part. 61 I also didn't want to spoil the convivial atmos phere, and 
so semi-consciously decided to be my "old self", as they knew me. 
71 Every now and then I felt strange, as if I were in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. 
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8/Later that evening I was simply emotionally too tired to sustain the 
role which I'd been playing, and I began to dance with the young people 
until late in the evening. 9/1 was still tired the next morning. but 
I got up and began to dance again as if I was driven to it by anxiety. 
It was easier to dance than to stay with the relatives that stayed 
over. 
However, it did not relieve the anxiety. 10/r became more anxious 
and the feeling of strangeness and isolation was even stronger than it 
had been the previous night. I could not sustain my role for the 
others any more; I was also physically too tired. I went and lay on 
my bed. 
11/ At that stage I was so anxious that I was aware of my heart which 
was beating almost painfully. I felt totally strange and lost, and 
I simply could not get rid of the feeling. It was as if I had lost 
myself completely. I was so anxious that it felt as if even my body 
d · . 12/ . d d 1 1 was lsappearlng. I trle esperate y to re ax and to find myself. 
My brother came and sat with me and I tried to speak to him. However, 
this made the anxiety worse, because I could not tell him what was 
happening with me. 13/1 asked him to take my children out and to 
leave' me alone for a while. I had to do this because it felt to me 
as if something was saying to me that whatever I did now, I would have 
to do for myself. I had to find myself on my own. could not 
present some other self to the people for a moment longer. I was 
alone, and I had to find myself, find my real self, on my own. 
- 207 -
15/My anxiety at that stage was so overwhelming that 1 could scarcely 
control my movements, but I had to do something for myself. With 
difficulty 1 managed to go and bath and to get dressed - this made me 
feel myself a bit more, and also gave me the opportunity to be with 
myself, totally on my own. 16/1 realised that 1 needed help, and 
went to ask a General Practitioner in the town for some medication to 
relieve my anxiety. 
17/After that, 1 went and lay in my room and asked my relatives to keep 
my children busy and to give me a chance to find myself. 18/ 1 said 
that I would speak to them again later but I first needed time for 
myself. I slept for the rest of the day and also that evening. 
1
9
/ I began to feel my real self again only the next day, and from then 
on was very careful to take note of something within me that was me, 
and not to let myself down. 
20/Although the others were disappointed in my "serious" attitude, I 
preferred their disappointment to the feeling of losing myself, and 
at all costs I had to remain true to myself. 
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Inquiry: 
R: 21/yOU said that the evening you arrived in Johannesburg, you 
attended a typical Afrikaans meeting, and you felt strange and 
ill at ease. Could you say more about that? 
5: Urn, well, the meeting - that's now the Academy of Arts and Sciences 
- so all the staunch Broederbond Afrikaners were there. And that, 
in Afrikaans society, is the in-thing to attend. It's a big thing 
to attend this thing, 22/and it was an absolutely ridiculous feeling. 
It felt as if everyone was playing games, to fit in. And I just 
decided I wouldn't play games to fit in. So that's why I felt so 
strange in that situation. Because I tried to be j ust as I am 
there without participating in social games. That's why I felt 
strange and ill at ease, because I didn ' t adhere to the rules of 
the game at that stage. 
R: 23/How did you feel about the games? 
5: Basically, they're the sort of games that I 'd played earl i er in my 
life, to adapt to the society I was in all my life. But I think 
in the meantime I have sorted myself out a bit more, and become 
myself a bit more. And that sort of game has become total l y un-
t bl t 24/ b . 11 d· d · accep a e 0 me. So aS1ca y I was 1sguste w1th these 
sort of !=>lJ.pe-rficial tricks and things) and with this sort of empty J 
alienating conversation. And I just couldn't manage to play along. 
R 25/ h . d : W en you arrlve at your dad's place, all of his friends were 
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there and so on, and you said it was pleasant to see everyone, 
but for a moment it felt as if time had stopped. Could you tell 
me more about that? 
5: Yes. Everyone used to gather at my father's house on a Friday 
night - in summer for a braai and in winter to eat soup and so on. 
And the three years that we spent in X (5's home town), before we 
came here, was a time that I played these games a lot. Every 
Friday night we would be there with the whole crowd, and in the 
year and a half that I spent away from them in Grahamstown, X was 
no longer an important place in my life. At that time (when 5 was 
in X) Friday nights with the same crowd were an important part of 
my life. 50 when I returned after a year and a half, it was the 
same place with the same food and drinks that everyone drank and 
the same sort of jokes and all. And it felt as if the year and 
a half that I was away from X, the time that I lived here did not 
exist. Almost as if it had been something I thought up. Because 
26/ 
everything there remained as it had been, and I had basically 
changed a lot in the year and a half. And it was as if nothing 
had happened - as if my being was just a dream. As if that scene 
had just continued and I'd just woken up from a sleep. 
R: 27/ You say you changed. Can you go into that a bit more? 
s: Well, basically, many things had happened in my life. I had moved 
here, where I met my sort of people and didn't need to play these 
games anymore. I could be myself more, and actually worked on 
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being myself more. I got divorced, which also helped me to be 
myself more - I found it less necessary to play all the games that 
suited my husband. So in everything I did I began to be myself 
more - doing things that I thought were right for myself. So 
this is, generally speaking, how I changed. I basical ly stopped 
playing the games and began to do my own thing more. 
R: 28/ You say you semi-consciously decided to be your "old self". 
Could you tell me more about this? 
S: This crowd of people were all so excited to see me after the year 
and a half. We always used to have fun together on Friday nights. 
And they sort of expe.cted ~ I could see it when I arrived there -
they sat there and waited for me to have fun again as they still 
have fun every Friday night - what they think is fun, which was 
never really much fun for me, but - I could see that they were 
sitting and waiting for me to fall in line and have fun together 
with them. 29/And at that stage I was so tired after driving there, 
and the previous night's shit meeting, and the shopping in town and 
so on, that I basically had no more energy to decide to be myself 
and stick to that decision. It was easier to play the old role 
and to speak nonsense and p lease them with my behaviour. 30/ In a 
way, then, I was pretending that the year and a half that I was 
away did not exist, and to fall back into the pattern as I remembered 
it. In this way, I decided, "Ag, forget about that year and a 
half - it actually had nothing to do with them and it will take me 
years to try to explain to them where I am nowt!. So all I could 
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do now was once again to be as they knew me - that would be the 
easiest for everyone. It would please them, make the evening fun 
for them, and that would be the easiest. I didn't have the energy 
to fight the system. 
R: 31/ You say you felt strange, as if you were in the wrong place at 
the wrong time •.. 
S: Yes - it's the same thing of how I'd changed in the year and a half. 
Not so much how I changed, actually, but how I had become myself 
more in that year and a half, and abandoned all the roles, which 
was very important for me. 32/ d . 1 bl' An I was qUlte vu nera e In a 
way. I lacked the defences, social games and tricks with which 
I would easily have fitted in in that situation. 33/ So when I 
walked in, it ... (pause) ... ja, when I kept quiet and was myself, 
when I didn't play the games, these people were so surprised with 
me, and didn't know how to handle me - !lAg no man, you aren't as 
nice as you used to be anymore. You must come back here so that 
you can be yourself again!! J and such like. And that's precisely 
what I didn't want to do. 34/ That's why I left there, because 
I just felt I wasn't myself . So when I did feel I was being myself, 
when I didn't play along and so on, they moaned about it . They 
wanted me to be as they had got to know me . 35/so the times that 
I fp.l t I \>!=.£ beir.g myself the moat, I felt most strongly that I 
was ·in the wrong place at the wrong time,· It felt as if I - the 
time was wrong, because they denied the year and a half of my life, 
and the place was wrong because I couldn't be myself there - I had 
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to playa game to be accepted. 50 the more I felt myself, the 
more I felt it was the wrong place and the wrong time, in that 
specific situation. 
R: 36/yOU say that later that night you were simply too tired emotionally 
to sustain the role which you'd been playing ... 
5: Yes. I tried hard to be my "old self", as they like me, to please 
them, basically, and to feel accepted in their company. But it 
was so damn exhausting - it was as if I stood detached from myself 
while I performed for them to please them. So it was terribly 
exhausting for me, because I was literally playing a role, in a way, 
of which I was constantly aware. I wanted to please them and 
because I was physically so tired, as well as emotionally tired 
from my divorce and my job, and what had recently happened, that 
I just simply couldn 't sustain it. 37/I just couldn't go on 
socialising and that's why I started dancing with the younger people, 
because I thought, if I dance, then I at least won't have to do 
anything else but dance. I won't have to speak, and we can still 
have fun in that way. Then -at least I won't have to speak too 
much or try to explain myself, or continuously try to justify things 
that they don't like - to explain why I said such and such - because 
how I was there initially and how I operate here were so far removed 
from each other, that it really was an emotional strain to please 
them, so that I could be accepted. 
R 38/ - - d : You say 1t was eaS1er to ance than to spe ak with the family ... 
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5: Ja - speaking was difficult because I couldn't answer their 
questions without explaining. They wanted to know about my life, 
what has happening in my life, because you must have fun there, 
you must sit and speak nonsense and gossip about the people in X 
and bitch about the people in X and such like, something in which 
I have lost interest entirely. It was just not important in my 
world. And they wanted to know what had been happening with me 
and what had been happening with Mark (S's ex-husband) and so on. 
And I just couldn't tell them - it was hopelessly too much. 
39/The other thing which one could have done was to sit and speak 
absolute nonsense which I was basically too tired to be able to do. 
But I didn't want to go to sleep early and have them feel that I 
was not interested in their party. So I felt, well, I'll take 
part in the party, but I'll dance rather. Then I wouldn't have 
to tell long stories and try to make sense, while I felt as if I 
was sitting and trying to speak with people from another planet. 
Or as if I at least had come from another planet. 
R: 40/yOU say the dancing made you more anxious, it didn1t relieve 
the anxiety ... 
5: Yes. (Laughs) I became more anxious when I danced because 
basically everyone carne to dance then. And now there were other 
games, once again, sexual games with the dancing, which I also did 
not feel like playing. It was so clear to me what was happening 
- the games and so on - and I just didn't have the energy for it. 
So I became more anxious because I didn't want to be there. I 
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wanted to go and sleep rather or be back here where I could be 
myself and do my own thing. I didn't want to be there, whatever 
I did, whether I spoke, or danced or whatever, it didn't work. 
Because I couldn't just be myself and be left alone and be accepted 
as I was. So whatever I did made me more anxious, because I was 
busy doing the wrong things, for myself and for them. 
R: 41/yOU say the feeling of strangeness was strong. Could you go 
into that a bit more? 
s: It was the same strangeness that I didn't belong there, and that 
what I was doing was wrong, for me, anyway, hopelessly wrong. Urn, 
so it was as if I became more and more estranged from myself, in 
my attempt to be through continuing to do the things which I really 
didn't want to do but which I did to please them. The more I tried 
to please them, the stranger I felt, and the more estranged I felt 
from myself. 
R: 42/yOU talk of isolation ... 
S: Yes, that was almost as if I was almost two people in that situation. 
Because it was almost as if I distanced myself from myself when I 
was playing the role for them. When I decided to be my "old self". 
It was as if I distanced myself from myself - almost like acting 
43/ in a play. And they were pleased, but I felt incredibly a lone, 
because the things I was doing to please them, thereby trying to be 
44/ 
accepted, didn't work at all. And I almost l ost myself in the 
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process. I constantly felt that I was letting myself down 
terribly, because they were now liking me for something that I was 
not at all. I was pleasing them through being something that I'm 
not. So that they accepted me did not help because it wasn't 
actually me. 45/so then I felt incredibly isolated and alone, 
because when I tried to be the genuine me they said, "Ag no, that's 
not nice. You're not nice now. You've changed and now you're 
funny", and things like that. So in that way I felt terribly 
isolated. 46/There's a difference between the strangeness I felt 
at the Academy meeting and that which I felt now. At the meeting 
I felt strange but it was in the crowd. But now, as 1'm telling 
you this, it occurs to me that I felt more and more estranged from 
myself in X. 47/The first evening I felt strange among the people, 
and the more I tried to please them, the more I felt estranged from 
myself, and the more anxious it made me. Because I could still 
handle the strangeness among the people, but the more I became 
48/ 
estranged from myself, the less I could handle it. So through 
trying to please the people through trying to be accepted by them, 
I let myself down all the more, and the more I tried to relieve 
the anxiety through not being myself, the worse I made the anxiety 
because I estranged myself from myself all the more. The more I 
departed from myself, the worse the anxiety became. 
R: 49/"1 felt lost and I simply could not get rid of the feeling ... " 
S: I think I've just explained that when I said I became more and more 
estranged from myself, basically. And how futile my attempt to 
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relieve my anxiety was. The more anxious I became, the more I 
tried to win the acceptance of the others, and the more I became 
estranged from myself. 50 the attempt that I made was the wrong 
attempt, basically. I let myself down more and more and sort of 
almost lost control of myself, in a certain sense. SO/The attempts 
to be myself failed completely, and then I was so strange -
estranged from myself . Because I gave myself over so completely 
and tried to go along with how it had always been. 
R: 51/yOU say you tried to relax and to find yourself ... 
5: Yes. The next day I continued with the same bizarre attempt to 
be part of things and to be fun and not to upset anyone with my 
changed state or whatever. And then I sort of collapsed - I 
just couldn't carryon. I was neither physically nor emotionally 
capable of carrying one. 52/Then I went to lie on the bed, and 
then I got the feeling that I was totally alone, because it really 
felt as if - on the one hand, here I lie on the bed, and on the 
other, there I perform for the people, and they see what I'm doing, 
but it's got nothing to do with me. And then I became terribly 
anxious. 53/ · And then I felt, now I'd better do something. And 
I thought, no, no, I can't go on like this, itls laughable, 
physically, to perform like that. And then I danced again, and 
it became totally ridiculou3 and I had to go and lie on the bed and 
come to a stop, and get my pieces together. I must come to myself 
and get back to myself in a way. And I must relax - relax physically, 
and I must relax in all ways, and stop performing, so that I can 
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get back to myself again - find myself. 54/1 just felt I must 
leave the people alone now and be myself again, because now I didn't 
really know who I was, whether I was that performing idiot or the 
person that I have been in Grahamstown for the last year and a half. 
Who the devil am I really now? I wasn't sure who I was and I had 
to find out who I was. And it was extremely anxiety provoking. 
There once again I had the feeling that I was in the wrong place 
and at the wrong time. I didn't know if I was wrong or if the 
time and place were wrong, or whatever. 55/And it was as if I'd 
disappeared, as if my body had disappeared in the situation. As 
if I no longer owned my body or my body me. That's how bad it was 
getting. And I just felt that I'd better get back into my body, 
I'd better gather my pieces together. 56/Later on I sort of - as 
I lay on the bed (pause) I couldn't relax, I was too anxious at 
that stage. But it was as if I was speaking to myself almost, as 
if a part of me was saying, it was as if I was listening to myself, 
you know, urn - it wasn't like a voice or anything like that, it was 
as if I was speaking to myself and was listening to my own voice. 
Because it didn't make sense anymore that other people should talk 
to me at that stage. 
they must just go away. 
or anything like that. 
I didn't want to speak to other people either, 
57/ And I also couldn't seek help for myself 
Whatever happened-at that stage whatever 
I had to do, I had to do for myself. I myself had to gather my 
pieces together. And I lay on my stomach on my bed a.nd, =5 I say, 
sort of spoke to myself. It was as if something in me, of myself, 
was speaking to me, and said, basically , that I (pause) the only 
way to get rid of my anxiety is just simply to be myself. And 
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whatever I do I must do for myself. I must do it for myself -
in other words, I must sort of do my own thing - and if I want to 
relieve myself of the anxiety, then I must do something about it. 
Nobody is going to do it for me. The people aren't going to help 
with that. 
find myself. 
I had to sort of establish once again who I am, to 
R: 58/Tell me more about the incident with your brother. 
5: Urn, (pause) as I tell you about it, I think I'm almost back in that 
situation. My brother sat with me and he saw that I was very 
anxious - I think I'd told him, but I'm not really sure, as at that 
stage I wasn't having much to do with people - but I could see that 
he himself began to look frightened. I think he could see that 
there was something wrong with me. And he sort of tried to speak 
to me, and so on. He said to me, I1What's going on?" J and he tried 
to be nice and gentle with me, but it didn't make sense anymore. 
It actually made me more scared, that he could see something was 
wrong. 59/ I can recall the whole scene - with my bed that I lay 
on, and the cushion with the blue flowers, and it was intense, the 
whole thing. And my brother's anxiety which freaked me out even 
more. 60/And my children who came in and (pause) who I just wanted 
to keep away from me, because I didn't want them to see what was 
happening to me. I don't know if I thought they'd be able to see, 
but I was afraid my anxiety might freak them out as well. So - and 
I couldn't at that stage consider anyone. I just had to take care 
of myself. It was urgently necessary that people just leave me alone. 
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Children - I couldn't be anything for anyone at that stage, except 
for myself. So the people who were there - it was terribly 
important that they should go away. 
on my own, gather my pieces together. 
So that I could come to myself 
And the intensity of that 
whole thing - I remember how I covered myself with the bedspread, 
urn, how I felt it. Everything was so - very intense. 
R: 61/yOU say you managed to take a bath and this made you feel more 
yourself ... 
5: Yes. I told my brother to take the children and said they had to 
go away. They had to just leave me because I had to find myself 
urgently. I was still very anxious, but I could relax to a certain 
extent because there was at least nobody with whom I had to be 
anything. So I thought (pause) - I couldn't relax properly. So 
I thought I must do something. And then once again I had to, as 
I told you, I was lying on my arms, as if I had to speak to myself, 
as if one part of me was saying, almost prompting, it was as if I 
literally had to listen to myself. It was very important to get 
in touch with myself, in a sense. It was as if I lay and really 
listened to myself. 62/ Because, you know, I sort of, knew, I had 
to do something physically as it still felt - probably from the 
anxiety - that my body was disappearing. I thought I had to do 
something physical, like take a bath, where I would feel cold or 
warm water or whatever, or knock my head against the wall or some-
thing, just to feel that I was there, and that my pieces were to-
gether. 63/And then with great difficulty I got myself together 
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enough to get up and, like an ordinary person - not like a bloody 
circus clown or something - get up and find my clothes and go to 
the bathroom and let the water run in - to do ordinary things for 
myself. 64/It had nothing to do with anyone else . I chose the 
clothes for myself, that I would wear that day, and the bathing was 
just for me and it had nothing to do with anyone else. I had to be 
good to myself and just do my own thing so that I could become more 
together again. So in that way the bathing helped to make me feel 
a little more real. A bit more - as if I was myself. 
R: 65/Having seen your G P you asked your family to keep your kids 
busy to give you a chance to find yourself. You needed time for 
yourself and would be able to speak to them later ..• 
S: Yes. It's the same as what I said about my brother and the kids 
who were there and so on. I didn't want to have anything to do 
with anyone. Because pieces of me were spread allover the place. 
So after I'd been to the G P - he injected me with tranquillisers 
which sort of made me relax more so that I could make more sense 
of myself at that stage, and handle the anxiety. So, urn, I needed 
time to, to - almost as if I had to get myself back from, that I 
had to stop doing the stupid things that I was doing for the crowd 
th t th 66/ d h d ' a was ere. An I a to be on my own, as I have been for 
the past year and a half, so that I could know who I actually was, 
and what was happening with me, and get in touch with myself and 
my own feelings, so that I, urn (pause) - ja, so that I could just 
be myself. I was wasting all my time with the blessed people. 
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R: You said that you would speak to them later ... 
s: Yes. Then I would speak to them again as I was, myself. 68/At 
that stage I realised that it was useless to put on this act, be-
69/ 
cause it was just going to freak me out completely. They would 
just have to - I should have done this long ago the previous night, 
just remain myself. But it was as if I needed a period of transi-
tion in which they were leaving me alone and I could gather my 
pieces together. And then later, when I felt more safe and secure 
and under my own skin, altogether whole within myself, then I would 
once again see fit to speak to them and possibly say to them, 
"Look, this is ridiculous. It doesn't help me to go on in this 
way. I am me. And you must take me as I am or leave me. 11 But 
I found it necessary first to build up energy for that. 
R: 70/yOU say it was only the next day that you felt your real self -
your real self? 
S: Yes. I think that's when I felt genuine . Okay , 11m in touch 
with myself and with my own feelings and I know who I am once more. 
I could sort of gather the pieces together of the time when we lived 
there at X, and how I had changed. The things that had happened 
to me, my experiences, became more chronological. I could think 
about it and fit the whole thing together chronologically, so that 
the time and everything was okay. I sort of stopped spinning and 
it was okay. I had stayed there for three years and I was away 
from there for a year and a half, and now I was visiting there and 
R: 
- 222 -
it was okay. 71/And they would have to accept me as I was, even 
though they couldn't understand and I couldn't explain to them 
everything that had happened to me. It was okay that I knew. 
That things made sense for me, and they would have to get used to 
me as I really was with time - and not as they would like me to be. 
72/And I sort of had the strength and the energy, now that I'd also 
slept well, to sort of present myself to them, as I really was. 
It didn't matter whether I would fit in with them or not. 
73/ You say you were careful to notice within yourself what was 
yourself ... 
S: Yes. I had to take notice of something - I had to pay attention 
to - (pause) when I was with the others and I half wanted to get 
involved in the games again, and try to please them, I was terribly 
aware that I couldn't do it. 74/1 had to listen to that little 
voice of mine. My own voice - that voice that I lay and listened 
to on my bed - I had to sort of listen to, to pay attention to 
what I was. And I had to stop myself from just rolling on like a 
tumbleweed together with the others. I had to keep a check on 
myself and say "No lI , because it didn't fit, it wasnlt me, it was 
for the others, but this was me and this was for myself. And it 
was terribly important for me to maintain that sort of control over 
myself so that I wouldn 't let myself down again. 
R: 75/ . . You say the people were d~sappo~nted ... 
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5: Yes. I fitted in well - the three years I stayed there I fitted 
in well. I took care to fit in, because I wanted to be accepted . 
50 I fitted in well with their games and the same sorts of things. 
I played the little games with greater ease at that stage, because 
I didn't have the guts really to be myself as I thought I was, as 
I felt I was, you know, as I felt comfortable with myself. Urn, 
(pause) so when I was basically as I was, and was almost true to 
mysel f , this wasn't very nice for them. They probably felt a bit 
disappointed in the whole scene. I wasn't as much fun for them as 
I had been. 
R 76/ f d th' d' , : You pre erre e1r 1sapPolntment to your . . _ 
5: Oh yes! Because playing those games freaked me out. I lost myself 
with the whole scene, as I said. And I felt I would much rather 
have them write me off, or le t them get to know me from the beginning 
or whatever, and then accept me like that or reject me, whatever 
they wanted to do. Rather than get that totally strange, spinning 
feeling about myself again, that I didn't know who the hell I 
actually was. It was better that they didn't know who I was , and 
learnt to know me from the beginning. 
77/ R: You say you had to remain true to yourself . .. 
s: Yes. That's right. I had to be what I was and feel comfortable 
with myself and feel at ease, sort of thing. And to hell with what 
they thought or said. It was just muc h less important . It also 
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didn't make me anxious at all, that they were sort of disappointed 
with me, because I sort of knew that they could rather write me 
off completely rather than that I should become so anxious that I 
didn't know who I was. So I just simply had to remain myself. 
I had to be true to myself. 
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PROTOCOL D LEONARD 
l/some years ago I was working in a job which I had taken on temporarily. 
I had, however, lied to my employers about my intentions and fabricated 
a career path to them. 2/1 didn't want to do that work and felt ill 
at ease in it most of the time. It did, however, provide me with 
quite a good income and I could keep going because I held the end in 
sight constantly. 3/As I was only half committed to the job, I ex-
pended a lot of energy hiding my true motivations as well as having 
to exert myself more in order to continue doing the job to my employers' 
satisfaction. 4/The company motivated its staff with a bonus scheme: 
if an employee reached his monthly target he was presented with a 
cheque and applause at a staff meeting especially arranged for the 
purpose. To achieve this reward was considered a prestigious achieve-
ment by the company. Through an enormous effort of "willI! on my part, 
something which exhausted me, I not only reached my target but exceeded 
it one month. 5/For some reason, I anticipated the presentation event 
with a mixture of vanity and dread. As the moment approached, my 
sense of vain achievement diminished and vanished and my sense of dread 
increased to almost intolerable levels. 6/ When my name was called out, 
there was a dramatic shift in the way my world appeared to me. 
overriding feeling/experience I had was of betrayal. I sensed a 
strong hostility towards me in the company bosses. 8/ I felt shame and 
guilt and it seemed to me as though others would see t hrough me, or 
literally into me, and they would see that part of me that I wanted to 
hide. 9/1 had in effect become the judgement of those others, there 
was nothing left of me. I was no longer me. I was "them" seeing 
. t d . d . 1 0/ h d f' 1n 0 me an JU g1ng me. I a a strong eel1ng of shame, but 
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betrayal was what I was. I must say there is a distinction for me 
between feeling something and the feelings I had during this event. 
During the time that I walked those few steps, received my "reward", 
and walked back to my seat, I didn't only feel these emotions, I had 
become them. 11/ People seemed to look away from me in confusion and 
dislike. 12/It was as if I had left my body and the usual sense of 
permanence and solidness I have about myse l f and my body disappeared -
I hadn't only become my own bad feelings, the me I know shifted its 
locus into others. They were solid and real and I was as evanescent 
as those feelings I describe. 13/In a sense I had . If t g~ven myse up 0 
others and at that moment fully experienced the ravages of inauthenti-
city. 
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Inquiry: 
R: 14/yOU mention that most of the time you felt ill at ease in the 
work you were doing. Could you go into the feeling of being ill 
at ease a hit more? 
s: I felt I didn't belong there, and I felt I was deceiving them. 
15/And I wasn't committed to the .work. I didn't like the work. 
I didn't like the whole philosophy or idea behind it. I didn't 
like the way that they went about doing their job. 16/ I didn't 
like the motivation of the work, and that relates to past things. 
A few years before that I had a selling job - this wasn't a 
selling job, but I had a selling job. And I actually gave it up, 
because I couldn't really go along with the profit motive. I 
think profit motives are fine, but not the way it's like implemented 
- you know, it becomes everything , and when it becomes everything, 
it pushes every other value out of sight. And so it becomes, like, 
for me anyway, the urn, a new morality based on profit. And no 
other values have space to come into it. 17/ And then, when I 
went back to this sort of work I actually had almost a revulsion 
for it, and yet I did it. And that was in my mind all the time. 
18/ And I didn't like the people very much. I didn't think they 
understood me, and I didn't make any effort to be understood. 
And so they didn't like me very much, and I didn't like them, you 
see. It was that sort of thing. 19/ d . k An so ~t too a hang of a 
lot of effort just to keep going, because about half of me was 
fighting all the time, saying "Get out, go away, leave it, this is 
not where you belong. This is not something you can really work 
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with, something you can give yourself to ... That's how it felt. 
20/1 think that's more or less what my dis-ease was. My discomfort . 
I couldn1t be involved in what I was doing. I was doing it in-
authentically, I was doing it superficially. I was doing it with 
a lot of reservation. I don't know if I'm making myself clear. 
R: 21/ h f ' Yes, t at's ~ne. You say you were only half committed to the 
job. Could you tell me a bit more about that? 
S: Well, I went to the job with a lot of sort of history behind me. 
I was working for the Government before that. I had a very 
worthwhile job, and it was something I really could do well. I 
could really go along and feel that the potential in the job for 
me to like live myself out - the Afrikaners have a good word for 
it, they say "jOll uitleef" - you know, was there, but the salary 
was so hopelessly low that I actually couldn't survive on it, and 
I got married during that time and had a family so I couldn't 
survive on that sort of salary. Also the bureaucracy was unbe-
lievably terrible. So I decided to change Jobs, but I had then 
decided to come back to university while I was still working with 
them, but I couldn't do it until a period of 2 years had passed. 
So I needed a better job, more pay, and also it was too difficult 
working under those sort of conditions with the Government and low 
pay, so I found this job, you see . 22/And actually, when they 
offered me the job I knew that it was wrong for me, and I knew that 
I was repeating the same sort of pattern that I'd experienced before 
exactly. 23/1 had a selling job once before, I was selling drugs 
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to doctors, which was actually a very well paid job, I had a 
motor car and there was enough money for me. But I actually -
after being there for 3 years I also did well at it, like I was 
promoted and things . I couldn't bear the thought that all I was 
doing was pushing up somebody's, the sales of certain drugs, and 
it was like my vocational existence, it was like meaningless. 
24/And that meaninglessness developed as the years developed, as I 
got more and more into the job, you see, and it was very clear to 
me, I reached a crisis at one point where I couldn'~ carryon. 
It wasn't something which I 'd actually chosen, it wasn't a decision 
I I d made, it was a decision I I d made in .spi te of myself, you see. 
25/ It was like an inner part of me was saying, "You can't go on 
like this, you just can't." And I kept saying, "Well, I must, 
I can and I will", you know. Because of all the acceptable things 
that were there, like it was a good job, it was well paid, it wasn't 
difficult, there were a lot of career prospects and things like 
that. 26/And yet this revulsion, and I can only call it revulsion 
because that's exactly what I experienced. For the whole philosophy, 
the whole value structure behind it. It became intolerable for me. 
And so I resigned the job, 27/ d t 11 . .. an ac ua y It was qUlte lnterest-
ing because when I resigned my bosses were utterly flummoxed. And 
they said well , they won 't accept my resignation and they want to 
talk to me, and so we like had a meeting and they said they thought 
I was like emotionally disturbed to make a decision like that. 
And to me it was the opposite of that, it was like some integrity 
coming out , not emotional disturbance. And they had actually 
made an appointment with two psychiatrists in Johannesburg for me 
- 230 -
to go and see them. (Laughs) So concerned they were for me. 
I actually appreciate it, it was actually quite a caring thing 
for them to have done, as people for another person. 28/ d An , 
anyway, I gave up my job and then I joined the Department of Social 
Welfare and worked in the social welfare field, and that, as I say, 
was very valuable. The welfare job was, in a sense it was very 
task-oriented. The task was given, and what I made of it, for 
myself, was up to me. There was hardly any training and very few 
vital guidelines. There weren't really people around who could 
help me or show me what to do at the level at which I wanted to 
do it. 29/1 felt the job was vast in its implications, and it 
was potentially very challenging - it was like inviting me into it, 
and I could put what I wanted into it. And what I put into it was 
determined by my values. 30/Whereas the other job, this personnel-
type job, I couldn't put myself into that, because what was required 
of me was very explicitly and overtly stated. I had to follow a 
very strict set of rules to do that job. 31/With the welfare job, 
to a large extent I was left to do the job the way I felt or 
believed I could do it. And as long as I didn't infringe on overt 
instructions - like give people too much money f or a food parcel -
I was more or less free to do what I felt I could do . It didn't 
clash in any way with my own value-system, that was the main thing 
about it. 32/ It was very c ompatible with my life-style outside 
the job. I didn I t have to become another person ~'lhen I went irJ.to 
that job. I didn't feel I had to change in any way - there was 
nothing to pretend about. And t ha t was the goodnes s about it . 
R: 
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33/ What was the nature of the work? 
It was interviewing people and giving them advice about pensions -
that was one section. The other section was interviewing people 
who had nothing, and finding them jobs and accommodation, and if 
they were destitute I would give them a food parcel, you see. 
That's mostly what it was. What I found terrible about it was that 
the quality of the work I did had no bearing on my advancement in 
the organisation. I also felt that there was nobody who could 
really tell whether I was doing good work or bad work, because 
they weren't qualified to know. Not necessarily academically, but 
they themselves didn't know what was good or bad. 34/And so I 
f elt very on my own, sort of thing, you see, there was no larger 
structure which could support me in what I was doing. I had to 
find those resources in myself, and so support myself. 35/But as 
I say , the most important thing was that it didn't in any way clash 
with my belief system, it didn't need to, it didn't ask to. The 
nature of the job wasn't such that I had to be re-moulded to suit 
it, like this other job, where I felt they were perpetually trying 
to change me. And perpetually trying to change the people, not 
only me, but everybody, to suit what they wanted . People became 
like clay, you had to change, you had to give everything to that 
other organisation, irrespective of whether you agreed with it or 
not. 36/ th· h f . d· . In 18 one t ere was ar more In lVlduality for me, I 
could give as much as I wan ted to or wi thhold as much as I wan ted to. 
And that was the main thing, the main advantage, I was left to be 
myself, very largely. And nobody tried to really change my 
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attitudes or my belief-system or my value structure. That's 
what it was. 37/But then I couldn't carryon there because the 
pay was so bad and the bureaucracy was intolerable. 38/And when 
I went back to this job, which was like, it was actually recruiting 
staff for companies, you see, but the underlying motive was to 
recruit as many people as fast as possible. Whether you do it 
well or not is irrelevant. 39/They couldn't care whether that 
person is happy in his job or not. All they cared about was how 
many people you managed to place into positions. And that was 
the overriding value, that was the motive behind it all. All the 
rest was actually just eye-wash, just kak. 40/ It wasn't true, it 
You can't do something like that with real integrity . 
You can't do it well, no matter how hard you try. You can place 
a lot of people, but you can never do the job well. If you're 
doing it well the way they want to do it, you see. 41/ The company 
got paid for every p l acement they made, you see. And so they 
obviously wanted as many placements made as possible. So what it 
actually boiled down to, was that to place a lot of people you had 
to interview a helluva lot of people. And the only way it actually 
worked was to send a lot of people to a lot of interviews, irrespect-
i ve of whether they are actually suited to that job or not. Because 
just by the law of averages, the more people you send out, the more 
are going to be employed. So that ' s what it really boils down to. 
42/ . . 
Your 1nterv1ews, your insights) your abilities and all those 
sorts of things are irrelevant. All you really need to do is send 
a lot of people out to a lot of jobs as quickly a s possible. And 
by doing that you need to know how to manipulate the applicant 
R: 
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and the personnel officer of the company, you see. That's the 
real backbone of what was going on. The rest, like you must know 
your people and know what they want, you must get to know them and 
all that, actually was irrelevant. That's what I call eye-wash. 
43/ It was actually using people, like blatantly, and I couldn't -
the same revulsion I had when I was selling tablets came back when 
I was doing this. And I said, "You're doing it again. II 44/ Like 
when I gave up the job it was like a tremendous leap forward for 
me in my own (pause) like moral strength, I think. And when I 
went back to this job it was· like a terrible regression. I perceived 
it and experienced it. 
I'd betrayed myself. 
It was a very great regression, I felt 
And I had. And so I was unhappy. I don't 
know if that answers your question. 
45/ Ja, sure. 
motivation. 
You say you expended a lot of energy hiding your true 
Could you tell me a bit more about that? 
s: Ja. Perhaps it's not very clear . I spent a lot of energy hiding 
(pause) let me give you an example, perhaps that will make it 
clearer .. You see, since there was a lot of work to be done, like 
we had to first of all interview the applicants, and you had to 
write ads, and the ads had to be appealing, you see. And it 
actually takes a lot of time to write a creative ad, an ad that 
someone will respond to. It takes a lot of time to go into the 
company and interview the personnel officer and go around and 
look at the job and see what it's like and things like that. It 
takes a lot of time to build up contacts and so on. 46/Sut if I 
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actually felt that what I was doing was valuable, it wouldn't 
have - I wouldn't have used up energy. But part of me was saying, 
"This is rubbish, you're doing this - you don't want to do it.'t 
47/ I was like battling myself, you see. And I couldn't let them 
know that I was thinking this is kak, this is rubbish, I can't go 
along wi th this. This is dishonest, it's deceitful, it's inferior 
work, you see. I had to pretend that I was enthusiastic. I had 
to pretend that I went along with it, 1 had to pretend that I also 
valued those sort of values. That I could give myself to those 
sort of values, could believe in them, could accept them and that 
they could become mine. And they weren't, you see. 48/1 had to 
put on a face. To say, "Ja, I like it", you see. Meanwhile 
inside me I was thinking this is rubbish, 1 can't go along with it, 
1 hate it, I hate everybody here, you see, that's what 1 mean. 
So I had to expend energy to put a smile on my face whereas actually 
I was scowling, you see, or crying. That's what I mean by expending 
energy. 
49/ You say you exceeded your target through an enormous effort of 
will. Could you say a bit more about that effort of will? 
S: What I mean is that because I was so conflicted about what 1 was 
doing, I felt very insecure. And I didn't - and since I - oh, 
another thing about hiding my true intentions, I went there knowing 
that I was only going to stay there for 18 months, you see. 
Because after 18 months I was going to resign. That was my plan, 
I'd worked that out. But I didn't tell them that - they would 
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never have employed me. And so I was also very insecure. I 
wanted it for 18 months, but I knew that if I like just became 
myself and said this was rubbish, they'd just kick me out. 501 So 
I made an extra effort to reach target, and the only way I could 
do it, not because I wanted to do it, but because I had to do it, 
and I had to fight myself. The only way I could do it was to 
expend will power, to say to myself, UYOll must do this. II Instead 
of going home at 5 o'clock, lid say, "No, I will stay here until 
6 11 and force myself to write good ads, and force myself to make an 
extra 5 • phone calls, instead of just going home, that's what I 
mean, you see. That's what I see as like will power. 
R: 51/yOU anticipated the presentation event with a mixture of vanity 
and dread. Could you go into those feelings a bit more? 
S: Well, I sort of felt vainly proud, because I'd managed to reach 
target, and actually exceed target. That's what I mean by vanity. 
It was vanity because it was empty. 52/because there was nothing 
to be proud about. It was actually something to be ashamed of, 
in reality. I should have been ashamed of expending so much 
effort, so much dishonesty, putting on such a mask, to reach such 
a valueless target. And yet I felt vain about it because I thought, 
I knew people would clap and say , "Well done" and things like that, 
you see. That's what I mean by vanity. 53/And apprehension, I 
don't know about the apprehension. I just felt very apprehensive. 
I just felt there's something - and I wasn't like so in touch with 
what was happening to me, because I was trying to suppress it, you 
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see. So (pause) but there was apprehension. 54/ I was like 
dreading it. Where the dread came from I couldn't actually say, 
you know, this is what I'm dreading. I didn't sit down and say, 
"What am I actually dreading?" I tried to brush it off and say, 
!lAg J nonsense man." But I knew I was dreading. I didn I t know 
what that dread was. 55/But I think I must have anticipated that 
I would feel like, the way I did as I described it, and the dread 
was of that. That I would be showing up to myself for what I'd 
actually done. That was the dread. That I would get to a point 
where I would be absolutely confronted with what I'd done. With 
the results of what I'd done to myself. And I couldn't anticipate 
it, I couldn't work it out for myself. I could only experience it. 
R: 56/your sense of dread increased to an almost intolerable level as 
the event arrived ... 
s: It's like a cliche isn't it? (Laughs) Ja, well what I mean by 
that is that it was as though something terrible was going to 
happen to me as the time sort of got closer. And all I wanted to 
do was run away. I actually wanted to go home. 57/ But I couldn't 
go home because I would have to come to work the next day and they 
would say J "Well J where the hell were you? II sort of thing, you 
see. So I was like trapped, you see. And that feeling of being 
trapped, there was actually no way out. I couldn't run away, I 
couldn 't avoid it, I had to face it. And that became almost 
o t I bl 58/ ok ld 1n 0 era e. L1 e I cou avoid that confrontation in the daily 
living of the job, you see, because it was, like, I'm going and I 
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could always avoid my feelings and thoughts and what was going 
on inside me and keep pretending to them mostly and to myself a l ot. 
But when, but the mechanics of the situation, I had to go for it, I 
couldn't avoid it. I couldn't say~ "Look, I'm not coming . II They 
would have said J "Why not? II and I wouldn't have been able to say 
I'm sick or something because I couldn't have lied, you know. 
59/1 was like so fragile, I just had to go through with it. And 
so it was intolerable. It was like having to face something 
absolutely terrible and there was no alternative, I had to face it, 
and I didn't want to. I didn't want to face it. It was the last 
thing I wanted to do. 
R: 60/The overriding experience you had was of betrayal ... 
s: You know it's difficult for me to tell you how it felt, but I felt 
betrayal. I can' t actually take betrayal apart and say I "This is 
what it's like." It was like (pause) I'd done something to some-
body. I'd built up some sort of trust , and I don't know who it 
was, I don't know who I was betraying. All I know was there was 
this tremendous sense of, feeling that I'd betrayed somebody, you 
see. That I'd built up some sort of trust and that trust had -
that I'd actually broken that trust, and like in a very despicable 
way. That's how I felt. In the most despicable way possible. 
61/ hO kO b kIf 1 d b T 1n l.ng ae Jet I' etrayed them, those people ~ and I 
felt they'd sensed my betrayal, they knew I was betraying them. 
But I also felt terrible betrayal towards myself, you know. (Pause) 
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R: Betrayal towards yourself? 
s: Ja. I'm not sure how that worked, but that's what I felt. 
R: 62/ Ja4 As you walked up to receive the reward, you sensed a 
feeling of hostility towards you from the company bosses. Could 
you say more about that? 
s: Ja. Like, the whole event, the whole visual event for me was, I 
think, because I felt so unsure and shaky at that momsnt, I like 
looked at people's eyes, sort of almost t o see, to perhaps guage 
some response, some reaction. Perhaps some reassurance, I think 
that's what it was. Because I felt this sense of betrayal, I like 
63/ looked towards them for reassurance, you see, and I didn't see 
that. What I saw was like, they were looking at me in a very 
hostile fashion. They seemed, instead of seeming pleased with my 
performance , they seemed he lluva hostile. Like people would be 
when they feel betrayed. I think that's where it comes from. 
You see, I felt I'd betrayed them, and therefore they would be 
very hostile, very angry with me for betraying them . And that's 
what I saw. 64/1 don't think they were hostile, why should they 
have been? I hadn't done anything to them that they knew about. 
I can't believe that they experienced what I experienced or felt. 
Obviously they didn't. That's how my world changed for me. I 
saw them looking at me and saying "You betrayer II J angrily and 
helluva hostile. It was a betrayal at a deep level. That's 
what I mean. 
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R: 65/yOU experienced a sense of shame and guilt. Could you go 
into that a bit more? 
s: I think once I looked at these people and I sensed sort of like 
hostility or what I thought was hostility in their eyes, because 
that's how it appeared to me. I felt very guilty about what I'd 
done. Helluva guilty. 66/And as I say, I - at that moment I 
wasn't in touch with what I'd done, all I was in touch with was 
what it felt like, the consequences of it. And that was the guilt, 
the guilt of betraying people. 67/And the shame. The shame was 
- ja, the shame came from (pause) ja, I felt that sort of guilt and 
the shame came from because I'd been caught out, you see. lid 
been like stripped naked, so to speak, like they could see through 
me. That was the shame. 68/Because they were hostile it meant 
they could see through me. Obviously they couldn't have been 
hostile if they didn't see what I'd done to them. So all that 
sort of fell into place for me, like all at one moment. You're 
guilty and they can see you're guilty. Aren't you ashamed of 
yourself? That's what it was like. 
R: 69/ t' th' 'f h 1 You men lon at It was as 1 ot ers COll d see through you, or 
li terally into you ... 
S·: Mm,. I think that's what I mean when I felt they could see what 
lid done. That's how I felt, you see. 70/ d th' k An I In because 
I'd so given myself over to this pretence (pause) ja, that's what 
it was. lid so lived a pretence, a role, a mask, that they couldn't 
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see me . 71/And when I said e arlier I couldn't make myself clear 
to them, I f e lt they didn't understand me. How could they under-
stand me if I was wearing a mask all the time? 72/so what I was 
presenting to them wasn't me, and that must have also accounted 
for the shame in me. And that's what they saw through. 73/And 
because I didn't present any other part of me to them, they didn't 
know me, Leonard Smith, · t hat I know myself. They only knew the 
mask I put up, and they saw the mask was false. Therefore there 
was nothing else to see. That's why they could see right through 
me. You see what I'm getting at? 
I think I get it. They only saw - they didn't see the 
genuine you ... 
S: No, because I never allowed them to. They never saw the authentic 
me because I was covering it up all the time. They never got to 
know me. That was part of the pain and discomfort of being there. 
75/NObOdY knew me, because if I'd allowed myself to expose myself 
and be me , they would have seen this guy doesn't belong here, he 
76/ 
must go. You see. And of course I would have done that myself, 
I would have had to confront myself and say, "Look, you're .. mad to 
be here." So I was putting the mask onto myself as well. And 
so they neve r saw me, they never saw anything of me, the real me . 
All they saw was what I thought they wanted to see. 77/ And therefore 
there was nothing else for them to s ee once they took that mask off. 
That's what they saw, that's how I felt they saw right through me. 
78/yOU see, if they'd seen me as somebody like me, and I'd exposed 
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some of that, and that event had happened, I would still have felt 
that shame, but not to that extent, because I'd feel they'd still 
see the genuine me still there, you see. The Leonard that they 
know, the real Leonard, is still there. But they never got to 
know that real Leonard , so how could they have seen anybody? 
That was that transparence, the looking through that I experienced. 
There was like nothing there for them to see, because lid never 
let them see it. And if I'd never let them see it, how could they 
ever see .it? And I knew I'd never let them see it. And so I 
knew they couldn't see it, and 'so therefore if they saw the facade, 
through the facade, there was nothing to see. 
R: 79/Ja. You mention they could see that part of you you wanted to 
hide ... 
S: Ja. That doesn 't fit in so well with what I've just been telling 
you, but that part which I wanted to hide (pause) was the real me, 
you see. Ja J and it ' s more or less the answer I gave to you just 
now. And that's that part of me I wanted to hide which was the 
801 
real me, they didn't actually see. So they actually saw (pause) 
they saw that part of me inside me, they saw behind the mask, in 
other words they must have seen the part of me which created the 
mask, that's what I mean. That part of me which is capable of 
deceit, you see. That's what they saw. But t .hey did!! I t see 
anything else, because there was nothing else for them to see. 
And I knew that. The important part was that I knew that, that 
I'd never revealed any other thing about me to them. So all they 
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could have seen was the mask which had been ripped off, and 
they must have seen into the person who is capable of producing 
these sort of masks. And there was nothing else for them to see. 
It's the same sort of thing that I explained just now . 
R: 81/yOU mention that you had a strong feeling of shame, but betrayal 
was what you were ... 
s: Ja, urn (pause) what I think I mean by that is that this mask that 
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I put on would preserve the job, would keep me in the job, was 
(pause) was in actual fact a betrayal, you see, that's what they saw. 
It was a mask. What I presented was a mask, but whaf I - the 
motivation behind it was betrayal or deceit, you see. And perhaps 
that's what I mean, that that's what they saw. It's all they could 
see as well, a person who is full of ·deceit and nothing else. And 
that's how I experienced myself, as betraying or betrayal. That's 
what I mean by that. 
82/Ja. You say there's a distinction for you between feeling 
something and the feelings you had during this event. 
go into that a bit more? 
Could you 
S: In everyday life, that's what I mean. Like in everyday life if 
I feel a sense of betrtly,=,_l or a sense of angei- or whatever J 
whatever the feeling is, there's still me around, you see. And 
I'm likely to feel more intensely with people I know very well, you 
see J than with strangers. The people I know really well really 
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know me, that's how I feel. So that me never disappears, like 
it did on that occasion. So it's like me having a feeling. It 
can be strong, but there's always me here. 83/Whereas there 
there wasn't a me, I'd actually disappeared. I actually did 
disappear, it's quite interesting that. So if I felt that 
b etrayal with my wife or something I'd know that she'd still see 
parts of me which weren't just betrayal. Because she'd see those 
parts of me and I've revealed those parts of me. So although, if 
I betray, it may be painful, but I won't disappear. There'll 
still be me, which she can see and which I can see because I've 
let her see it. You see. That's what I mean. 
R: 84/When you walked the few steps to receive the reward, you had 
become these emotions ... 
S: Ja. That's more or less the same as what I mean when I say that 
I was betrayal. Like there wasn't a me, there wasn't a me that 
was still doing it. I was just a mask, the unmasking and the 
betrayal which came out. That was me. There was nothing else. 
It carries on from the other question, it's the same thing. 
R: You mention it was as if you had left your body ... 
S: That's the same sort of thing. I couldn't - I didn't like feel 
myself, I didn't feel this is me walking. You know, these feelings 
were so strong, this whole sense of betrayal and shame and guilt 
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was so strong that I couldn't locate a centre from which - a 
centre that was feeling it, you see. It wasn't - as I was saying 
earlier, there wasn't me, the residue of me, from which I was 
feeling these things. There wasn't anything, there was just 
feeling. 
R: 86/when you were walking up to get your reward, you mention that 
people seemed to look away from you in confusion and dislike. 
Could you go into that a bit more? 
s: Ja. (Pause) Because I felt myself, like, disappearing, I needed 
to (pause) I couldn't tolerate the disappearance of me, so I had 
to find an anchor, and where I thought I'd find an anchor was in 
looking at other people and seeing what their response was to me. 
Like finding myself in them. And - because I didn't know where 
I was, and all I had was this bad experience. And I wanted to 
like get away from it, so I looked at people. Perhaps I was 
looking for confirmation that I was still there. That they could 
see something good. 871 d d'd th ' th' An I 1 nit seem to see at ~n e1r 
look. They looked as if they didn't know what was going on. 
They were confused because what they saw was going on wasn't what 
they knew me as being. Because I imagined they could see through 
my mask, past my mask, they actually saw that there was just this 
betraying me. Leonard the betrayer. But they didn't know me 
as a betrayer before, and that was their confusion. And they 
disliked noticing how they'd been betrayed. That ' s the sense I 
make of it to myself. 88/1 don't think it happened to them. I 
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don't think they actually saw that. I think I saw it in them, 
but I don't think they were feeling that. Because how could they 
have? They didn't see that betrayal - they didn't know about it. 
And what was happening was a confirmation of the mask, not a 
betrayal, for them. B9/And that was very frightening, because 
they changed too, you see. And then I didn't know where I stood 
with them. I had changed , and they had also changed. They 
weren't the people that I thought I knew. They were hostile 
people, they weren't people giving me awards, fri endly people, 
they were suddenly very hostile. And so there was an element of 
fear, too, about it. Suddenly I knew I didn't know them. 90/0f 
course I must have said to myself, "Of course you couldn't have 
known them, because you can only know them if you've revealed 
yourself. (Pause) You can only know the part of them which re-
sponded to your mask, you see. You couldn't know the part of them 
that would have responded to the authentic me." So I actually 
didn't know them. And that was the fear. I also realised that 
I didn't know myself, but I also didn't know them. 91/ And perhaps 
I interpreted in their look (pause) something which wasn't there . 
And I made out of something else, a look which could mean anything, 
I created or interpreted a look of confusion and dislike, which 
wasn't there. 92/ d ·bl d . An POSSl y I coul n't have recognlsed that 
look, because I'd never actually looked at them as people, you 
see. I'd looked at them as people who I'd had to hoodwink. And 
so they would take on almost any possibility, and the possibility 
which they took on was a possibility which I ' d created J in a sense. 
There was only one real possibility left for me to experience them , 
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and that was dislike and betrayal. 
R: 93/Ja . When you say it was as if you'd left your body you mention 
that your usual sense of solidness and permanence disappeared ... 
s: You know, in everyday living, I'm aware of me. As a person, a 
person I know, a body I know. I mean it's me, my body. I'm not 
just saying this because phenomenology says it, that's how I 
experience myself. My body is the centre of the world in which I 
operate - and other things as well, but primarily my solidness of 
me - like I'm thinking of going in a lift, I can experience the 
weight, the increased weight when the lift goes up. So 1 1 m 
aware of myself as a body, I'm aware of myself walking on the floor 
with weight. Those sort of things. Now that disappeared. 
94/And once that had disappeared there was nothing to replace it 
either, except these feelings. I didn't feel myself walking up 
those steps and walking back. I can't tell you what actually 
happened in terms of me as a body. I could have done a somersault 
- I don't know what I did with my body. I've no idea what I did 
wi th my body. I assume it just went up there and came back, 
because people didn't laugh or get amazed or something, or start 
screaming because I was floating. But I don't know what happened 
t b d 95 / f . d ' . o my 0 y. I went out 0 ~t. But I ~dn't go out of ~t and 
look - there's my body - it disappeared. It was just this whole 
complex of feelings of betrayal and all those sort of things that 
was actually moving from where I was sitting to that little place 
where the boss was standing at the back. It wasn't me as though 
- 247 -
I could walk there with weight. That's what I mean. 
R: 96/Ja . You say, "The me I know shifted its locus into others .•. " 
s: Ja. It was as if - that was part of the experience of my body. 
That disappeared, and perhaps when I looked at people to see how 
they took me I was looking for m~, the body that disappeared, you 
see. And (pause) it was ~s though- and I find this difficult to 
explain - it was as though I was - it wasn't them looking at me, 
with dislike, it was like I was in them, and I was the dislike in 
them. I was the experience of dislike in them. 97/yOU see, if 
somebody looked at me with dislike in the ordinary course of events, 
I 'd say, well, really, that's that person's feeling against me. 
I wouldn't disappear. I'm still here. They can't really do 
anything to me by their dislike. I mean, they can possibly 
scandal about me and things like that, but it doesn't like threaten 
me. It does threaten me, so I may get a bit frightened because I 
don't like being disliked, but I don't feel I'm going to disappear, 
981 you see. They don't have magical powers over me. But there, 
I had disappeared, and I was then - where was I if I'd disappeared? 
I was still feeling things, and I had actually - I was them, their 
experience of me. That's where I was. I was in them. I was 
their feeling, their unpleasant feeling about me, that was me. 
It's funny to say, but that's exactly what I experienced. I was 
like in their heads, or in them. I was their bad experience. 
That's what I was. I was no longer a person, an object, another 
person at whom they were looking and disliking. I was the bad 
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experience. And where was the bad experience if I'd disappeared -
it no longer had a centre. So where was it? So it was in them. 
R: 99/ You say, II I had given myself up to others ... " 
s: Well, by that I mean that I'd actually lived the life which I 
thought they wanted, you see. I thought they wanted a type of 
person who was enthusiastic, committed, energetic, and quite 
simplistic in a certain sense. A person who was like a machine 
that was working towards a certain aim. And there was nothing else 
about life. Because a lot of those people who are successful in 
those sort of jobs, that's their whole life. Anything else they 
do, any diversion or any pass-time or recreation is aimed at re-
storing themselves so that they can get back to the job and carry 
on. And that was the sort of person I was pretending to be. 
And so in actual fact I'd put on a mask which is what I'd felt 
they wanted. And in that way I was giving myself to them, I was 
becoming what they wanted me to become. That's what I mean by 
giving myself up to them. 
R: 100/ . You flnally say J .. In a sense I'd given myself up to others, 
and at that moment fully experienced the ravages of inauthenticity." 
Could you go into that a bit more? 
s: It sounds a bit dramatic. You see, this is what I understand 
about inauthenticity. That's what happens to me when I'm so 
inauthentic. And that's a very dramatic happening, and it sticks 
R: 
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in my mind because it was so dramatic. 101/ d . k An 1t too me some 
time to unravel it, to work out actually what was going on. Why 
did I have these peculiar sensations and feelings? There? And 
I can't remember having other feelings like that. Clearly. 
102/And so it said to me, this is what happens to you when you are 
inauthentic . You disappear and you feel betrayal. And it like 
ravaged me, it like broke me up. 103/ Instead of becoming me, 
becoming more solid, becoming - instead of me centering on myself, 
and operating in the world, I'd actually lost that ability complete-
ly. 104/ When I'd become their dislike, I was totally at their 
mercy, obviously. I didn't even have a body who could put margins 
on my feelings any longer. I was like their body, and I didn't 
know their body, so I was totally at their mercy. Whatever they 
felt, whatever depth of disgust they had towards me, or I imagined 
they had towards me, I would have become. And in that sense it 
was like being obliterated. 
105/ So you sort of lost your sense of yourself ... 
S: Completely. That going into them was losing me, I'd lost me 
completely. And why had I lost me completely? Because I'd 
given myself up to them, I'd lived the life they'd wanted - I 
pretended to live the life they wanted. But I'd done it to such 
an extent there there was nothing left, there was almost nothing 
in reserve for them, or for our relationship . 106/ And that wasn't 
a good feeling, that wasn't creative, that wasn't a me developing. 
It was the opposite. It was a destruction, it was a ravage. It 
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was like becoming a spirit without a body. And that is what 
happens when I'm inauthentic. 107/ d I . d 1't An exper1ence very 
acutely, because somehow all the sense came together at that moment, 
you see. Like the day to day living of this inauthenticity - I 
could still hang onto other things, and I still had meaning outside 
my inauthenticity which I sort of hung onto, you see. Or perhaps 
not hung onto - ja, which was me. But at that moment there was 
nothing else but the moment. And because the moment was so totally 
inauthentic, I could only experience the fullness of the inauthenti-
city of me. 108/1 could only experience my inauthenticity then, 
I couldn't experience my authenticity, it wasn ' t available for me 
to experience. Because I'd left it behind. I'd left it somewhere 
else, in other parts of my life which I hadn't brought in there. 
I'd only brought inauthenticity into it. If I'd brought in authen-
ticity there (pause) well I couldn't have, because I'd lived the 
inauthenticity so well up to that point. I'm not actually sure 
about that, you know, I can't really work it out at the moment, 
The situation was such which, it was contrived in a way which 
allowed only that part of me which I had actually shared with others 
and revealed to others to emerge. And therefore I experienced my 
mask completely. I didn't experience myself any longer. 10g/The 
ravages of inauthenticity was actually experiencing me as a mask 
completely, without the me behind it, to say, this is a mask. 
R: 110/ . . Could you tell me what followed th1s exper1ence? 
s: Well, it actually upset me quite profoundly, because it was so 
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vivid and dramatic. It was a profoundly upsetting experience. 
It wasn't nice, but it wasn't unpleasant, it was more than that. 
111/It was like, there's something terribly wrong going on with me. 
It was like the experience was saying to me, this is what's going 
wrong with you, now you can fully experience it, but it's like 
happening to you all the time. You're doing something which is 
leading to this sort of experience. That's how I saw it, I 
didn't see it as an isolated event. I knew it was a comment on 
the way I was living. That I knew. Quite clearly. 
R: 112/HOW did you feel immediately after the experience? 
s: I had a tremendous longing to go back to people that I knew, you 
know, to go home. To my wife and my family. And to have my 
friends around me. It was like I needed some reality that I knew. 
That was very strong for me. That was the immediate reaction. 
113/ . But then I settled down - there was l1ke a party afterwards, 
and I could more or less handle it, it was alright. I felt a bit 
strange, you know, I still felt a little bit transparent and I 
still felt a little bit that people weren't trusting me. But then 
those were feelings, I was back in my body. But I was perhaps a 
little bit uncomfortable, after the shock. 
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